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Introduction 
From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: A Transnational Account
1
    
 
On the morning of February 8, 1977, Police Superintendent John Potter and his men 
carefully loaded seven white plastic bags into a police van.  Inside the bags were the bullet-
riddled corpses of seven missionaries who had been stationed at St. Paul’s, a Roman Catholic 
mission in northern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe).  The dead included two Jesuit priests, a 
lay brother, and four nuns of the Dominican order.  The victims ranged in age from 34 to 73.  All 
were white.  According to the sole survivor of the attack, the missionaries had been watching a 
popular British television program when a group of 12 black guerrillas entered the mission, 
herded the missionaries out of the television room, and gunned them down at point-blank range.  
When he learned of the slayings, Archbishop Patrick Chapaika (a Zimbabwean) was beside 
himself.  He described the missionaries as “fine servants of the African people” and denounced 
those who had killed them.  Nor was the Archbishop the only member of the Catholic Church to 
condemn the incident; Pope Paul VI publicly decried it as an act “without reason.”2 
The St. Paul’s massacre appalled many Rhodesians.  For although the colony had been in 
a state of civil war since 1966 (the year after its white-supremacist leaders had broken with the 
British crown in an effort to preserve their privileged position), the guerrillas had previously 
limited their attacks to farmers in remote parts of the country.  Assailing those who monopolized 
                                                          
1
 Terminology can become confusing when writing about Zimbabwean history.  Present-day Zimbabwe has only 
existed since April 1980, when the country achieved independence under majority rule.  Prior to that, the territory 
was known by its colonial name of Rhodesia.  Therefore, when writing about Zimbabwe prior to 1980, I will refer to 
it as Rhodesia.  When writing about events since 1980, I will use the name Zimbabwe.  I will refer to members of 
the white minority as Rhodesians and members of the country’s black majority as Zimbabweans.   
2
 Account based on The Times (of London), “Rhodesians Stunned by Massacre of Seven White Missionaries,” 
February 8, 1977 and New York Times, “Catholic Missions of Rhodesia: A Major Role Since Colonial Era,” 
February 8, 1977, “7 White Missionaries Slain in Raid by Black Guerrillas,” February 8, 1977, and “Pope Calls 
Killing of Missionaries in Rhodesia an Act ‘Without Reason,’” February 14, 1977. 
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the colony’s most arable farmland was one thing, but slaughtering missionaries (a group 
respected by many Zimbabweans for providing education and health care) was quite another.
3
  
As Rhodesian calls for retribution escalated, southern Africa seemed to be headed for an all-out 
race war.  International commentators had been speculating about the possibility of such a 
conflagration since the early-1970s.
4
  By mid-decade, diplomats and journalists alike feared that 
the Rhodesian bush war (known in Africa as the Chimurenga) would drag the entire region into a 
vicious race war, pitting the guerrillas and their allies in the neighboring black states against the 
Rhodesian security forces and their South African allies.  One of the most concerned African 
statesmen was Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who believed that the Chimurenga would 
lead to “a racial…holocaust” unless Rhodesia’s leaders could be brought to accept the principle 
of majority rule in the near future.
5
  On the other side of Africa’s black-white divide, South 
African Prime Minister John Vorster agreed that the bush war had the potential to spill over into 
neighboring countries such as Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa.  While Kaunda and 
Vorster could rarely be found on the same side of any issue, they agreed that an all-out race war 
would have consequences which were simply “too ghastly to contemplate.”6   
Officials in Washington grew increasingly concerned about the Rhodesian crisis as it 
wore on.
7
  By the mid-1970s, many had come to share Kaunda’s concern that the Chimurenga 
                                                          
3
 There had been a similar outcry when reports of Congolese soldiers raping and killing Belgian nuns had leaked out 
in the early 1960s.  See, for instance, New York Times, “Terror in Congo Related by Nuns,” March 14, 1961. 
4
 For US press commentary, see, for instance, Time, “State of Siege,” July 2, 1973, “The Thin White Line,” June 3, 
1974, and “Angola’s Three Troubled Neighbors,” February 16, 1976. 
5
 Letter, Kenneth Kaunda to Lyndon Johnson, January 16, 1968, FA/1/105, National Archives of Zambia (hereafter, 
NAZ).  In fact, Kaunda had long been concerned about the “appalling consequences” that a major racial conflict in 
southern Africa would have.  See, for instance, Record of a Meeting held at State House on 10
 
January 1972 
between his Excellency the President and Ambassador Bush, FA/1/387, NAZ. 
6
 Quoted in Time, “Make Peace or Face War,” March 8, 1976. 
7
 See, for instance, Untitled Memorandum, Robert Komer to Lyndon Johnson, December 6, 1965, Rhodesia folder, 
National Security File (NSF), Files of Edward K. Hamilton, Box 3, Lyndon B. Jonson Presidential Library 
(hereafter, LBJL) and Jeremy Shearar to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, “US State Department’s Views on Africa and 
African Problems,” November 8, 1978, BTS 1/33/8/3, vol. 1, South African Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation Archives (hereafter, SAA). 
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would lead to “a bloodbath” unless it was swiftly resolved.  In addition to their humanitarian 
concerns, US officials feared that a race war in southern Africa would not only enable the Soviet 
Union to gain a foothold in the region but would also exacerbate racial tensions at home.  “If 
there is a race war in [Southern Africa], there will be a race conflict in the United States,” 
predicted one senior US official.  “[R]acial tensions in this country are always just below the 
surface.” 8  Desperate to forestall these possibilities, some of America’s most senior statesmen 
(including George Ball, Henry Kissinger, Andrew Young, and Jimmy Carter) expended 
considerable time and energy trying to facilitate Rhodesia’s transition from white minority rule 
to black majority rule during the 1960s and 1970s.
9
   
In addition to their concerns about a race war, some Americans saw in the Rhodesian 
crisis an opportunity to strike a blow against white rule in southern Africa.  Indeed, many foreign 
policy experts believed that the advent of black majority rule in Rhodesia would resonate 
throughout white-ruled Africa – in effect, triggering a racial “domino effect.”  According to 
former President Jimmy Carter, “At the time, it was clear to everyone that the end of apartheid 
[sic] in Rhodesia would set an example for future action in South Africa.”10  While not everyone 
shared Carter’s belief that the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia would hasten the end of 
minority rule elsewhere in southern Africa, many did.  And in the end, these optimists were 
correct.  For although it did not provide an exact blueprint of how to dismantle apartheid, the 
introduction of majority rule in Rhodesia demonstrated that southern Africa’s white minority 
regimes could no longer expect international acceptance or assistance.  For this reason, it can 
                                                          
8
 In a 1978 interview, another high-ranking US official speculated about what might happen “if televised reports of 
white bloodshed were to enter American living rooms.”  Quoted in Gerald Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun: The 
United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001): 17 and New York Times, “Young Says Africa[n] Race War Would Start One in US,” June 6, 1977.  
9
 Carter has estimated that he spent as much time trying to bring peace to southern Africa during his presidency as 
he did trying to achieve peace in the Middle East.  Jimmy Carter, The White House Diary, (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, Giroux, 2010): 20. 
10
 Carter, White House Diary, 20. 
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hardly be considered a coincidence that shortly after Zimbabwe achieved independence under 
majority rule, Namibia and South Africa (the region’s last remaining white redoubts) came under 
increasing pressure to grant majority rule as well.  In this sense, Zimbabwe’s birth represented a 
pivotal moment in southern Africa’s history – namely, the beginning of the end of white rule.  
Although the results of this process have been far from perfect (as will be demonstrated in the 
epilogue), many expected the transition to black rule to be far more violent than it ultimately 
was. 
Based on the premise that the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis helped to bring white 
rule in southern Africa to a (relatively) peaceful end, this dissertation seeks to answer the 
question: how did Zimbabwe achieve independence under majority rule in April 1980?  For 
while it may now seem clear that white minority rule was on its last legs in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the “inevitable” seemed far less certain at the time.  Whereas previous scholars have examined 
the role that British diplomats and Zimbabwean guerrillas played in facilitating the transition 
from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, this dissertation explores the role that successive US 
administrations played in the search for Zimbabwean independence.
11
  In contrast to historian 
Frederick Cooper, who asserted (only partially tongue-in-cheek) that America’s most significant 
contribution to the decolonization process occurred during World War II, this dissertation 
maintains that the United States played an important role in brokering the agreement which 
                                                          
11
 See, for instance, Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI to Zimbabwe, (London: Pan 
Books, 1981); M. Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonization in Regional and International Politics, 
(London: Frank Cass, 1990); Robin Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa, (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997).  On the guerrilla war, see, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Independence: 
The Chimurenga War, (London: Faber and Faber, 1981); Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War 
in Zimbabwe, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe's Guerilla War: 
Peasant Voices, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  Historian Sue Onslow has written extensively 
about South Africa’s role in the Rhodesian crisis.  Her most important works include: “South Africa and the 
Owen/Vance Plan of 1977,” South African Historical Journal, vol. 51 no. 1 (2004): 130-158; “A Question of 
Timing: South Africa and Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1964-65,” Cold War History, vol. 5, 
no. 2 (2005): 129-159; “‘We Must Gain Time’: South Africa, Rhodesia and the Kissinger Initiative of 1976,” South 
African Historical Journal, vol. 56, no. 1 (2006): 123-153; and “‘Noises Off’: South Africa and the Lancaster House 
Settlement 1979-1980,” Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 2 (2009): 489-506.    
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brought the Rhodesian crisis to an end.
12
  However, it also asserts that America’s Rhodesian 
policy during the 1960s and 1970s was neither consistent nor preordained.  To the contrary, it is 
illustrative of what historian Wilson Miscamble has described as “the complexity, the 
uncertainty, and the sheer messiness of [foreign] policymaking.”13   
Much of the “messiness” in this case stems from the fact that the Rhodesian crisis had 
become a global dilemma by the 1970s – one involving the United Kingdom (the colonial power 
responsible for Rhodesia’s fate according to international law), the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Cuba, and Rhodesia’s neighbors in southern Africa.  While this dissertation focuses 
primarily on the role that the United States played in facilitating the transition from Rhodesia to 
Zimbabwe, it seeks to contextualize America’s role in this process.  Because US officials lacked 
the wherewithal to convince Rhodesia’s white-supremacist leaders to hand over the reins of 
power, they were forced to rely on regional diplomacy to achieve their objective.  As such, their 
room for maneuver was circumscribed by the aspirations and actions of African statesmen, 
guerrillas, and citizens.  By studying the Rhodesian crisis in a transnational context, this 
dissertation sheds new light on the settlement which brought the Chimurenga to an end and 
enabled Robert Mugabe to emerge as Zimbabwe’s first black prime minister. 
   
US-African Relations since 1945: A Brief Historiographical Overview 
This dissertation posits that scholars can learn a great deal about the nature of American 
foreign policy by studying US-African relations.  Until recently, however, few scholars of 
American foreign relations paid much attention to sub-Saharan Africa.  From the 1950s until the 
                                                          
12
 Frederick Cooper, The Past of the Present: Africa Since 1940, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 
134. 
13
 Wilson Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007): xiii. 
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1970s, heavyweights in the field were engaged in a heated debate about the origins of the Cold 
War and the nature of Soviet foreign policy.
14
  Crises and foreign interventions influenced a later 
generation of historians’ choice of subject matter.  Many focused on US policy toward Southeast 
Asia in an effort to understand how the United States had become embroiled in a hot war in 
Vietnam, while others examined American diplomacy toward Western Europe, Latin America, 
and the Middle East.
15
  Sub-Saharan Africa remained little more than an afterthought in this 
literature.  In part, this silence may reflect the fact that the United States exercised little direct 
influence over African affairs in the early postwar years, relying instead on its European allies to 
                                                          
14
 While the literature on the origins of the Cold War is vast, it can broadly be divided into three “schools.”  The first 
is the orthodox school, which alleges that the Soviet Union was responsible for the coming of the Cold War.  
Adherents to the orthodox school claim that Stalin’s refusal to abide by the Yalta agreement and Soviet 
expansionism after World War II left American policymakers with no choice but to assume a hostile stance and 
implement a policy of “containment.”  Two of the more important works of this school are: Herbert Feis, From Trust 
to Terror, The Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950, (New York: Norton, 1970) and Thomas Bailey, America Faces 
Russia: Russian-American Relations from the Early Times to Our Day, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1950).  A second wave of scholars, many of whom reached prominence in the mid-to-late 1960s, questioned the 
necessity of America’s containment policy.  These “revisionists” were more critical of America’s postwar 
diplomacy (particularly its quest for markets) and blamed the United States for the onset of the Cold War.  Among 
the most well-known revisionists works are: William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 
(New York: Dell, 1972); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966, (New York: Wiley, 
1967);  Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the 
American Confrontation with Soviet Power, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, The 
Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); and 
Thomas Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973).  By the mid-1970s, a “post-revisionist” school was beginning to 
emerge.  Post-revisionists argued that both the United States and the Soviet Union bore some of the blame for the 
Cold War – although they tended to see the Soviets as more culpable than the Americans.  See, for instance, John 
Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1972) and Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the 
Cold War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
15
 The literature on Vietnam is also extremely vast.  For a sampling, see George Herring, America’s Longest War: 
The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, (New York: Wiley, 1979); Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The 
Americanization of the War in Vietnam, (New York: Norton, 1982); Thomas McCormick, America’s Half-Century: 
United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); 
Frederick Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999); Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's 
Most Disastrous Military Conflict, (New York: Free Press, 1999); and Robert McNamara, James Blight, and Robert 
Brigham, Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, (New York: Public Affairs, 1999).  
7 
 
do so.  Yet it probably also reflects the fact that an earlier generation of historians tended to 
regard sub-Saharan Africa as little more than a backwater.
16
 
In recent years, however, the pendulum has begun to swing.  The trauma of the Vietnam 
War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the developing world have 
prompted some historians to question whether the US-Soviet confrontation was really the most 
significant development of the post-World War II era.
17
  In their search for a new grand 
narrative, some scholars have zeroed in on the end of European colonialism.  In 2001, for 
instance, historian Thomas Borstelmann suggested that, “In retrospect, the conflict between the 
great powers of the Northern Hemisphere after 1945 distracted attention from the period’s 
perhaps more significant long-term development: the emergence of the world’s non-white 
majority from white colonial rule into national independence.”18  It was a bold statement at the 
time, but if the recent spate of books and articles about the decolonization process is any 
                                                          
16
 So, too, did many US officials and politicians.  See, for instance, William Thom, African Wars: A Defense 
Intelligence Perspective, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2010): 27-44. 
17
 For instance, in 2010, historian Odd Arne Westad urged scholars “to place the Cold War in the larger context of 
chronological time and geographical space, within the web that ties the never-ending threads of history together.  
First and foremost,” Westad maintained, this meant situating the Cold War “within the wider history of the twentieth 
century in a global perspective.”  Such a call contrasts sharply with a 1998 historiographical work which began by 
confidently asserting that, “The Cold War was the defining event of the second half of the twentieth century.”  Other 
scholars have been even more adamant.  In a 2012 review, historian Akira Iriye questioned whether the Cold War 
still deserves “to be studied seriously.”  In noting that a younger generation of scholars has increasingly turned its 
attention to topics such as globalization, decolonization, human rights, and the environment, Iriye asserted, “It is 
becoming less and less fashionable to focus on the Cold War as the main drama in the history of the world after 
World War II.”  Westad, “The Cold War and the International History of the 20th Century,” in eds. Melvyn Leffler 
and Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 2; 
Michael Kort, The Columbia Guide to the Cold War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 3; and Iriye, 
“Review of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed., The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991,” in “The American Historical 
Review,” vol. 117, no. 1 (Feb. 2012): 175-76.    
18
 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 2001): 6.  Historian Philip Muehlenbeck has recently echoed the 
Borstelmann line.  Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist 
Leaders, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): xv-xvi. 
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indication, Borstelmann is not alone in his belief that the end of European colonial rule was 
indeed the defining geopolitical event of the second half of the 20
th
 century.
19
   
While historians of American foreign relations have examined the decolonization process 
in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia, the history of African decolonization has proven to 
be of particular interest – in no small part because it has allowed scholars to examine some of the 
ways in which changing conceptions of “race” have affected the American foreign policymaking 
process.
20
  Within the subfield of US-African relations, the search for Zimbabwean independence 
has attracted relatively little attention.  Only two historians have devoted monographs to 
America’s role in this process, and neither of these is entirely satisfactory.  Using race as his 
primary means of analysis, Gerald Horne has written about the ways in which white Americans 
attempted to thwart Zimbabwe’s transition to majority rule.21  While Horne demonstrates that 
some white Southerners did regard the Rhodesians’ struggle against black majority rule as 
analogous to their own struggle against the Civil Rights Movement, he overlooks the fact that US 
                                                          
19
 See, for instance, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, eds., The End 
of the Cold War and the Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict, (New York: Routledge, 2011); Sue Onslow, 
ed., Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, (New York: Routledge 2009); Prosser Gifford 
and William Roger Louis, eds., The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1982); Gifford and Louis, eds., Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of 
Power, 1960-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); R.F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981: 
An Introductory Survey, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985); and Frederick Cooper, The Past of the Present. 
20
 See, for instance, Thomas Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 
1948-1968, (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985); Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line; 
Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans; and Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 
1959-1976, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).  Some of the most prominent works on 
how “race” has influenced US-African relations include: Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans 
and US Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Penny von 
Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937-1957, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996); Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for 
Human Rights, 1944-1955, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kevin Gaines, American Africans in 
Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and 
Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W.E.B. DuBois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944-1963, 
(Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1986).  Some new and promising work examines the role that 
African Americans played in the anti-apartheid struggle.  See, for instance, Ryan Irwin, “The Gordian Knot: 
Apartheid & the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, 1960-1970,” PhD Dissertation, Ohio State University 
(2010) and Eric Morgan, “Into the Struggle: Confronting Apartheid in the United States and South Africa,” PhD 
Dissertation, University of Colorado (2009). 
21
 Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun. 
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officials consistently supported the Zimbabweans’ demand for majority rule – even if this 
support was often more rhetorical than material.  Andrew DeRoche comes closer to the mark, but 
by focusing too narrowly on US diplomacy, he overstates America’s ability to affect change in 
southern Africa.
22
  By contrast, this dissertation employs a more transnational approach to show 
that American efforts to mediate the Rhodesian crisis were important but by no means decisive.  
Drawing on recently-declassified archival materials from southern Africa, the United States, and 
the United Kingdom, this dissertation maintains that the process by which Zimbabwe achieved 
its independence was messy and inexact.  If the outcome was something that few had expected, 
this was because the final settlement reflected a compromise between African and Western 
interests, both of which were constantly evolving in response to shifting circumstances. 
 
Project Overview 
This dissertation has five chapters.  Chapter One examines Zambian President Kenneth 
Kaunda's response to the Rhodesian crisis.  It argues that between 1965 and 1974, Kaunda tried – 
and ultimately failed – to convince friendly nations such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States to support the Zimbabweans in their quest for majority rule.  This chapter is among the 
first works to use African archival materials to chronicle an African nation’s response to the 
unfolding Rhodesian crisis.  It attempts to show that although their initiatives did not always bear 
fruit, black Africans were hardly passive spectators in the Rhodesian crisis.  Fuelled by a 
combination of geostrategic concerns and pan-African solidarity, Kaunda elected to support the 
Zimbabwean people rather than merely allowing events to take their course.   
                                                          
22
 Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998, (Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World Press Inc., 2001). 
10 
 
Chapter Two examines the efforts of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to mediate 
the Rhodesian crisis in 1976.  It argues that in the aftermath of his disastrous foray into the 
Angolan civil war, Kissinger (who hoped to snuff out any further opportunities for Soviet and 
Cuban involvement in southern Africa) made considerable progress in his efforts to defuse the 
Rhodesian crisis.  In this respect, Chapter Two demonstrates an instance in which Cold War 
considerations prompted US officials to champion black majority rule.  Previous studies have 
asserted that Kissinger’s overt sympathy for southern Africa’s white populations ultimately 
undermined his efforts to play peacemaker.  This chapter does not dispute the claim that 
Kissinger had little faith in black Africans’ capacity for self-governance.  Nevertheless, it 
maintains that the so-called “Kissinger initiative” failed primarily because neither the Rhodesian 
leaders nor the Zimbabwean guerrillas were willing to accept a compromise settlement at the 
time.  Henry Kissinger certainly had his shortcomings, but it seems unlikely that the Rhodesian 
protagonists would have accepted a negotiated settlement in 1976 regardless of who had 
brokered it.  
Chapter Three examines US President Jimmy Carter and British Prime Minister James 
Callaghan’s joint effort to mediate the Rhodesian crisis in 1977.  It argues that Carter’s policies 
toward sub-Saharan Africa reflected his desire to move beyond the “Cold War orthodoxy” and 
conduct a foreign policy based on a concern for human rights.  While many scholars have 
applauded Carter for attempting to move beyond the containment policy that had driven 
American diplomacy since the late-1940s, this chapter demonstrates the limitations of Carter’s 
more moralistic approach to foreign policy.  It may have earned him the respect of some 
influential African leaders, but it failed to bring the Rhodesian crisis any closer to resolution.  
This chapter also seeks to shed light on the so-called “special relationship” between the United 
11 
 
Kingdom and the United States.  Examining the Carter-Callaghan initiative through this lens, 
Chapter Three concludes that the Anglo-American partnership was more “functional” than it was 
“special.” 
Chapter Four shows how African actors circumscribed the possibilities open to Western 
officials in 1978 and 1979.  After the collapse of the Anglo-American Proposals, the Rhodesian 
leaders entered into an ostensibly multiracial alliance with a handful of "moderate" Zimbabwean 
nationalists in an effort to preserve as much white privilege as possible.  This chapter focuses on 
the countervailing pressures that Jimmy Carter faced as he tried to decide whether or not to 
recognize the "internal settlement."  It focuses primarily on the lobbying efforts of African and 
African American leaders, concluding that these pressures – along with Carter's fears that 
recognizing the "internal settlement" would encourage the Soviets and Cubans to become more 
directly involved in supporting the Zimbabwean guerrillas – fueled his decision not to recognize 
the hybrid regime in Salisbury.  While many accounts treat Carter’s decision as a foregone 
conclusion, this chapter seeks to restore a sense of historical contingency. 
Chapter Five returns to the issue of African agency, focusing on the ways in which 
African and Commonwealth pressure forced British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to 
abandon her initial plans to recognize the "internal settlement" and to instead try for a settlement 
that included the co-leaders of the guerrilla forces: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo.  Chapter 
Five also examines the Lancaster House negotiations, which paved the way for Zimbabwe to 
achieve independence under majority rule.  Much of the previous scholarship on the Lancaster 
House negotiations has focused on the diplomacy of British Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington.   
While this chapter maintains that Carrington played his hand skillfully, it also argues that his 
importance should not be overstated.  Carrington was able to set up the framework for a 
12 
 
successful conference, but African leaders such as Samora Machel of Mozambique, Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia played a crucial role in convincing 
Mugabe and Nkomo to negotiate in good faith.   
The epilogue deals briefly with Zimbabwe’s history after independence.  It argues against 
reading history backwards.  For, although the country is in dire straits at the moment, many 
Zimbabweans saw their standard of living improve dramatically in the years after independence.  
Moreover, although Mugabe is now demonized in the West for his human rights violations and 
disastrous economic policies, he was initially praised for ensuring that white-owned farms 
remained intact and opting not to nationalize key sectors of the economy.  It was only in the late-
1990s and 2000s (when the country turned in a more autocratic direction) that relations between 
Zimbabwe and the West began to sour. 
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Chapter One 
The Limits of African Influence: Kenneth Kaunda and the Rhodesian Crisis, 1964-1974 
 
 1964 was a year of exhilaration for the citizens of Northern Rhodesia.  After months of 
negotiations, the British colony was set to join the international community as the sovereign state 
of Zambia.  Unlike many African countries which emerged in the 1960s, international observers 
were bullish about Zambia’s prospects.  With its rich copper deposits and modest population, 
there was reason to believe that it would succeed where so many other African nations had 
failed.
23
  But perhaps the greatest cause for optimism was Zambia’s leader, President Kenneth 
Kaunda.  A devout Christian who had rubbed shoulders with the likes of Mohandas Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King Junior, Kaunda desperately wanted to improve the quality of life for all 
Zambians, black and white alike.  He electrified crowds with his vision of a peaceful and 
prosperous nation in which “people of all tribes, races, beliefs and opinions…will be able to live 
happily and in harmony.”24  Indeed, it was this desire to build a multiracial society that made 
Kaunda a media darling throughout the Western world.  With the price of copper booming and 
with Kaunda at the helm, Zambia’s future seemed so bright in the heady days preceding 
independence that some pundits dubbed the soon-to-be-nation “Africa’s second chance.”25   
                                                          
23
See, for instance, Chicago Defender, “Zambia To Be ‘Free’ Saturday,” October 24, 1964; New York Times, “The 
Future Zambia,” May 20, 1964; and New York Times, “Copper is King in Newest African Republic,” October 24, 
1964.   
24
 Quoted in Time Magazine, “Zambia: Tomorrow the Moon,” October 30, 1964.  For more on Kaunda’s desire for 
greater US involvement in southern Africa, see Andrew DeRoche, “Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia 
and the USA, 1964-1968,” Cold War History, vol. 7, no. 2 (May 2007): 227-250 and “Dreams and Disappointments: 
Kenneth Kaunda and the United States, 1960-64,” Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies, vol. 
9, no. 4 (October 2008): 369-394.  For the US government’s views on Kaunda, see, for instance, Memorandum, 
Dean Rusk to Lyndon Johnson, “Your Meeting with President Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia,” November 28, 
1964, Zambia: Kaunda Visit: 11/30-12/2/64 folder, NSF Country File, Box 102, Lyndon Johnson Presidential 
Library (hereafter LBJL). 
25
 Quoted in Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South, (New York: Africana 
Publishing Company, 1970): 67. 
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 On October 24, 1964, 73 years of British colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia came to an 
end.  According to contemporary reports, nearly 40,000 spectators representing more than 60 
nations packed into Independence Stadium, where traditional dancers clad in lion skins 
performed to the rhythm of pounding drums and blaring horns.  At midnight, a hush fell over the 
crowd.  The lights were dimmed, and the Union Jack was lowered for the final time.  When the 
lights came back on, the Zambian flag fluttered in its place.  Fireworks exploded, and a wave of 
jubilation swept across the nation.  Cries of “kwacha” (meaning “freedom”) reverberated 
throughout the stadium and throughout the country.  Even Zambia’s white population seemed to 
accept the moment with tranquility, displaying “an equanimity and readiness to accept black rule 
not found in any other British territory in Africa.”  All things considered, it was an auspicious 
start for Africa’s 36th sovereign nation.26   
 Approximately 250 miles south of the Zambian capital of Lusaka, the mood was far less 
exuberant.  The 250,000 white settlers in Southern Rhodesia (known simply as Rhodesia after 
Zambian independence) abhorred the idea of majority rule.  To them, it meant ethnic violence, 
rampant corruption, and economic mismanagement.  They were therefore determined to prevent 
their colony from following in Zambia’s footsteps.  Since the election of the white-supremacist 
Rhodesian Front in December 1962, there had been whispers that the Rhodesians were prepared 
to seize independence from Great Britain if the British continued to insist that the colony’s four 
million black inhabitants be given greater political and economic rights.  These whispers grew 
louder when the Rhodesian Front jettisoned Prime Minister Winston Field in favor of Finance 
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Minister Ian Smith.
27
  A hardliner who drew inspiration from such right-wing organizations as 
the John Birch Society in the United States, Smith’s ascension to the prime ministership in April 
1964 raised concerns that a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) was imminent.
28
  Some 
observers even predicted that Smith was planning to break with the British on the very day 
Zambia was slated to receive its independence.  Although such forecasts proved inaccurate, 
Smith and his ministers did nothing to allay suspicions that a unilateral declaration of 
independence was in the offing.  Most international observers believed it was only a matter of 
time before the Rhodesians took the plunge, and, indeed, on November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian 
Front unilaterally broke with the British crown. 
 This was the background against which Kenneth Kaunda and his United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) assumed power. The joy of achieving nationhood was tempered by 
the foreboding developments south of the Zambezi River.  As Kaunda and his ministers set to 
work attempting to forge Zambia’s 72 ethnic groups into one nation, they also had to consider 
how they would respond if the Rhodesians broke with Britain in an effort to preserve white 
privilege.  Could they afford to take a principled stand on behalf of Rhodesia’s black majority?  
Or would their nation’s vulnerability to Rhodesian reprisals compel Zambia’s leaders to stand by 
as the settlers attempted to stem “the wind of change?”   
Viewing the Rhodesian crisis through the eyes of policymakers in Lusaka, this chapter 
will argue that Kaunda and his cabinet colleagues opted for a policy of principled pragmatism, 
endeavoring to bring about a swift resolution of the Rhodesian crisis while simultaneously trying 
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Country File, Box 97, LBJL. 
28
 For more on the connection between the Rhodesian Front’s ideology and right-wing organizations in the US, see 
Michael Evans, “The Role of Ideology in Rhodesian Front Rule,” D. Phil dissertation, University of Western 
Australia, 1993.  For a more sympathetic view of Smith, see J.R.T Wood, So Far and No Further!  Rhodesia’s Bid 
for Independence during the Retreat from Empire, 1959-1965, (Victoria, British Columbia: Trafford, 2005). 
16 
 
to avoid being sucked into a military or economic confrontation with Ian Smiths’ regime.  
Zambia’s leaders clearly understood that they lacked the clout to force Smith and his followers to 
grant majority rule.  They therefore called upon the United Kingdom (the colonial power 
responsible for Rhodesia’s fate according to international law) to defuse the crisis.  When the 
British proved unequal to the task, the Zambians sought to enlist the United States in the search 
for Zimbabwean independence.  Unfortunately, neither the Johnson Administration nor the 
Nixon Administration was willing to fulfill this role.  It was only after southern Africa became a 
Cold War arena in the mid-1970s that US officials began to reconsider their nation’s role in the 
region.  Thus, while this chapter will argue that the Zambians displayed a degree of agency in 
seeking to convince sympathetic foreign powers to defuse the Rhodesian crisis before it spiraled 
out of control, it will also seek to demonstrate the limitations of that agency.  Zambian officials 
could plead and cajole all they wanted, but until Soviet and Cuban troops began arriving in 
southern Africa, they were unable to convince their counterparts in London and Washington to 
take decisive action against the Rhodesian rebels. 
 
The Zambian Response to UDI  
Although the Rhodesian Front’s unilateral declaration of independence was condemned 
throughout black Africa, no country was more alarmed by this development than Zambia. For 
whereas many Africans regarded UDI as an existential threat, Kenneth Kaunda and his cabinet 
colleagues saw it as a threat to their nation’s very existence.  Their concern is evidenced by the 
fact that Zambian representatives abroad reported on little else in their dispatches to Lusaka in 
the months leading up to November 11, 1965.  Whether stationed in Washington or Moscow, 
London or Dar es Salaam, Zambian diplomats dedicated the overwhelming majority of their 
17 
 
correspondences to predicting how the nation to which they had been accredited was likely to 
react if Ian Smith and his followers broke with the British.
29
       
The Zambians’ most immediate concern was that Smith’s regime would seek to smother their 
economy if the international community tried to snuff out Rhodesia’s “independence.”30  Such 
fears were well-founded since Zambia’s location and colonial inheritance left the fledgling 
nation in an extremely vulnerable position.  At independence, Kaunda and his UNIP colleagues 
had inherited an economy dependent on copper exports.  Unfortunately for Kaunda and his 
countrymen, Zambia was a landlocked nation, and the only rail route to the sea passed through 
the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury.  This arrangement had worked well enough during the 
colonial era, but as tensions between the Zambian and Rhodesian governments escalated, 
policymakers in Lusaka quickly realized that a hostile regime in Salisbury could easily isolate 
their nation from the outside world.  Zambia’s allies arrived at similar conclusions.  As one 
American official noted, Smith’s regime could “quickly bring the modern economy of Zambia to 
a halt” by refusing to allow Zambian imports and exports to pass through Rhodesia.31  Doing so 
would have entailed a fairly substantial loss of revenue for the Rhodesians, but few observers 
doubted that Smith would resort to such a ploy if the international community attempted to drive 
his regime from power.  
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Equally foreboding was the fact that Zambia was almost completely dependent on Rhodesia 
for its energy needs.  Its coal came from the Wankie colliery in Rhodesia, while its oil passed 
through a pipeline that ran through Rhodesia.  Further adding to the Zambians’ plight was the 
fact that the colonial regime had built the Kariba hydroelectric power station, which supplied 
electricity to much of southern and central Zambia (including Lusaka and the Copperbelt region), 
on the southern banks of the Zambezi River.  Zambia’s energy dependence meant that Smith’s 
regime could effectively paralyze its northern neighbor by terminating the northward flow of 
coal, oil, and electricity.
32
  Depriving Zambia of power for even 72 hours would have caused the 
nation’s copper mines to flood, ruining its economic prospects and depriving the West of a vital 
source of the strategically-important mineral.
33
  While the Rhodesian Front had refrained from 
using this leverage at the time of UDI, there was nothing to guarantee that Smith would not turn 
the screws at some point in the future.  To the contrary, he had given every indication that he 
would retaliate against Zambia if the international community threatened his regime.
34
   
Additional threats emerged as the Zambian government and its allies began their contingency 
planning.  Chief among their concerns was the possibility of a Rhodesian invasion.
35
  Not only 
was the Rhodesian military better-equipped and better-trained than its Zambian counterpart, but 
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the fact that the Zambian military was led by white officers raised doubts about its loyalty in the 
event of a Rhodesian attack.
36
  Policymakers in Lusaka also feared that the Rhodesians’ 
unilateral declaration of independence would unleash a wave of racial unrest in Zambia.
37
  Not 
only were such tensions likely to thwart Kaunda’s goal of establishing a multiracial society, but 
they also threatened to undermine the Zambian civil service and economy, both of which, like 
the army, were reliant on a small cadre of whites whose loyalties remained uncertain.  With their 
nation’s physical security, economic prosperity, and racial harmony potentially in jeopardy, it is 
no wonder that Zambian officials became increasingly alarmed by the storm clouds gathering 
over southern Africa in 1964 and 1965. 
Despite his nation’s precarious position, Kaunda assumed a fairly hardline stance against the 
Rhodesian Front – a decision which, at first glance, may seem puzzling.  The President was more 
cognizant of his nation’s vulnerability to Rhodesian reprisals than anyone, so why would he risk 
provoking the rebel regime?  The question remains unresolved, although scholars have proffered 
several compelling hypotheses.  Previous works have stressed Kaunda’s dedication to his own 
brand of “humanism,” a philosophy which emphasized non-racialism and equality.38  His 
admirers contend that Kaunda felt a near-messianic calling to eradicate racial oppression in 
southern Africa, and, for this reason, have posited that Kaunda’s abhorrence of racial 
discrimination shaped his response to the Rhodesian crisis.
39
  Other scholars have noted that the 
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Zambian President was under pressure from elements within his own party and from abroad to 
take an uncompromising stand against the white-supremacist regime in Salisbury.
40
  Less 
charitably, at least one scholar has suggested that the President hoped to use the Rhodesian crisis 
as an excuse to consolidate his power and clamp down on internal dissidents.
41
  While it is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to determine Kenneth Kaunda’s exact motivations, it seems 
likely that all of these factors contributed to his decision to stand firm against the Rhodesian 
Front in spite of the obvious risks involved.   
Having decided to oppose the rebels, Kaunda and his advisers sought to determine the 
most effective way of defusing the Rhodesian crisis.  Whereas the British favored imposing 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia, Zambian officials doubted that such measures would 
succeed in bringing down the Rhodesian Front. They assumed that Portugal (the colonial power 
in Mozambique and Angola) and apartheid South Africa would refuse to comply, thereby 
rendering sanctions hopelessly ineffective.
42
   Instead of relying on economic coercion, Kaunda 
and his ministers insisted that the British use military force to crush the Rhodesian uprising.  In 
this respect, Zambia’s position mirrored that of many other African nations, several of which had 
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been clamoring for the British to “fulfill their colonial responsibilities” in Rhodesia for some 
time.
43
   
Kaunda and his advisers were realists, however, and they refused to countenance any course 
of action that seemed likely to unleash a major racial conflagration.  The Zambians were 
particularly concerned about how the South African government (the dominant military and 
economic power in the region) would respond to any attempt to unseat the white regime on its 
northern border.  Thus, while the Zambian government believed that only a military intervention 
could defuse the Rhodesian crisis in a timely fashion, Kaunda and his ministers were adamant 
that only the British (the colonial power responsible for Rhodesia’s fate) could undertake such an 
endeavor without provoking the South Africans.  As the Zambian High Commissioner to 
London, S.C. Katilungu, reported shortly after UDI, “[O]ur tactics and pressures should now be 
directed at committing the British Government to the use of military force.”  Katilungu noted 
that he had “singled out Britain and not any other power or groups of allies” because the 
deployment of British troops to Rhodesia would be less likely to provoke the South Africans 
than if the United Nations (UN) or the newly-established Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
spearheaded the invasion.
44
  The Zambian Undersecretary of State argued along similar lines 
when he opined that sending UN or OAU forces into Rhodesia was all but certain to ignite a 
wider war – “whereas if Britain sends troops, the situation would be very different.”45  For this 
reason, Zambian emissaries refused to join Egypt, Ghana, and Ethiopia in calling for Africans to 
take matters into their own hands.  Instead, they looked the British for leadership.
46
  Viewed in 
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this light, the Zambian response to UDI was hardly the knee-jerk reaction that some foreign 
policy experts deemed it to be.  The Rhodesian rebellion posed a grave threat to Zambia’s 
national security, and Kenneth Kaunda and his ministers recognized that they could not reverse 
UDI by themselves.  They concluded that a British military intervention offered the best hope of 
defusing he Rhodesian crisis before it spiraled out of control. 
 
“Satisfying No One:” Britain’s Response to UDI 
However reasonable this policy may have seemed to officials in Lusaka, it soon became 
apparent that the British government had no intention of using military force in Rhodesia.  Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson was dead set against the idea and said so publicly.  “If there are those in 
this country who are thinking in terms of a thunderbolt,
 
hurtling through the sky and destroying 
their enemy, a thunderbolt
 
in the shape of the Royal Air Force, let me say that this thunderbolt
 
will not be coming,” Wilson announced on October 30, 1965.47  The Prime Minister was even 
more direct in an interview he gave the following evening, declaring that Her Majesty’s 
Government “do not believe this problem can be solved by force.”48  While many throughout the 
Commonwealth (including some members of his own party) regarded Wilson’s statement as a 
shameful abrogation of British responsibility, it merely reflected what his government had been 
saying in private for some time.
49
  Indeed, while recently-declassified documents at the British 
National Archives fail to reveal the exact date when military intervention in Rhodesia was ruled 
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out, they tend to substantiate one former member of the Commonwealth Relations Office’s 
assertion that, “From the beginning, there was really no likelihood that Harold Wilson was going 
to use force in Rhodesia.”50  
There were many reasons for the British government’s reluctance to embark on a military 
adventure in Rhodesia.  These included: the logistical difficulties involved in transporting up to 
two divisions of troops to southern Africa, concerns about the domestic ramifications of British 
soldiers fighting against their “kith and kin” in Rhodesia, and fears that a war in southern Africa 
would adversely affect the British economy.  Historians have spent the past 45 years trying to 
determine which of these factors weighed most heavily on ministers’ minds when they decided 
to rule out the use of force in Rhodesia, but for the purposes of this dissertation, it is unnecessary 
to delve into this ongoing debate.
51
  It is sufficient to note that while British officials opposed the 
use of force in Rhodesia, they understood that they would have to undertake some action in order 
to minimize the damage that UDI was bound to have on Britain’s relations with the newly-
independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa.  Their response was to ask the United Nations 
Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.  The Security Council agreed 
that the Rhodesian crisis constituted a threat to international peace and instructed member 
nations to embargo the colony’s major export crops: tobacco, sugar, and chromium.  Member 
states were also instructed to stop supplying the colony with oil and military equipment.  In a 
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phrase that would come back to haunt him, Wilson predicted that these measures would bring 
down Smith’s regime “in a matter of weeks rather than months.”52   
Historians have roundly condemned Wilson for his handling of the Rhodesian crisis.  
Some have castigated the Prime Minister for implementing sanctions despite the fact that few 
economists believed they would bring Smith’s regime to its knees – much less in a matter of 
“weeks rather than months.”53  Others have seen Wilson’s sanctions policy as a cynical ploy 
designed to appease African nations and prevent the Commonwealth from unraveling.
54
  In 
reality, Wilson’s sanctions policy represented an effort to steer a middle course between the 
Scylla of military intervention and the Charybdis of passive quiescence.  Viewed in this light, the 
policy is hardly worthy of some of the more savage criticism it has received.  It succeeded in 
holding the Commonwealth together (no mean feat given the vitriolic rhetoric coming out of 
Africa in the weeks following UDI) and left the door open for Smith to negotiate a “return to 
legality.”55  Given Wilson’s belief in the Commonwealth ideal, his pacifistic nature, his party’s 
slim majority in the House of Commons, and Britain’s diminished global position in the wake of 
the Suez debacle, it is unrealistic to have expected the Prime Minister to undertake a bolder 
initiative.     
Wilson’s sanctions policy may have averted an open Commonwealth revolt, but his 
refusal to send troops to Rhodesia soured London’s relations with countries throughout the 
developing world.  Tanzanian Prime Minister Julius Nyerere and Ghanaian President Kwame 
Nkrumah were among the most vocal critics of Britain’s flaccid response to the Rhodesian crisis.  
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Both leaders severed ties with the United Kingdom in the aftermath of UDI.
56
  Meanwhile, 
London’s relations with many other African nations (most notably Nigeria and Sierra Leone) 
declined precipitously when it became clear that the British were unwilling to impose majority 
rule at gunpoint.
57
  Nations outside of Africa were also unhappy with Harold Wilson’s handling 
of the Rhodesian crisis, as evidenced by their critical remarks in the United Nation General 
Assembly and at the 1965 and 1966 Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings.
58
  
But no government was more dismayed by Wilson’s response to the Rhodesian crisis 
than was Zambia’s.  As previously noted, Zambian leaders believed that South African and 
Portuguese non-compliance would render sanctions ineffective and maintained that only the use 
of force would bring the Rhodesians to heel.  More than one Zambian official accused Harold 
Wilson of operating in bad faith, alleging that he and his cabinet colleagues were more interested 
in placating members of the Commonwealth and the OAU than they were in defending the rights 
of Rhodesia’s black majority.59  The Zambians only reluctantly agreed to curtail their trade with 
Rhodesia – and this was done less out of any conviction that sanctions would succeed than in the 
hope that the British would be compelled to dispatch troops to Rhodesia once sanctions had 
failed to topple Ian Smith’s regime.60 
Relations between the United Kingdom and Zambia further deteriorated as the Rhodesian 
crisis wore on.  “It is nearly two years since UDI was proclaimed,” Zambian official G.B. 
Silwizya noted in a dispatch to Lusaka.  “Up to date, it still survives.  The reason is that Britain 
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has shamefully and disappointingly failed to assert her authority over Rhodesia.”61  Because 
Zambian officials erroneously believed that the majority of Labourites favored military 
intervention in Rhodesia, they focused their ire on Harold Wilson.
62
  Such misperceptions were 
fuelled by reports that the Zimbabwean cause enjoyed widespread support throughout the United 
Kingdom.  In one such report, Silwizya described the pro-African statements made by many of 
the speakers at the 1966 Labour Party Annual Conference.  “The way in which [the] speeches 
were delivered from the floor would lead one to think that [the] speakers were Africans from 
Zimbabwe and not Britons.  The impression [one] got was that the ordinary British Labour Party 
supporter is committed to crushing the rebellion but it is his Government which lacks the will 
and power to do so.”63  Pro-Zimbabwe bumper stickers and press reports reinforced this 
impression.
64
  Thus, as Zambian officials saw it, Harold Wilson was the chief impediment to a 
swift and just resolution of the Rhodesian crisis.  Even worse, many in the Zambian government 
suspected that Wilson’s aversion to the use force was racially motivated.  After all, Britain had 
dispatched troops to help put down mutinies in the predominantly-black countries of Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Kenya only two years earlier.  Why, then, would Wilson refuse to send troops to 
Rhodesia – except for his concern about how stories of British troops slaughtering their own 
“kith and kin” would be received by the British public?65 
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Despite Wilson’s obstinacy, Kaunda persisted in his efforts to prod his British 
counterpart into action.  The Zambian President threatened to sever his country’s ties with the 
United Kingdom unless Britain drove the Rhodesian Front from power.
66
  Kaunda also 
threatened to withdraw Zambia’s sterling reserves from British banks, a measure which would 
have placed tremendous pressure on sterling at a moment when the British economy was 
particularly vulnerable.
67
  When these ploys failed to produce the desired result, Kaunda 
spearheaded a movement to toss the United Kingdom out of the Commonwealth unless the 
British fulfilled their “colonial responsibilities” in Rhodesia.68  By this time, however, it was 
more apparent than ever that military intervention was not in the cards.  In 1967, Wilson’s 
government was forced to devalue the pound.  Continued economic woes forced the Prime 
Minister to withdraw from Britain’s position “East of Suez” the following year.  Both of these 
actions represented political and personal setbacks for Wilson, who had come to office 
determined to preserve what remained of Britain’s position as a world power.69  During this 
period of retrenchment, there was little chance of Britain embarking on a military adventure 
against a well-armed foe in southern Africa.   
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Britain’s failure to come to the aid of Rhodesia’s black majority caused Kenneth Kaunda 
to lose faith in “perfidious Albion.”70  Having concluded that Harold Wilson was either 
unwilling or unable to douse the Rhodesian flames, the Zambian President cast about for 
alternatives.  Seeking to capitalize on the ongoing struggle between the United States and Soviet 
Union, he sent out feelers to Washington and Moscow in the hopes that one of the superpowers 
would be able to succeed where Britain had failed.  Zambian officials were split on this decision.  
The Zambian Ambassador to Moscow urged Kaunda to use caution in dealing with the 
Americans and the Soviets.  “He who sups with the devil needs a long spoon,” the Ambassador 
warned, noting that the adage was “pertinent to our relations with both power blocs.”71  
Conversely, the Acting Zambian High Commissioner to London applauded his President’s 
decision to appeal to the superpowers.  “This is no longer the time to be playing to the gallery,” 
he opined “since we have now come face to face with the stark-naked realities of the situation.”72  
Kaunda decided to press ahead, and from 1968 onward, Zambian officials concentrated on trying 
to persuade the Americans and the Soviets to use their influence to force Ian Smith and his 
followers to relinquish power. 
 
The Johnson Administration and Rhodesia: “Keeping as far away as we could” 
On December 15, 1965, Zambian officials announced their government’s intention to 
dispatch high-ranking emissaries to Washington and Moscow.
73
  While envoys were sent to both 
capitals, this was done primarily to maintain the appearance of Zambian non-alignment.  In 
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reality, Kaunda coveted US assistance.  The Soviets’ decision to join some of the OAU’s more 
militant members in calling for an African force to liberate Zimbabwe raised hackles in Lusaka 
as early as December 1965.
74
  Since the Zambians believed an OAU-led invasion would ignite a 
race war in southern Africa, they concluded that the Soviets either did not understand southern 
African realities or – more likely – were exploiting the Rhodesian crisis in order to improve their 
standing with some of Africa’s more “radical” leaders.  Zambian officials also resented Soviet 
efforts to pressure them into quitting the Commonwealth and cutting ties with the United 
Kingdom when it became clear that Harold Wilson did not intend to use force to quell the 
Rhodesian rebellion.  To policymakers in Lusaka, these actions represented affronts to Zambian 
independence and reinforced their fears that the Kremlin was seeking to turn Zambia into a 
Soviet satellite.
75
  These developments, combined with Moscow’s refusal to offer any concrete 
assistance in the immediate aftermath of UDI, bolstered Kaunda’s preference to work with the 
Americans.   
In many respects, these tensions mirrored the Soviet Union’s inability to gain a foothold 
in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1960s.  This failure can be partially attributed to the Soviets’ 
staggering ignorance about African affairs during the 1940s and 1950s.  According to historians 
Christopher Andrew and Vasali Mitrokhin, it was not until 1960 that the KGB established a 
department dedicated to African issues.  Prior to this, Soviet policymakers had seen little more 
than “a blank sheet of paper” when they gazed at maps of Africa.76  As relative latecomers to the 
African scene, the Soviets had not been in a position to offer substantial assistance to the first 
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wave of liberation movements during the 1940s and 1950s.  What limited support they did 
provide earned little gratitude from nationalistic leaders like Kenneth Kaunda, who claimed that 
“the communist[s’] offer of help in the freedom struggle was so belated that it was like throwing 
a lifebelt to a swimmer in difficulty just as he drags himself to shore.”77  Most African leaders 
who had achieved independence without Soviet assistance remained wary of Marxism, which 
they regarded as “a subtle and debilitating form of colonial domination which can carve up 
Africa as effectively as anything achieved by the Great Powers in the late nineteenth century.”78  
Even the few African leaders who received substantial aid from Moscow sought to keep the 
Soviets and their ideology at arm’s length.79 
This coolness was one reason why the Kremlin’s interest in sub-Saharan Africa waned in 
the 1960s.  Another factor was the change in leadership that occurred in Moscow in 1964, when 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was deposed in favor of Leonid Brezhnev.  Whereas 
Khrushchev had believed that the Cold War would be won in the developing world, Brezhnev 
had little interest in the global periphery.  Chastened by their lack of success in sub-Saharan 
Africa, many high-ranking officials in the Soviet Foreign Service had come to share this 
sentiment.  As Moscow’s longtime Ambassador to Washington, Anatoli Dobrynin, later recalled 
of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, “The Third World was not his prime domain.  He believed 
that events there could not decisively influence our fundamental relations with the United 
States.”80  Given the attitudes of these leading Soviet statesmen, it should come as little surprise 
that Moscow’s interest in sub-Saharan Africa dissipated as the 1960s wore on.  This sense of 
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disenchantment was reinforced by the ouster of two of the few African leaders who had forged 
close ties with the Soviet Union: Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Mali’s Modibo Keita.  With the 
change in leadership in Moscow and their inability to make inroads in southern Africa, the 
Soviets grew apathetic about African developments, judging the continent as not yet ripe for 
revolution.
81
   
Kenneth Kaunda’s preference for American assistance was based on more than the poor 
state of Soviet-Zambian relations, however.  At one level, the Zambian leader’s desire to 
cooperate with the Americans reflected his preference for Western liberalism and individualism 
– as opposed to “the tough discipline that goes hand in glove with socialist civilization.”82  
Indeed, the type of oppressive, one-party police states the Soviets had helped to construct in 
Ghana and Mali hardly fit with Kaunda’s “humanist” vision.  And for all of America’s 
shortcomings, Kaunda believed that African Americans were making progress in their quest for 
racial equality.
83
  But perhaps most importantly, Kaunda saw the United States as the only nation 
capable of affecting change in southern Africa.
84
  For these reasons, the Zambian President 
pinned his hopes on the Americans once it became clear that the United Kingdom was in no 
position to break the Rhodesian impasse.  “I have said time and again that the situation in 
Southern Africa is slowly but surely leading us to a…racial and ideological holocaust,” Kaunda 
wrote in a desperate appeal to his American counterpart, Lyndon Johnson.   “[U]nless your 
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country, which is the leading country in the West, acts now to stop the rebellion in Rhodesia, a 
very serious catastrophe is going to befall Southern Africa.  Enough has already been said.  What 
is required now is action.  We cannot expect it from Mr. Wilson as he appears to be helpless.  It 
is our hope that your country, which believes in the equality of men and Human Rights, will take 
a lead in helping to bring about justice and peace to [sic] Southern Africa.”85 
Unfortunately for the people of southern Africa, Kaunda’s plea for assistance fell on deaf 
ears in Washington.  As previous accounts of the search for Zimbabwean independence have 
emphasized, the Johnson Administration had no desire to become too deeply entangled in the 
Rhodesian imbroglio.
86
  “In general we felt this was a British problem,” Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk later recounted.  “[W]e tried to stay one or two steps behind Britain in it because we did not 
want to buy the Rhodesian problem as our own.”87  Much to the chagrin of Zambian officials, 
numerous high-ranking Americans – including G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs whose pro-black sympathies had prompted one Rhodesian man to 
punch him in the face – seemed to share this attitude.88  Indeed, the Zambian Ambassador to 
Washington complained that the Americans were doing everything in their power “to mislead the 
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world in[to] believing that the Rhodesian crisis is a British problem and requires [only] a British 
solution.”89  The perception that the Americans were looking to “duck” the Rhodesian issue was 
reinforced by the cool reception that Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe received when he met 
with US officials in December 1965.
90
 
There were many reasons for the Johnson Administration’s reluctance to become 
embroiled in the Rhodesian crisis in 1965.  For one, that year saw the “Americanization” of the 
war in Vietnam.  Given the importance that the war took on as American combat troops assumed 
responsibility for the defense of Saigon, developments in Southeast Asia soon came to consume 
the bulk of Lyndon Johnson’s attention.  Moreover, scholars of American foreign relations are 
increasingly coming to appreciate that the President had more on his plate than just the war in 
Vietnam.  Historian Thomas Schwartz has recently documented LBJ’s extensive dealings with 
Europe.  From fending off French President Charles de Gaulle’s challenge to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, to promoting liberal international economic policies, to attempting to build 
bridges to Warsaw Pact members, Schwartz’s study is an important reminder that US diplomacy 
continued apace even as the Vietnam War heated up.
91
  As if all this were not enough, Johnson 
and his chief foreign policy advisers were also forced to grapple with crises in locations as 
disparate as the Middle East, the Dominican Republic, and the Congo.     
In addition to these diplomatic preoccupations, LBJ also hoped to implement an 
expansive domestic agenda, constructing what he would come to call “the Great Society.”  
Johnson never seems to have doubted that an active federal government could (and should) solve 
all of America’s ills.  “Some men want power simply to strut around the world and hear the tune 
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of ‘Hail to the Chief,’” the President once remarked.  “Others want it simply to build prestige, to 
collect antiques, and to buy pretty things.  Well, I wanted it to give things to people, all sorts of 
things to all sorts of people.”92  Put more succinctly, Johnson hoped to use the power of the 
federal government to ensure “abundance and liberty for all.”93  From advancing civil rights for 
African Americans, to eradicating poverty, providing affordable health care, and liberalizing 
immigration laws, Johnson’s agenda was nothing if not ambitious.94  Given these myriad foreign 
and domestic preoccupations, it is easy to see why Johnson and Rusk hoped to play second fiddle 
to America’s European allies when it came to African affairs.95  LBJ agreed to go along with the 
UN-sponsored sanctions against Rhodesia, but that was the extent of his involvement in the 
search for Zimbabwean independence. 
 
The Nixon Administration and Africa: “Accomplishing Nothing In Particular” 
If Kenneth Kaunda grew frustrated by Lyndon Johnson’s unwillingness to assume a 
leading role in the search for Zimbabwean independence, he quickly became exasperated with 
Johnson’s successor, who was determined to play as passive a role in African affairs as possible.  
In a memorandum written to Richard Nixon, Marshall Wright (one of the National Security 
Council’s African experts) advised the President to assume an “essentially defensive” position 
when it came to dealing with African questions.  According to Wright, the continent and its 
problems were not “central in any way to US foreign policy operations or interests.  We deal 
with them because they are there, not because we hope to get great things from our participation.  
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We aim at minimizing the attention and resources which must be addressed to them…Our policy 
is therefore directed at damage limiting, rather than at accomplishing anything in particular.”  
“That being true,” Wright opined, “there is (or at least, I can find) no broad and positive 
conceptual base which can credibly be put forward to explain why we do what we do in 
Africa…The task then is to put the best possible face upon essentially negative roles, and to try 
to make them sound more positive and more integrated than they actually are.”96  Coming from 
one of the National Security Council’s African specialists, this memorandum did not bode well 
for US-African relations in the years ahead. 
For his part, the new President seemed inclined to heed such advice.  Shortly after 
receiving Wright’s memorandum, Nixon informed a trio of his top aides that he did not want any 
papers relating to sub-Saharan Africa to cross his desk “unless they require [a] Presidential 
decision and can only be handled at the Presidential level.”  Nor was his chief foreign policy 
mandarin, Henry Kissinger, to waste his time dealing with Africa.  “[H]e should farm that 
subject out to a member of his staff but he, himself, should not bother with it,” Nixon stipulated.  
“I want him to concentrate just as hard as I will be concentrating on the…major countries and 
major problem areas.”97  Thus, despite the change in the administrations, African affairs seemed 
destined to remain a distant afterthought in the American foreign policymaking process as the 
disco decade dawned.   
African diplomats quickly picked up on the Administration’s lack of interest in their 
continent and its problems.  When the President had failed to spell out a coherent African policy 
after several months in office, a group of senior African ambassadors took it upon themselves to 
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gain a clearer idea of what they could expect from the new Administration.  “In an effort to pin 
down or rather to entice President Nixon, out of sheer embarrassment perhaps, to make some 
pronouncement on Africa,” they invited the President to be the guest of honor at a celebration of 
Africa Day.  According to the Zambian Chargé d’Affaires, the diplomats’ hearts sank when 
“Tricky Dick” offered nothing but vague, high-sounding platitudes.  Nixon’s vapid remarks, 
combined with the fact that he did not know the name of even the longest-tenured member of the 
African diplomatic corps, left his hosts with the unmistakable impression that the new President 
“really did not care to know more about African diplomats” or the nations they represented.98   
This negative impression did not improve over time.  To the contrary, the more Zambian 
officials learned about the Nixon Administration’s African policy, the less they liked it.  After 
studying the Administration’s first annual foreign policy report (a 119-page document entitled 
“United States Foreign Policy in the 1970s”) the Zambian Ambassador to Washington glumly 
concluded that the report, which focused primarily on Europe and Southeast Asia, represented 
little more than “an on the fence policy in Africa.”  Based on its contents, he predicted that the 
United States would seek to play “a largely insignificant role” in Africa’s political and economic 
development in the coming years.
99
  Thus, less than one year after taking the oath of office, 
Richard Nixon had made it abundantly clear that his Administration had no intention of playing a 
leading role in the search for Zimbabwean independence – or, indeed, in any African problem. 
Adding insult to indifference, Richard Nixon went out of his way to avoid meeting with 
African leaders.  One of the more notorious instances of this behavior occurred in October 1970, 
when he ducked out of a meeting with Kenneth Kaunda.  The Zambian president, who was slated 
to address the UN General Assembly in New York, hoped to meet with his American counterpart 
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while he was in the United States.  Given that Kaunda was also serving as the Chairman of the 
Organization for African Unity and the head of the Non-Aligned Movement at the time, Zambian 
officials expected that the two statesmen would have much to discuss.  However, due to 
“scheduling conflicts,” the summit never occurred.  Kaunda and his aides were incensed by the 
fact that Nixon and his staff had seemingly “made mountains out of molehills” in order to avoid 
meeting with them.
100
  This slight was seen as yet another indication of Nixon’s “apparent 
apathy” toward southern Africa and did considerable harm to the US-Zambian relationship.101  
Given all this, it is not difficult to see why Zambian officials would later describe Richard 
Nixon’s tenure in the Oval Office as an “era of arrogance.”102   
Critics often attribute the Nixon Administration’s disregard for sub-Saharan Africa to the 
less-than-enlightened racial views of the President and some of his chief advisers.  Historian 
Thomas Borstelmann has claimed that Richard Nixon, who was born in 1913, demonstrated “the 
casual racism common among white Americans of his generation.”103  In the words of historian 
Dean Kotlowski, Nixon “could sound as bigoted as any southern segregationist.”104  Historian 
Phil Muehlenbeck has gone even further, describing America’s 37th President as “clearly racist at 
heart.”105  Others, including former New York Times journalist Seymour Hersh and former 
National Security Council staff member Roger Morris, have leveled similar accusations.
106
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While the degree to which Richard Nixon’s racial prejudice affected his diplomacy can 
be debated, the existence of such a bias cannot.  Indeed, it is not difficult to unearth examples of 
the low esteem in which Nixon held Africans and African Americans.  For instance, during the 
course of a telephone conversation with UN Representative Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the 
President confided that black Africans were not cut out for self-governance. “The Latins [Latin 
Americans] do it in a miserable way, but they do it,” Nixon opined.  “But the Africans just can’t 
run things.”107  As this conversation suggests, Nixon’s view of sub-Saharan Africa had not 
changed much since his days as Vice President, when, due to his belief that some Africans had 
“been out of the trees for only about fifty years,” the Vice President had cautioned the National 
Security Council that “it would be naïve of the US to hope that Africa will be democratic” as it 
emerged from colonial rule.
108
  Nor did Nixon hold African Americans in particularly high 
regard – although he did suggest to Moynihan that “they can beat the hell out of us” in fields like 
music, poetry, dance, and athletics.  In a reference to the reigning World Series champions, 
Nixon queried, “[W]hat would [the] Pittsburgh [Pirates] be without…heh, heh…[a] hell of a lot 
of blacks!”109  Such remarks, in addition to his frequent quips about “niggers,” “jigaboos,” and 
“jungle bunnies,” seem to substantiate the charges of racial prejudice leveled by critics like 
Borstelmann, Muehlenbeck, Hersh, and Morris.
110
 
Such contemptuous attitudes were not confined to the Oval Office.  National Security 
Adviser Henry Kissinger was a German-Jewish émigré whose family had fled the Nazi regime in 
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the 1930s, but this experience did not prevent him from indulging in racially-offensive humor.
111
  
“I wonder what the dining room is going to smell like,” the National Security Adviser once 
quipped on his way to a White House dinner for African Ambassadors.
112
  Given the “locker-
room mentality” that Nixon and Kissinger allowed to develop, it is hardly shocking that Deputy 
National Security Adviser Alexander Haig drummed his fists on the table as if playing a tom-tom 
whenever African issues were discussed or that some members of the National Security Council 
routinely made derogatory racial comments at staff meetings.  According to its detractors, the 
Nixon Administration’s attitude toward sub-Saharan Africa is epitomized by the gaffe of White 
House Press Secretary Ronald Zeigler, who began one briefing by informing the media that the 
President had asked him to read a statement concerning the “Niggerian [sic]” civil war.113   
While racial prejudice was not uncommon in the Nixon White House, the question 
remains: how much did these attitudes influence the direction of American diplomacy?   The 
answer, it seems, is relatively little.  Nixon and Kissinger came to office determined to introduce 
“conceptual coherence” to the American foreign policymaking process.  No longer would the 
United States “pay any price,” “bear any burden,” or “oppose any foe.”114  Under Nixon and 
Kissinger, the country would return to the type of containment envisioned by George Kennan.  
The United States would defend those interests considered truly vital to its national security, 
while peripheral interests would receive far less attention.  This policy shift was exemplified by 
the Nixon Doctrine (which stipulated that the US would honor its existing treaty obligations by 
providing allies with money and material rather than troops) and the “Vietnamization” of the war 
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in Southeast Asia.
115
  Given Nixon and Kissinger’s appreciation of the limits of American power 
– especially at a time when many Americans, from anti-war protesters to members of the 
Washington establishment, were clamoring for a period of retrenchment – assuming greater 
responsibilities in southern Africa, where American interests were seen as “important but not 
vital,” would have been inconsonant with the Administration’s larger foreign policy aims.116  
Viewed in this light, Nixon and Kissinger’s disinclination to become embroiled in southern 
Africa seems to have been fuelled less by racial prejudice than by a desire to ease America’s 
imperial overstretch.    
Further fuelling their disinterest in black Africa was the fact that Nixon and Kissinger 
viewed the continent as one of the few regions where communism was not on the march.  
Despite their desire to scale back America’s global commitments, the President and his National 
Security Adviser proved just as incapable of resisting the urge to squelch communist movements 
in the developing world as their predecessors.
117
  Thus, Nixon may not have held black Africans 
in high regard, but Cold War considerations had caused him to take notice of the continent 
during the late 1950s.  “Africa is the most rapidly changing area in the world today,” the then-
Vice President had warned Dwight Eisenhower upon returning from an eight-nation tour of the 
continent in 1957.  “The course of its development, as its people continue to emerge from a 
colonial status and assume [the] responsibilities of independence and self-government, could 
well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between [the] forces of freedom and [those of] 
international Communism.”  In order to prevent the communists from gaining the upper hand, 
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Nixon advocated improving US-African relations.
118
  Henry Kissinger’s attitudes closely 
mirrored those of his boss in this regard.  Thus, if anything could have forced Nixon and 
Kissinger to take an interest in sub-Saharan Africa, it would have been the possibility of the 
region falling into Moscow (or Peking’s) orbit.  However, policymakers in Washington felt 
confident that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese were making significant headway in Africa; 
nor were they were likely to do so in the near future.
119
  Operating under the premise that most of 
Africa was safely in the Western camp, Nixon and Kissinger felt free to ignore the continent’s 
problems and focus their energy on such tasks as ending the war in Vietnam, promoting détente 
with the Soviet Union, and improving Sino-American relations. 
An additional reason for the Nixon Administration’s disregard for sub-Saharan Africa 
may have been that it felt little domestic pressure to adopt a more progressive African policy.  
Many African Americans had felt tremendous pride and excitement as the “wind of change” 
swept across the African continent in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  So had the black press, 
which lauded the appearance of black statesmen such as Kwame Nkrumah on the world stage.
120
  
In many cases, however, this euphoria had been undermined by the corruption, ineptitude, and 
authoritarianism which seemed to plague Africa’s post-independence regimes.121  In any event, 
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the attitudes of African Americans meant relatively little to Richard Nixon, whose “southern 
strategy” of courting aggrieved white voters ensured that he did not feel beholden to African 
Americans for his narrow 1968 electoral victory.  “If I am president, I am not going to owe 
anything to the black community,” Nixon told an aide during the campaign.122  Once in office, 
most historians agree that Nixon did his best to honor this vow.
123
 
The Nixon Administration’s African policy may have been shaped more by apathy than 
animus, but it nevertheless worked to the detriment of those seeking to achieve majority rule in 
Rhodesia.  Disinterest devolved into neglect, and in the absence of any high-level leadership, a 
small but determined group of Congressmen managed to overturn the ban on Rhodesian chrome 
adopted by the Johnson Administration.
124
  The 1971 Byrd Amendment (so named because 
Virginia Senator Harry Byrd Junior had been its strongest advocate) represented a notable 
victory for the Rhodesian Front.  Prior to UDI, the United States had been the foremost consumer 
of Rhodesian chrome, purchasing nearly half of the colony’s annual output.  While leaders in 
Salisbury were eager to resume this lucrative trade, they secretly acknowledged that the 
amendment’s symbolic value was of even greater importance than its economic impact.125  
Indeed, Ian Smith’s propagandists had long sought to portray Rhodesia as an anti-communist 
bulwark in Africa.  The Byrd Amendment enabled many Rhodesians were to delude themselves 
into thinking that policymakers in Washington had finally come to appreciate their contribution 
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to the Cold War.  And if the Americans now recognized Rhodesia’s strategic significance, this 
logic ran, surely they would not allow the colony to fall into the hands of communist-inspired 
agitators like Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe.
126
  Thus, by indirectly providing Ian Smith’s 
regime with additional funds to use in its counterinsurgency efforts and by giving Smith and his 
followers hope that the United States would not allow the Rhodesian Front to be driven from 
power, the Byrd Amendment prolonged the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia.  For this 
reason, those who sympathized with the Zimbabwean cause decried the act.  “The action of the 
USA to resume chrome imports from Rhodesia under the present circumstances only goes to 
show that she cares more for metals than for justice and peace in southern Africa,” lamented one 
leading Zimbabwean nationalist.
127
  Zambian officials were forced to agree with this assessment, 
seeing in the Nixon Administration’s unwillingness to stand firm for principles yet another 
indication of America’s “impotence on moral issues.”128 
In spite of the Nixon Administration’s obvious lack of interest in sub-Saharan Africa (as 
well as the less-than-enlightened racial views of some of its leading figures), Kenneth Kaunda 
continued trying to reach out to the President.  He even wrote his beleaguered counterpart in the 
middle of the Watergate scandal, expressing his hope that Nixon’s political fortunes would 
quickly rebound.
129
  While it may seem strange that Kaunda would send such a message to a man 
who had done his best to ignore Africa and its problems, the Zambian leader was probably 
seeking to curry favor with his American counterpart in the hope that a grateful Richard Nixon 
would devote more time and energy to resolving southern Africa’s problems once the furor over 
                                                          
126
 For more on the importance of anti-communism in Rhodesia, see Donal Lowry, “The Impact of Anti-
Communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 1920-1980,” Cold War History, vol. 7, no. 2 (May 2007): 
169-194. 
127
 Quoted in DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 177. 
128
 Unknown to Unknown, “United States Policy on Zambia,” undated, FA/1/105 folder, NAZ. 
129
 Letter, Kenneth Kaunda to Richard Nixon, September 20, 1973, UNIP 7/23/40 folder, UNIPA. 
44 
 
Watergate had subsided.  For, in spite of America’s persistent failure to assume a leading role in 
the search for Zimbabwean independence, Kaunda remained convinced that the United States 
was uniquely positioned and qualified to do so.  Having lost faith in Britain’s ability to facilitate 
Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule, and doubtful of the Soviets’ ability to achieve this aim, 
Kaunda had few options but to continue trying to prod American officials into action.  The 
collapse of the Zambian economy and the election of a Conservative government in the United 
Kingdom that was far less sympathetic to the Zimbabwean cause than its Labour predecessor had 
been made American assistance more vital than ever by the early 1970s.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the Zambians’ best efforts, the international community marked the 10th 
anniversary of UDI in November 1975.  As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, Kenneth 
Kaunda and his Cabinet colleagues tried to resist the policies of the Rhodesian Front, but in the 
end, they were only partially successful.  The Zambians did manage to stave off financial 
collapse and avert a military invasion.  Indeed, by 1975, Zambia had reduced its economic 
dependence on Rhodesia by developing its own coalfields, constructing an oil pipeline that ran 
from Lusaka to the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam, and completing the TANZARA railroad, 
which provided Zambia with an alternate rail route to the sea.  Less concretely but perhaps no 
less significantly, the Zambians helped to keep the Rhodesian crisis on the international agenda 
at a time when the Western powers would have preferred for it to fade into the background.  
These actions represent important successes, and their significance should not be discounted 
when evaluating the Zambian response to UDI.   
Nevertheless, the Zambians failed to bring the Rhodesian crisis to an end.  Indeed, their 
aim of liberating Rhodesia’s black majority seemed no closer to being realized in 1975 than it 
45 
 
had been a decade earlier.  To the contrary, the Rhodesian Front had intensified its segregationist 
laws during this period, leaving the colony’s indigenous black population worse off than it had 
been before UDI.   Nor could Zambians claim to be significantly more secure from Rhodesian 
reprisals in 1975 than they had been in 1965.  Their country was no longer completely dependent 
on Rhodesia for its trade and energy needs, but it was hardly on sound economic footing.
130
  
Zambia remained a “one-commodity economy” and a drastic decrease in world copper prices left 
the fledgling nation in dire financial straits by the mid-1970s.
131
  Thus, although Zambia was 
theoretically participating in the UN-sponsored sanctions campaign against Rhodesia, the 
rebellious colony remained one of Zambia’s most important trading partners well into the 
1970s.
132
  The outlook was similarly bleak on the military front, where the Rhodesian security 
forces remained capable of invading their northern neighbor with ease.   
Developments on the international front were no more promising.  As this chapter has 
attempted to demonstrate, Kenneth Kaunda’s efforts to solicit international assistance in the 
search for Zimbabwean independence failed to bear fruit during the first decade of the Rhodesian 
crisis.  Kaunda’s faith in the British Labour Party seems particularly misplaced.  Due to the 
weakened state of the British economy, the “kith and kin” ties between many Britons and 
Rhodesians, and the United Kingdom’s desire to shed existing commitments, it is difficult to 
imagine any circumstances under which Harold Wilson would have considering using military 
force in Rhodesia.  Nor were Kaunda’s attempts to convince the United States to assume a 
leadership role in the search for Zimbabwean independence any more successful.  Some US 
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officials empathized with the Zambians’ plight, but none were willing to do anything more than 
follow Britain’s lead.  Preoccupied with domestic affairs and the war in Vietnam, policymakers 
in Washington had little desire to become embroiled in what they regarded as a British affair. 
Despite their lack of success, the Zambians’ diplomatic maneuverings should not be 
dismissed as quixotic or naïve.  Their country was in a weak position, and there was little else 
that Zambian officials could have done to resolve the Rhodesian crisis.  Zambia was in no 
position to dictate terms to the well-armed settlers south of the Zambezi River –especially since 
they seemed to have the solid backing of the South African military.  Nor, for all its bluster, was 
the OAU.  Overall, then, Zambia’s response to the Rhodesian crisis should be seen as a reminder 
of the relative weakness of many nations in the developing world during the Cold War era.  
Despite Kaunda’s desire to facilitate Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule, he was unable affect 
any real change in the colony.  Nor was he able to persuade the Western powers to support the 
Zimbabwean cause until a massive Soviet and Cuban intervention in southern Africa transformed 
the region into a Cold War arena and convinced policymakers in Washington and London that it 
was in their interest to support the Zimbabweans’ struggle for independence before the Soviets 
and Cubans solidified their position in southern Africa. 
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Chapter Two 
The Limits of Realism: Henry Kissinger and the Rhodesian Crisis, 1976 
 
 On April 27, 1976, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda struggled to control his emotions 
as an American envoy addressed a gathering of notable Zambians.  “Of all the challenges before 
us, of all the purposes we have in common, racial justice is one of the most basic,” the speaker 
declared in a gravelly voice.  “We know from our own experience that the goal of racial justice is 
both compelling and achievable.  Our support for this principle in southern Africa is not simply a 
matter of foreign policy, but an imperative of our own moral heritage.”  The speaker went on to 
align the United States with the cause of majority rule in southern Africa – although he focused 
primarily on the situation in Rhodesia.  He outlined a ten-point program for implementing 
majority rule in the colony and pledged that under no circumstances would the United States 
assist Rhodesia’s white-supremacist government in the Chimurenga (the African name for the 
bush war that had been simmering in Rhodesia since 1972).  “The Salisbury regime must 
understand that it cannot expect [American] support…at any stage of its conflict with African 
states or African liberation movements.  On the contrary, it will face our unrelenting opposition 
until a negotiated settlement is achieved.”  The speaker concluded by warning that unless the 
South African government began to dismantle apartheid, it would soon face similar 
opprobrium.
133
   
Kaunda, who had long urged the United States to play a more active role in promoting 
majority rule in southern Africa, wept openly during the address and, in what must have come as 
something of a shock to those present, embraced the speaker at the conclusion of his remarks.  
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While there is no report of anyone else in the audience reacting in such a visible manner, Kaunda 
was probably not the only Zambian to be taken aback by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 
message.  Indeed, there was nothing in the Secretary’s past handling of US-African relations to 
suggest that he would emerge as a champion of black majority rule in 1976.  To the contrary, 
critics had long decried Kissinger’s approach to US-African relations.  At best, it could be 
described as one of “benign neglect.”  At worst, it represented what historian Andrew DeRoche 
has termed “jackassery.”134   
This chapter will seek to explain how it was that the “Doctor of Diplomacy” came to 
spend his final year in office shuttling across sub-Saharan Africa in an effort to mediate the 
Rhodesian crisis.
135
  It will argue that Cold War considerations drew Kissinger’s attention to the 
region in 1975, when (in the aftermath of America’s withdrawal from Vietnam) southern Africa 
became the central sparring ground for the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies.  
Fearful that the Soviets and Cubans would exploit the Rhodesian bush war to increase their 
influence in southern Africa, Kissinger saw promoting a quick transition to majority rule in 
Rhodesia as the best way to ensure that the communist powers remained minor players in 
Africa’s mineral-rich southern tip.  This chapter will also take issue with those scholars who 
have given Henry Kissinger’s African diplomacy short shrift.136  For although he failed to broker 
a deal between the Rhodesians and the Zimbabwean nationalists, Kissinger’s diplomacy helped 
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to reassure African leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda that majority rule in Rhodesia could still be 
achieved by the ballot rather than by the bullet.  By doing so, Kissinger helped to forestall a 
major racial war and left the door open for the future statesmen to obtain a Rhodesian settlement. 
 
Explaining Kaunda’s Tears 
 Kenneth Kaunda’s emotional reaction to Kissinger’s Lusaka Address almost certainly 
reflected his relief that the United States had finally decided to assume a leadership role in the 
search for Zimbabwean independence.  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Zambian 
officials had been trying – without success – to convince the Americans to bring their influence 
to bear in southern Africa since the mid-1960s.  From Kaunda’s perspective, a negotiated 
settlement was more vital than ever in 1976.  His decision to apply sanctions against Rhodesia 
(formerly his country’s most important trading partner) had seriously damaged the Zambian 
economy.  Without access to the Rhodesian railway, Zambia was having difficulty getting its 
copper exports to market, thereby depriving the country of its major source of foreign 
currency.
137
  Many Zambians who had been employed in the mining industry found themselves 
without jobs, and a major increase in urban crime had accompanied this rise in unemployment.  
As agricultural production and manufacturing output were also lagging, foodstuffs and other 
basic commodities were in short supply throughout the country.  Not surprisingly, this situation 
was doing little to endear Kaunda to his fellow Zambians.
138
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In addition to his domestic difficulties, Kaunda feared that the Chimurenga was about to 
ignite a region-wide race war.  The Rhodesian security forces had contained the insurgency with 
relative ease during its early years, but the tide was beginning to turn by 1976.
139
  While it may 
seem strange, Kaunda viewed the guerillas’ success with a deepening sense of foreboding.  This 
apparent incongruity can be explained by that fact that Kaunda, like many international 
commentators, believed that if the guerrillas gained the upper hand in the Chimurenga, South 
Africa’s apartheid government would intervene on the Rhodesians’ behalf.  In this scenario, 
many pundits predicted that the South Africans would not only seek to crush the guerrillas but 
would also punish the so-called “Frontline States” (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and 
Botswana) for aiding and abetting them.
140
  From Kaunda’s perspective, therefore, Henry 
Kissinger’s Lusaka Address had come not a moment too soon.   
Kaunda’s tears probably also revealed a sense of surprise that it was Henry Kissinger 
who had answered his calls for assistance.
141
  As noted in the previous chapter, Kissinger had 
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displayed little interest in southern Africa during Richard Nixon’s presidency.142  To the extent 
that he had formulated an African policy at all during the Nixon years, he had advocated forging 
closer ties with the region’s white minority regimes on the assumption that “[t]he whites are here 
to stay and that constructive change can only come through them.”143  Some critics have chalked 
this attitude up to racism, asserting that Kissinger – like many American policymakers – 
regarded black Africans as inferior to their white counterparts.
144
  There is probably a grain of 
truth to these accusations as Kissinger freely admitted that he felt a “basic sympathy” toward the 
white regimes of southern Africa.
145
  He was impressed by the modern skyscrapers, bustling 
highways, and conspicuous consumer culture of cities like Johannesburg and Salisbury and made 
little secret of his belief that both races would see their standard of living deteriorate under 
majority rule.
146
   
Nevertheless, claims of Kissinger’s racialism should not be overstated.  His attitude 
toward sub-Saharan Africa was one of apathy rather than overt racism.  He was pessimistic about 
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Africa in many respects, but he does not seem to have shared the low opinion of black Africans 
held by an earlier generation of American statesmen such as former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, who publicly railed against decolonization, asserting that majority rule was doomed 
because “[m]any blacks are still in a state of primitive [N]eolithic culture.”147  Like Richard 
Nixon, Kissinger’s focus was on the “major countries and major problem areas.”  African 
countries, which tended to be poor and militarily weak, did not count for much in the Secretary’s 
balance of power calculations.  As one State Department official later recounted, “Kissinger had 
very little interest in the third world and what interest he had was keyed to the [C]old [W]ar 
implications of Third World activities. He never looked at the Third World in terms of the 
inherent problems, but thought that the[se] problems flowed from the East-West rivalry.”148   
   Given his tendency to view events through the lens of the Cold War, it took a massive 
and unexpected intervention in southern Africa by America’s chief Cold War rivals to jolt 
Kissinger from his torpor.  This shock occurred in Angola, where three ethnically-based guerrilla 
armies had waging a low-level insurgency against the Portuguese for more than a decade.  When 
the Portuguese announced that they would withdraw from Angola in November 1975, each 
faction dreamed of seizing power once the Portuguese had abdicated.  Against this background 
of mutual suspicion, a transitional government of national unity proved unworkable.  By March 
of 1975, the factions had turned on each other, dragging Angola into civil war.
149
   
Before long, rumors that the Soviets and Cubans were backing the Marxist faction, the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), began to swirl.  Exactly when 
Moscow and Havana became involved in the Angolan civil war remains difficult to determine, 
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but by mid-1975, a number of international observers believed that outside assistance was 
providing the MPLA with a decisive advantage over its rivals.
150
  This development alarmed 
Henry Kissinger, who was outraged by what he perceived as the interference of America’s chief 
Cold War rivals thousands of miles outside of their traditional spheres of influence.  Although he 
repeatedly stated that he was not opposed to the MPLA per se, Kissinger refused to countenance 
any regime that came to power as the result of Soviet and Cuban “meddling.”151   Indeed, during 
a May 1975 staff meeting, Kissinger tellingly grumbled that he “couldn’t care less what happens 
in Angola,” as long as the Soviets and Cubans did not end up with a foothold in southern 
Africa.
152
  The Secretary reiterated this message to America’s allies over the course of the next 
several months — albeit in somewhat less abrasive terms.  “We are open-minded about the 
MPLA,” Kissinger insisted in a conversation with one African Foreign Minister.  “What we are 
not open-minded about is the Soviet Union.”153   
Given its presumed dependence upon Soviet largesse, Kissinger concluded that an 
MPLA-governed Angola was likely to become a Soviet satellite.  As he noted in a memorandum 
to President Gerald Ford, “The Soviet Union has backed the MPLA since it was founded.  While 
we do not know the exact quantity of military assistance the Soviets are providing for the MPLA, 
this assistance is of major significance, and the Soviets could be expected to play a major role in 
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an MPLA-dominated Angola.”154  This was more than Kissinger could stomach, and in June he 
began pressing for a clandestine operation to “prevent an easy victory by the communist-backed 
forces in Angola.”155  Brushing aside the doubts of the “choir boys” and “missionaries” in the 
State Department’s African Bureau, who argued that Soviet aims and involvement in Angola 
were likely to remain limited, the Secretary exhorted Ford to funnel $14 million the MPLA’s 
rivals: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the 
Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).
156
  The President acquiesced in mid-July, and, shortly 
thereafter, American economic and military aid began flowing into Angola.
157
   
If Ford and Kissinger believed that this modest amount of aid would allow UNITA and 
the FNLA to turn the tables in Angola, they had badly miscalculated.  The Soviets and Cubans 
soon learned of Washington’s involvement and redoubled their support for the MPLA.  
According to historian Piero Gleijeses, this was especially true of Soviet General Secretary 
Leonid Brezhnev, who had been far more interested in finalizing a new strategic arms limitation 
treaty (SALT II) and participating in another US-Soviet summit than in supporting the MPLA.
158
  
But whereas Brezhnev had initially been content to supply the MPLA with a limited number of 
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small arms, the Soviet leader quickly realized that Washington’s support for the FNLA and 
UNITA (possibly in conjunction with South Africa’s apartheid government) had upped the ante, 
placing his credibility as an anti-colonial leader at stake.
159
  Under pressure from members of the 
Politburo and KGB, Brezhnev agreed to airlift approximately 12,000 Cuban combat troops to 
Angola between November 1975 and January 1976 while drastically increasing Soviet arms 
shipments to the MPLA.
160
  The additional troops and arms had an immediate impact, and the 
tide quickly began to turn in the MPLA’s favor.   
Things went from bad to worse for Kissinger when Congress, in no mood for foreign 
adventures in the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and the ongoing hearings into the CIA’s past 
misdeeds, passed the Tunney and Clark Amendments in December 1975 and January 1976, 
respectively.  These acts prohibited any further funds from being spent on Angolan operations, 
thereby short-circuiting Kissinger’s plans to funnel another $28 million to the MPLA’s rivals.  In 
so doing, they effectively prevented the Secretary from responding to the Soviet-Cuban airlift 
and sent him scrambling to reassure America’s allies that he and the President (and not the 
“McGovernite” 94th Congress) remained in charge of the American foreign policy-making 
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process.
161
  Without US support, the FNLA rapidly disintegrated.  UNITA forces fared little 
better in spite of the not-so-covert assistance they were receiving from the South African 
Government.
162
 As a result of America’s failed efforts to install a pro-Western regime in Angola, 
many international commentators saw the January 1976 decision by the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) to recognize the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola as a serious 
setback for America’s efforts to contain communism in the developing world.163   
 
Kissinger's "African Safari” 
In the wake of the Angolan debacle, Henry Kissinger became increasingly concerned 
about the possibility of the communist powers increasing their influence elsewhere in southern 
Africa.  A spate of recently-declassified documents reveals that the Secretary was particularly 
worried that the Soviets and Cubans would attempt to repeat their Angolan success elsewhere in 
the region.
164
  And nowhere did the situation seem more ripe for intervention than in Rhodesia, 
where a fractious national liberation movement and a burgeoning guerrilla war seemed to offer 
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the communist powers ample opportunity to meddle.  Relations between Joshua Nkomo’s 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) were every bit as strained as those between the Angolan factions had been in 
1975.  In fact, ZANU had been established when Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, and a 
handful of their colleagues broke away from ZAPU to form their own nationalist movement in 
1963.
165
  The potential for internecine conflict was immediately apparent to African observers.
166
  
As predicted, it did not take long for trouble to begin.  As early as 1967, Zambian officials were 
lamenting the fact that ZANU and ZAPU were spending much of their time “fighting against 
each other, forgetting the common enemy in Rhodesia.”167  The ZANU-ZAPU rivalry only 
intensified over time.  Kissinger quickly spotted the parallels between the two situations and 
worried that Rhodesia might become “another Angola” – with the Soviets and Cubans gaining 
another ally in southern Africa.  Given Kissinger’s anti-communist leanings, it can hardly be 
deemed a coincidence that in early 1976, as the Angola crisis was reaching its denouement, Sir 
Peter Ramsbotham (the British Ambassador to Washington) informed the Foreign Office that 
Kissinger was becoming “increasingly worried about the prospects for Rhodesia.”168   
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Despite his concern, Kissinger did not have any firm ideas as to how the United States 
could prevent the Soviets and Cubans from increasing their influence in the region.  His initial 
inclination was to punish the Cubans for their involvement in the Angolan civil war.  However, 
the Secretary’s desire to “give the Cubans a bloody nose” completely ignored domestic 
realities.
169
  For as the British Embassy in Washington recognized, the American public was 
bound to oppose the type of undertaking Kissinger was advocating so soon after the traumatic 
conclusion of the war in Vietnam.  Instead, the British sought to persuade the Secretary to 
channel his energies in a more fruitful direction.  “Our aim should be to persuade Kissinger that 
African diplomacy of the kind we are attempting is more likely to prevent the Russians from 
getting what they want than the measures which he has in mind, and for which on present 
evidence he has no chance of obtaining Congressional support,” Ramsbotham advised the 
Foreign Office.
170
   
Based upon this recommendation, Undersecretary of State for African and Middle 
Eastern Affairs Tony Duff was dispatched to Washington for a series of consultations with two 
of Kissinger’s top aides, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Joseph Sisco.171  Since many in the State 
Department were already coming to favor the type of approach the British were advocating, it is 
difficult to determine the extent to which Duff succeeded in convincing US officials that 
diplomatic finesse – rather than military aggression – offered the best chance of containing the 
communist threat in southern Africa.  It seems likely that the British merely reaffirmed what 
many US officials were already thinking.  Nonetheless, the British got what they wanted: the 
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Americans’ new African policy emphasized facilitating Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule 
before the colony became “another Angola.”  
By this time, events in southern Africa were moving quickly.  On March 3, Mozambican 
President Samora Machel closed his country’s border with Rhodesia.172  Because an estimated 
30% of the colony’s imports and exports passed through Mozambique, the move constituted a 
potentially devastating blow to the Rhodesian economy.
173
  Nevertheless, Ian Smith remained 
obdurate in his defense of minority rule.  On March 19, he allowed the talks he had been 
conducting with Joshua Nkomo to break down over the issue of how soon majority rule would be 
implemented.
174
  The collapse of the talks surprised no one; however British and American 
officials worried that the announcement that the Smith-Nkomo talks had failed would unleash a 
wave of guerrilla violence.  Such fears were exacerbated by the flood of radical statements 
emanating from southern Africa when Smith’s decision to break off the negotiations became 
known.  Typical of the African press’s reaction was the Zambia Daily Mail, which declared,  
Africa has no option now but to declare total war on the Rhodesian white population…It is a total 
war to the finish.  A few days back, Africa had hoped for a solution that would have given the 
whites in Rhodesia a chance to salvage whatever they had built up...That chance has gone forever.  
We had hoped for peaceful change.  But there is now no alternative but violent change.  And when 
that violent change comes, it is the victor grabs all, and all fair play to the winds.
175
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Such vitriolic rhetoric did not augur well for anyone who continued to hope that a moderate 
black regime would peacefully assume power in Rhodesia.   
In an effort to stem this rising tide of violence, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan 
went before Parliament and laid out a new plan for bringing majority rule to Rhodesia.  Little has 
been written about why Callaghan opted to undertake a new Rhodesian initiative in 1976.  In 
some respects, the decision can be seen as a courageous one.  For the United Kingdom was so 
beset by economic, political, and social turmoil that some commentators wondered aloud 
whether it “was drifting toward a condition of ungovernablity.”176  Moreover, the Rhodesian 
issue was particularly divisive in Britain.  Many Conservatives saw the colony as a bastion of 
western civilization in a region wracked by violence, corruption, and economic mismanagement.  
Members of the so-called “Rhodesia lobby” had no desire to see their “kith and kin” thrown to 
the wolves.
177
  For its part, the Labour Party was divided over the issue.  While some on the left 
clamored for the government to use military force to crush the rebellion, few Labourites had any 
confidence that they could compel Smith to accept majority rule.  The British had attempted to 
negotiate Rhodesia’s “return to legality” on three separate occasions between 1966 and 1972 – 
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only to see their efforts founder.
178
  As a result, a palpable sense of impotence seemed to hover 
over Whitehall like a thick London fog when it came to dealing with Rhodesian affairs.
179
  
American officials did not expect the British to provide much leadership in defusing the 
Rhodesian crisis.  “The political circumstances in London…do not favor a bold and vigorous 
involvement in a faraway place that is the legacy of an earlier era,” remarked one high-ranking 
member of the US Embassy in London.  “The risks would be too great for a government whose 
hold on power is already too weak.”180   
Despite this myriad of seemingly-intractable problems, British officials felt compelled to 
make one final attempt to resolve the Rhodesian crisis.  Although the British were eager to 
prevent a racial war from erupting in southern Africa, they were not motivated solely by 
humanitarian concerns.  As noted in the previous chapter, Britain’s inability to bring the 
Rhodesian crisis to an end had long plagued the country’s relations with its Commonwealth 
partners.  By 1976, there was concern in some Foreign Office circles that unless Britain found a 
way to “fulfill its colonial responsibility” in Rhodesia, Commonwealth members such as Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Tanzania might sever their ties to the United Kingdom.
181
  Such a development 
would have been both diplomatically humiliating and economically damaging to the former 
metropole.  For not only was the Labour Party politically and ideologically committed to the 
establishment of a close partnership between Britons and the citizens of all Commonwealth 
countries, but southern Africa represented one of the few regions where Britain maintained a 
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favorable balance of trade.  Losing access to these markets would have further exacerbated 
Britain’s economic plight.   
Adding to the Foreign Office’s anxiety was the specter of Soviet and Cuban adventurism 
in Rhodesia.  While Europe and Southeast Asia had theretofore served as the primary Cold War 
arenas, the continued intransigence of southern Africa’s minority regimes was beginning to 
create new opportunities for communist involvement in the region as Africans frustrated by the 
glacial pace of progress toward majority rule began looking to the Soviets, Cubans, and Chinese 
for assistance.
182
  Such fears were seemingly substantiated by the unprecedented assistance the 
Soviets and Cubans had provided to the MPLA.
183
  This support seemed to indicate that, in the 
wake of America’s humiliating defeat in Vietnam, the communist powers were prepared to act 
more aggressively in southern Africa.  “I entirely share your concern at the seriousness of what 
has happened in Angola,” James Callaghan wrote in a message to Henry Kissinger.  “[W]e both 
agree that in the short term the communists have scored a major success and that we must do 
everything we can to prevent the same thing [from] occurring again…[T]he Angolan episode 
will have encouraged the Russians and Cubans to look for other opportunities to exploit, one way 
or another, to their own advantage and to the discomfiture of the West.”184  Fearful that the 
communist powers would target Rhodesia next, Callaghan and his Foreign Office colleagues 
were eager to defuse the Rhodesian crisis before the Soviets and Cubans attempted to capitalize 
on their Angolan success. 
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It was with these considerations in mind that the Foreign Secretary unveiled his blueprint for 
Rhodesian independence.  He envisioned the transition to majority rule as a three-step process.  
First, the Rhodesians and the guerrillas would agree to end the Chimurenga and accept a package 
of preconditions.
185
  Once this had been accomplished, negotiations on an independence 
constitution would commence.  As soon as the new constitution (which would guarantee 
majority rule as well as minority rights) was finalized, Britain would grant Rhodesia its 
independence.  Playing to an international audience that was generally sympathetic toward the 
Zimbabweans’ struggle for independence, Callaghan heaped scorn on Ian Smith, who did not 
seem to realize that he was “leading his country on the path of death and destruction.”  The 
Foreign Secretary went on to blame the failure of the Smith-Nkomo talks on the “prevarications” 
of the Rhodesian leader, whose “purpose has not been to negotiate a constitutional settlement but 
to buy time in order to remove the pressures on him.”  Ominously, he warned, Smith did “not 
seem to realise that he no longer has much time to buy.”186     
Yet Callaghan was reminded that lofty rhetoric counted for little in Salisbury when Smith 
publicly rejected his proposals the next day.
187
  Despite this rebuff, all was not lost.  To the 
contrary, Callaghan’s message had been intended less for the obstinate Rhodesian Prime 
Minister (whom he had expected to reject the new proposals) than it had been for his good friend 
Henry Kissinger.  The Secretary, who had probably seen a copy of the British proposals in 
advance, publicly endorsed them on March 23, describing them as “most constructive.”188  Thus, 
while Callaghan’s proposals had fallen on deaf ears in Salisbury, they were embraced by the 
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Ford Administration as a way to break the Rhodesian impasse.  Backed by the power and 
influence of the United States, they would become the basis of a joint Anglo-American initiative.   
Such a coordinated approach suited both men.  Callaghan (who would become Prime 
Minister on April 5) knew that Britain could not achieve a negotiated settlement on its own.  A 
leading acolyte of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” he hoped that American power 
and influence might help to break the Rhodesian impasse.  He also hoped that procuring 
American involvement would go a long way toward persuading the British public and reluctant 
government ministers that the time was ripe for a new Rhodesian initiative.  Kissinger agreed 
that the British lacked the wherewithal to force the Rhodesians and the Zimbabwean nationalists 
to reach an agreement.  In his mind, only American power and influence could bring about the 
desired result.
189
  He therefore sought to maneuver the United States into the forefront of the 
search for Zimbabwean independence, and he believed that working alongside America’s “most 
natural ally” would allow him to sell the initiative to an American public that knew (and cared) 
relatively little about African affairs.  Kissinger also appreciated that Britain’s historic ties to 
many African states could well prove valuable in the search for a Rhodesian settlement.  Thus, 
after failing to deter the Soviets and Cubans in Angola through the use of force, Kissinger hoped 
to use diplomacy to prevent the communist powers from increasing their influence in southern 
Africa.  Ironically, then, it was Kissinger’s preoccupation with the East-West struggle that 
caused him to emerge as one of the most unlikely champions of black majority rule in 1976. 
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To Lusaka and Beyond 
In an attempt to emphasize America’s newfound commitment to majority rule, Kissinger 
decided to visit sub-Saharan Africa in April 1976.  However, the Secretary’s decision to embark 
on a seven-nation tour of the region generated more suspicion than optimism.  Many 
conservatives (including those who would support Ronald Reagan rather than Gerald Ford in the 
1976 Republican primaries) opposed the Secretary’s efforts to forge closer ties with black Africa, 
while Kissinger’s well-known sympathy for the white minority regimes in southern Africa and 
his disastrous foray into the Angolan civil war had done little to avail him to blacks at home or 
abroad.  “The perception of your general indifference to Africa and relative inaccessibility to the 
African diplomatic community in Washington, except when there is a public relations advantage 
to be gained, has created skepticism about the timing and the substance of your visit,” several 
members of the Congressional Black Caucus observed in a letter to the Secretary of State.
190
  
Many African leaders were equally skeptical of Kissinger’s intentions.  The governments of 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Ghana refused to grant him an entry visa, while Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere faced strong pressure from his Vice-Presidents to follow suit.  Although Nyerere 
overruled his Vice-Presidents, he harbored no illusions that Henry Kissinger had undergone a 
Pauline conversion.  As he told the British High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam, he was looking 
forward to “doing battle” with the Secretary and planned to “make it plain to him that the Indian 
Ocean and southern Africa were not American spheres of influence.”191   
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Thus, Kissinger had his work cut out for him on April 23, as he embarked on what Time 
Magazine sardonically labeled his “African Safari.”192  But before arriving in Africa, Kissinger 
stopped over in the United Kingdom to discuss matters with the British – as was his custom.  In 
part, he was anxious to gain some insight about a part of the world which he had largely ignored 
throughout his years in office.  Indeed, during a rare moment of humility, the Secretary 
confessed to his British counterparts, “I have no feel for Africa.  I read the cables.  But you have 
more experience.”193  The scant faith Kissinger had in the State Department’s African Bureau 
(which he suspected of being filled with “pacifists” and “missionaries”) only served to enhance 
the Secretary’s desire to consult with the British prior to setting foot in southern Africa. 
In addition to discussing African affairs, Kissinger hoped to establish a strong working 
relationship with the new British Foreign Secretary, Tony Crosland.  For, as Kissinger had 
remarked during a 1976 press conference, “The close and confidential relationship between the 
[American] Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary is one of the most important 
factors in international life.”194  Although these words were uttered during a public press 
conference, they should not be dismissed as mere diplomatic niceties.  To the contrary, as 
scholars of the Anglo-American relationship are increasingly coming to appreciate, Kissinger 
held the Foreign Office in the highest esteem, comparing it favorably to the State Department on 
numerous occasions.
195
  As a result of this deep respect, Kissinger became so accustomed to 
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consulting with the British on major foreign policy issues that acting without first attaining their 
feedback seemed “to violate club rules.”196  On top of this institutionalized pattern of 
consultation, Kissinger developed a particularly warm relationship with Foreign Secretary 
Callaghan when the Labour Party was returned to office in 1974.  Due to Callaghan’s avuncular 
personality, discretion, and “abundant common sense,” both contemporaries and historians have 
noted that the two statesmen quickly developed a good working relationship.
197
  Consequently, 
the notoriously-secretive Kissinger felt comfortable exchanging thoughts, comparing opinions, 
and sounding out ideas with Callaghan in a way that he did not with most other statesmen.   
Tony Crosland had his own reasons for wanting to forge a strong rapport with his 
American counterpart.  For while Kissinger may have found it reassuring to consult with the 
British, the United States did not require British support to enact most of its policies.  The 
British, by contrast, depended on American support to achieve many of their economic, military, 
and foreign policy goals.  Consequently, every British Prime Minister since Winston Churchill 
had sought to maintain the “special” relationship that had been forged in the flames of World 
War II.  During the 1970s, as economic decrepitude further eroded London’s ability to act 
independently on the international stage, British officials saw it as absolutely imperative to 
preserve the special transatlantic bond between Washington and London.   “[W]e remain 
America’s most natural and closest ally,” Peter Ramsbotham reported in his 1975 review of US-
UK relations.  “From this fact alone,” he added, “we derive much of our influence in world 
affairs…[W]e do well to make every effort to keep the relationship in good repair.”198   
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Keeping the Anglo-American relationship in good repair required a good deal of effort on 
the part of the Callaghan Government.  The British Embassy in Washington, aided by British 
consulates throughout the United States and the British Information Service, worked to portray a 
positive image of the mother country in the United States, cultivating influential politicians, 
journalists, and businesspeople.
199
  In the realm of foreign policy, maintaining harmonious 
relations involved cultivating key members of the State Department – including the Secretary of 
State.  And while British Foreign Secretaries since Ernest Bevin had generally worked well with 
their American counterparts, the personal dimension took on a special significance during Henry 
Kissinger’s tenure at Foggy Bottom.  As a result of his penchant for secrecy and his contempt for 
the State Department’s “detestable bureaucracy,” Kissinger frequently conducted his diplomacy 
personally, bypassing the State Department whenever possible.
200
  This state of affairs angered 
many lower-level British officials who found themselves deprived of meaningful contacts with 
their American counterparts.
201
  It also placed that much more emphasis on the relationship 
between the countries’ chief diplomats.  If the relationship was one of mutual trust and respect 
(as it had been during Callaghan’s tenure as Foreign Secretary), the Foreign Office was likely to 
be kept more up-to-date on Kissinger’s thinking and potential initiatives than many State 
Department officials.  A strained relationship, conversely, would rob London of its ability to 
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influence the US foreign policymaking process – thereby depriving the British of much of their 
influence in world affairs.
202
   
The first meeting between Kissinger and Crosland was a success, marking the beginning 
of an excellent – albeit somewhat abbreviated – working relationship.203  Flanked by several of 
his top aides, the Foreign Secretary was on hand to greet his American counterpart when his 
Boeing 747 touched down at Waddington Royal Air Force base early on the morning of April 
24.  Over the course of a working breakfast, the British delegation engaged Kissinger in a tour 
d’horizon of world affairs.  Predictably, the discussion centered on the Secretary’s upcoming 
African mission.  The British tried to convince Kissinger to play down his preoccupation with 
Cold War concerns during his trip since, to most black Africans, the struggle against communism 
paled in comparison to the struggle for majority rule.  They also encouraged the Secretary to 
rework his Lusaka Address, persuading the Secretary to focus on the moral imperative of ending 
minority rule in southern Africa and to make it clear to the Rhodesian hardliners that there would 
be no American bailout in the event of a Cuban or Soviet intervention in the bush war.
204
  Often 
impervious to advice, Kissinger so thoroughly incorporated these recommendations into his 
Lusaka speech that one commentator felt it “reflected almost word for word” what the British 
had recommended during their April 24 meeting.
205
   
                                                          
202
 For insight into how Kissinger’s personalized diplomacy affected his policymaking, see Barbara Keys, “Henry 
Kissinger: The Emotional Statesmen,” Diplomatic History, vol. 35, no. 4 (September 2011): 602-609. 
203
 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland, (London: Cape, 1982): 338.  Jimmy Carter’s election ended Kissinger’s reign as 
America’s chief diplomat in January 1977, and Crosland died of a heart attack less than a month later. 
204
 The Ford Administration’s intervention in Angola may have reinforced Smith’s belief that the US would come to 
the Rhodesians’ aid if the Cubans or Soviets intervened in the Rhodesian bush war. 
205
 Record of a Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the US Secretary of State at RAF 
Waddington Lincolnshire on Saturday 24 April, FCO 82/664, TNA.  “Word for word” cited in Crosland, Tony 
Crosland, 326.  Of course, not all of the credit should go to the British.  Kissinger was receiving similar advice from 
American ambassadors across Africa.  See for instance, Jean Wilkowski to Henry Kissinger, “Secretary’s Visit to 
Lusaka,” April 19, 1976, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=85170&dt=2082&dl=1345 
70 
 
Kissinger also solicited advice about how to handle his upcoming meetings with two of 
the region’s most important leaders: Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda 
of Zambia.  As previously noted, Tanzania and Zambia (along with Mozambique and Botswana) 
comprised the “Frontline States” in southern Africa’s struggle for majority rule.  The “Frontline 
Presidents” (particularly Nyerere and Kaunda) had long helped to legitimize ZANU and ZAPU’s 
struggle against the Rhodesian Front.  The presidents also provided vital assistance to the 
guerrilla armies, hosting them and ensuring that they received support from the OAU’s 
Liberation Committee.  Because of this leverage, American and British policymakers hoped that 
the presidents would be able to convince Nkomo and Mugabe to put aside their differences and 
entreat with the Rhodesians if Smith could be dragged back to the negotiating table. 
As the unofficial “chairman” of the Frontline Presidents, Nyerere was widely 
acknowledged as the most influential leader in southern Africa.  Thus, any Anglo-American 
initiative would require his seal of approval.
206
  However, obtaining Nyerere’s support promised 
to be a delicate task since the Tanzanian leader was torn between his desire to see the 
Chimurenga resolved as quickly as possible and his desire to see the Zimbabwean guerrillas 
establish a socialist state.  Kissinger was also slated to meet with Kenneth Kaunda, whom the 
Secretary regarded as a “closet moderate.”207  A longtime US ally, a champion of multiracial 
democracy, and the leader of Rhodesia’s northern neighbor, Kaunda desperately wanted a 
settlement in Rhodesia before a full-scale race war erupted.  The Secretary hoped to reassure the 
Zambian leader that a moderate, non-racial Zimbabwe remained within reach.  Moreover, Joshua 
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Nkomo, the man whom the British and Americans hoped would emerge as Zimbabwe’s first 
prime minister, was Kaunda’s protégé.208  Maintaining good relations with Kaunda was therefore 
seen as a way to ensure that neither he nor Nkomo fell under the sway of some of their more 
radical colleagues – most notably, Robert Mugabe. 
Despite concerns that it would not be well-received by black Africans, Kissinger’s 
“safari” made quite a favorable impression.  The British High Commissioner to Dar es Salaam 
described it as “a far greater success than anyone on either side had expected.”209  The US 
Ambassador to Lusaka echoed this sentiment.
210
  The Secretary won acclaim for publicly 
endorsing the notion that “African problems should be solved by African solutions.”211  He also 
demonstrated sensitivity for Africa’s past by visiting the Senegalese island of Gorée, which had 
served as a key point in the transatlantic slave trade.  “It makes you ashamed to be a human 
being,” he subsequently told reporters.212  Kissinger also seemed to strike the right chords in his 
private meetings with African leaders.  He explained that, whatever its past actions, the Ford 
Administration was now fully committed to majority rule.  He pledged that the United States 
would not support any Zimbabwean faction over the other (as it had done in Angola) and 
conceded that he did not have all the answers to southern Africa’s problems.  “I don’t know the 
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nuances,” the Secretary confessed in a private meeting with Nyerere.  “But I have come here to 
learn.”213  For their part, neither Nyerere nor Kaunda seem to have protested when Kissinger 
lectured them on the importance of keeping the Soviets and Cubans at bay.  “I know that your 
Government fears Russian and Cuban interference in Rhodesia, but I also know of no African 
leader who has spoken of this possibility,” the Zambian leader reassured him.  “We do not want 
to see outside interference at all.”214  Nyerere agreed that southern Africa could not afford to 
become the next Cold War hot spot.  For as the Tanzanian leader was fond of saying, “Whether 
the elephants are fighting or making love, the grass gets trampled.”215   
Publicly, the highlight of the trip was Kissinger’s Lusaka Address, which was hailed as a 
masterstroke by those who had been waiting for the United States to emerge as the champion of 
majority rule in southern Africa.
216
  Kenneth Kaunda was particularly delighted by Kissinger’s 
speech, which he regarded as a turning point in US-African relations.  The Zambian leader 
informed the American Ambassador to Lusaka that Kissinger’s mission had been “fantastic and 
beyond all expectations.”217  Even Julius Nyerere came away impressed by the Secretary’s 
seriousness of purpose.  “American international power [i]s a fact of life which we all 
recognise,” he admitted to the British High Commissioner to Dar es Salaam.  “If it could be 
placed behind an agreement for the introduction of majority rule…then perhaps there may yet be 
a chance for the war in Rhodesia to be brought to an end more quickly than had earlier seemed 
possible.”218  Botswana’s Seretse Khama echoed these sentiments when he paid a state visit to 
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Washington in early June.
219
  Thus, Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and Lusaka Address seem to 
have succeeded in persuading three of the four Frontline Presidents that an Anglo-American 
initiative might yet obviate the need for armed struggle in Rhodesia.  
 
Playing the South African Card 
By the time he returned to Washington, Kissinger felt confident that the Frontline 
Presidents would support an Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia.  Because of the vital 
assistance the Presidents were providing to the guerrillas, Kissinger believed they would be able 
to ensure that Mugabe and Nkomo entered into negotiations with the Rhodesian Front when the 
time came.  The question he now faced was how to disabuse Smith and his followers of their 
belief that minority rule remained a viable option.  His discussions with the Frontline Presidents 
and the British had convinced him that the Rhodesian Front and its supporters were living in 
“cloud cuckoo land” and would never accept majority rule if left to their own devices.220  The 
key to forcing the Rhodesians to accept reality, Kissinger was told time and again, was to 
persuade Rhodesia’s stalwart ally, the South African government, to pressure the Rhodesian 
Front into granting majority rule.
221
  As long as the South Africans continued to back him, Smith 
seemed unlikely to budge.  But if the South Africans could be persuaded to withdraw their 
support, the Rhodesians would be left with no choice but to enter into negotiations with the 
nationalists.  Thus, Kissinger decided to sound out South African Prime Minister John Vorster to 
determine whether he could be persuaded to sever his nation’s ties to the Rhodesian Front. 
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 Although the New York Times described Vorster as “the most extreme, most ruthless, 
and most totalitarian” acolyte of apartheid, Kissinger’s task was not as daunting as it might have 
seemed.
222
  For while South Africa and Rhodesia shared an ideology rooted in white supremacy, 
there was a great deal of tension behind the façade of white solidarity.  As scholars such as 
Leonard Thompson, Robert Massie, and Sue Onslow have noted, many Afrikaner elites carried a 
deep-seated hatred of Britain that dated back to the Boer War.
223
  Thus, the mere fact that most 
white Rhodesians were of British descent was a lingering source of friction.  Their respective 
racial policies also drove a wedge between the two peoples.  Seeking to juxtapose their policies 
against those of their southern neighbor, Rhodesian propagandists tried to justify UDI as a 
defense of meritocracy rather than a defense of white supremacy.  The Rhodesian Front’s 
supporters insisted that they were merely trying to maintain “standards” and were not opposed to 
“responsible” Africans having a say in Rhodesia’s governance.  In fact, black Africans were not 
legally prohibited from voting (although the property and education qualifications enshrined in 
the 1969 Rhodesian constitution ensured that the overwhelming majority of black Rhodesians 
remained disenfranchised), and eight of the 58 seats in the Rhodesian House of Assembly were 
reserved for black delegates.  Such “enlightened” policies, in conjunction with the limited degree 
of racial intermingling that occurred in professional athletics and at some of Rhodesia’s top 
universities allowed many Rhodesians to delude themselves into thinking that their country’s 
racial policies were more progressive than South African apartheid.
224
  Most Afrikaners, by 
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contrast, believed their policy of “separate development” was more humane than the (albeit 
limited) racial intermingling which occurred across the Limpopo River.  While these differences 
may seem inconsequential in hindsight, this was not how many in Salisbury and Pretoria 
perceived them.  To the contrary, they helped prevent southern Africa’s remaining white 
redoubts from forging a stronger alliance against the myriad challenges posed by African 
nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s.
225
 
Personal factors also played a role in eroding the bonds of white solidarity.  At the 
highest level, John Vorster had long since soured on his Rhodesian counterpart.
226
  He had 
opposed Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, and the relationship between 
the two leaders languished thereafter.  Smith’s decision to close Rhodesia’s border with Zambia 
in January 1973 (in an effort to punish the Zambians for assisting the Zimbabwean guerrillas) 
had infuriated Vorster.  Not only had Smith failed to consult him with beforehand, but the border 
closure had thrust southern Africa’s racial problems back into the international limelight.  As a 
result, South Africa had found itself on the receiving end of a renewed barrage of criticism from 
the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity – both of which 
assumed that Vorster’s regime had sanctioned Smith’s decision.227  Despite all this, Smith was 
hardly the most reviled member of the Rhodesian Front.  That distinction was held by Defense 
Minister P.K. van der Byl, whom Vorster so despised that he was prohibited from accompanying 
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any Rhodesian delegation slated to meet with the South African Prime Minister.
228
  Several 
influential South African officials shared their leader’s contempt for Smith and his ministers, 
thereby ensuring that Rhodesian-South African relations remained far less harmonious than 
many outsiders appreciated. 
But perhaps the most important reason Vorster came to regard the Rhodesian Front as 
expendable was that its continued refusal to reach a settlement with the Zimbabwean nationalists 
threatened to destabilize the entire region.  Whereas the South African Government had viewed 
Rhodesia as a useful buffer against the black states north of the Zambezi River at the time of 
UDI, the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1974 forced Vorster to reassess this view.  Once 
Mozambique and Angola had attained independence, Vorster realized, a white-ruled Rhodesia 
could no longer serve as an effective cordon sanitaire between his country and black Africa.  To 
the contrary, he began to see in the Rhodesian crisis the seeds of another Angola, with a 
protracted guerrilla war leading to political, economic, and military chaos.  Vorster also 
appreciated that the longer the bush war dragged on, the more likely Robert Mugabe and his 
“wild boys” were to seize control of Rhodesia and transform the colony into a springboard for 
guerrilla attacks against South Africa.
229
  Therefore, he quietly let it be known that he was 
willing to sacrifice the Rhodesian Front at the altar of African nationalism – provided that a 
“moderate” black regime succeeded the Rhodesian Front.230  Vorster may also have hoped that 
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facilitating Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule would gain his regime more time in which to 
pursue its strategy of relocating black Africans into politically independent but impoverished 
“homelands.”231 
Although Vorster had expressed a willingness to pressure the Rhodesian Front into 
granting majority rule, Kissinger could not assume that the South African Prime Minister would 
automatically support an Anglo-American initiative.  For one, Vorster had imbibed a particularly 
virulent strain of Afrikaner nationalism and felt a searing hatred of all things British.
232
  Whether 
he could bring himself to cooperate with the Callaghan Government, therefore, remained 
uncertain.  Vorster also had his doubts about the Americans after the Ford Administration had 
left South Africa “in the lurch” in Angola the previous year.233  The fact that a number of 
influential South African ministers shared this opinion sparked a heated debate as to whether 
such an “indecisive and unreliable” nation could be trusted.234  Finally, even if Vorster was able 
to overcome his distrust of the British and the Americans, there was no guarantee that he would 
be able to garner sufficient support for such a drastic change of policy among his countrymen 
and cabinet colleagues.  Although the Prime Minister had come to regard the Rhodesian Front as 
“the Achilles heel of Southern Africa,” many white South Africans saw “good old Smithy” as an 
ally fighting for a common cause.
  
The fact that a substantial number of Rhodesians were of 
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South African stock only served to make the issue that much more emotionally charged.
235
  
Despite these obstacles, Kissinger saw South African pressure as the key to unlocking the 
Rhodesian crisis and was determined to see whether Vorster was willing to play his 
“indispensable part” in the search for Zimbabwean independence. 
However, the Kissinger-Vorster summit was nearly derailed by the international furor 
caused by the South African Government’s draconian handling of a student protest in Soweto (an 
impoverished township on the outskirts of Johannesburg).  On June 16, only a week before 
Vorster was scheduled to meet with Kissinger, violence erupted in the poverty-stricken 
community when white police officers shot and killed Hector Petersen, a black thirteen-year-old.  
Petersen had been one of nearly 10,000 schoolchildren protesting a recent government mandate 
that classes not taught in an indigenous African language would henceforth be taught in 
Afrikaans rather than in English.  With most of its 700,000 residents living below the poverty 
line, unable to find employment, and crammed into primitive dwellings that had neither 
electricity nor running water, Soweto was nothing short of a powder keg.  The government’s 
decision to force students to learn Afrikaans, long despised as the “language of the conqueror,” 
provided the necessary spark.  The student protesters responded to Petersen’s murder by setting 
schools, government buildings, and vehicles ablaze.  The police retaliated by firing on the crowd, 
which only served to further provoke the protestors.  Despite official claims that the situation 
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was “completely under control” by early evening, the violence raged on throughout the night and 
most of the next day, leaving nearly 600 dead and many more wounded.
236
       
The international community rushed to condemn the South African government for the 
incident.  In the days following the uprising, stories portraying the plight of Soweto’s residents 
were splashed across front pages throughout Africa and the West.  Most accounts (including 
those presented in such South African dailies as The Rand Daily Mail and Die Vaderland) 
blamed the incident, the bloodiest to occur on South African soil in 16 years, on the Afrikaners’ 
apartheid policies.
237
  So did the United Nations Security Council, which unanimously passed a 
resolution condemning the South African government for its heavy-handed actions and calling 
for an end to all forms of racial discrimination in the Republic.
238
  In light of the Soweto 
uprising, some clamored for Kissinger to call off his upcoming summit with the South Africans.  
These calls seem to have gone unheeded; for the record contains no indication that the Ford 
Administration considered cancelling the Kissinger-Vorster talks.  To the contrary, they may 
have hoped that Vorster would be more amenable to the idea of pulling the plug on Ian Smith’s 
regime in the wake of the worst domestic crisis of his prime ministership.  
At his June 23 meeting with the South Africans, Kissinger quickly cut to the chase.  The 
Secretary offered Vorster two choices: he could either work to promote majority rule in Rhodesia 
or he could continue playing for time while the situation around him crumbled.  Kissinger 
pledged to provide South Africa with substantial economic aid if Vorster agreed to play a 
constructive role in the search for Zimbabwean independence.  If he refused, Kissinger warned, 
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the Ford Administration would be forced to turn its back on Pretoria.  It was, Kissinger 
acknowledged, “as fundamental a decision as any South African Prime Minister had ever 
faced.”239  Whether because of the downturn in South African-Rhodesian relations, Vorster’s 
pessimism about the Rhodesian Front’s ability to defeat the guerrillas, or because of a sense of 
crisis generated by the Soweto uprising, Vorster agreed to apply the necessary pressure on the 
Rhodesian Front as long as the Americans and British could produce a “reasonable deal” that he 
could “sell” to his electorate.  He predicted that a package which included: financial inducements 
designed to prevent an exodus of white artisans, farmers, and civil servants; the enshrinement of 
minority rights in Zimbabwe’s independence constitution; a “moderate” black leader; a British 
presence during the transition period; and an end to the bush war would allow him the latitude he 
needed to pressure Smith into another round of negotiations with the nationalists.
240
  The deal 
was reaffirmed during the course of a follow-up meeting the next day, and Kissinger left the 
summit confident that he was on the verge of bringing the Rhodesian saga to an end.
241
 
 
The Anglo-American-South African Initiative 
After his summit with the South Africans, Kissinger returned to London to debrief the 
British.  The Secretary relayed Vorster’s willingness to pressure Ian Smith to negotiate with the 
nationalists so long as his preconditions were satisfied.  The transatlantic allies agreed that there 
would need to be some political and economic incentives to encourage whites in key fields to 
remain in the country after majority rule was implemented.  For unless a sufficient number of 
white farmers, artisans, and civil servants could be persuaded to stay on until their African 
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replacements had been trained, Zimbabwe’s economy was likely to run aground.  The allies also 
discussed the idea of Britain assuming control of Rhodesia during a brief transition period in 
order to ease tensions and ensure that free and fair elections were held as soon as was 
practicable.  Kissinger explained that his discussions with Vorster had reaffirmed his belief that 
the United Kingdom would need to govern Rhodesia during the transitional period if a workable 
agreement was to be reached.  Callaghan was not sanguine about the possibility of re-imposing 
colonial control and concluded that he would have to “think very carefully” about it.242   
While the British pondered how active a role they were willing to assume in Rhodesia, 
Kissinger dispatched Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele to 
southern Africa to determine whether the general framework he had discussed with the South 
Africans and the British was acceptable to Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda.  Specifically, he 
wanted to know whether the Presidents would support a package deal that called for an 18- to 
24-month transition to majority rule, economic and political guarantees for the Rhodesian whites, 
and British oversight of the transition period.  During the course of a July 9 meeting in Lusaka, 
Schaufele outlined this plan to Kenneth Kaunda.  Although Kaunda was hesitant to commit 
himself, Schaufele came away from the meeting confident that, when push came to shove, the 
Zambian leader would support the deal.
243
  Schaufele was further encouraged by the results of a 
July 12 meeting in Dar es Salaam.  Nyerere cautioned that the divisions among the Zimbabwean 
nationalists could pose problems down the road, but he encouraged the Americans to “push on” 
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with their initiative.
244
  Schaufele also discussed the scheme with Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Joshua Nkomo.  When 
none of these leaders objected to the details of the package he presented, Schaufele informed 
Kissinger that he had received a “general mandate” to continue working toward a negotiated 
settlement along the lines envisioned in Washington, London, and Pretoria.
245
   
When the British learned of the positive reception Schaufele had received in Africa, they 
decided that the time was ripe to make a final push for Zimbabwean independence.  “Unless we 
take the opportunity thus presented, we shall probably lose our last chance of bringing about a 
peaceful settlement on the basis of the principles set out by the Prime Minister in his statement of 
22 March,” one high-ranking official remarked during a meeting of the Ministerial Group on 
Southern Africa.
246
  Seizing upon this opportunity, however, was easier said than done.  In order 
to proceed with the initiative, Callaghan needed to secure the approval of his Cabinet, and the 
presence of left-wing ministers such as Tony Benn and Michael Foot ensured that this would be 
no easy feat.  Like many Labourites, Benn and Foot loathed South Africa and were reluctant to 
jeopardize Britain’s relations with black Africa by entering into negotiations with John Vorster, 
the high priest of apartheid.  Callaghan was temporarily able to skirt the issue by confining 
discussion of Rhodesian affairs to the Ministerial Group on Southern Africa, a body over which 
he could exercise a more direct influence than he could his Cabinet.  On July 22, Callaghan and 
Tony Crosland persuaded the Ministerial Group to allow Kissinger to press ahead with the 
initiative as long as the Frontline Presidents remained on board.
247
  Shortly thereafter, Crosland 
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informed the British Ambassador to Washington that Kissinger was free to present the Anglo-
American package to the South Africans as soon as it was finalized.
248
   
While the transatlantic allies continued to hammer out the details of the package, the 
British insisted upon further consultations with the Frontline Presidents.  Ostensibly designed to 
keep the Presidents up-to-date, these consultations also arose out of British concerns about Henry 
Kissinger’s modus operandi.  The British had harbored suspicions about the Secretary’s African 
policy from the beginning (especially the haste with which the Secretary was determined to work 
and his ignorance of African affairs), and these concerns escalated as several tactical 
disagreements began to boil to the surface.
249
  British officials also worried that Kissinger not 
keeping them adequately informed about his summit with Vorster and Schaufele’s subsequent 
African mission.  “There is a danger of Kissinger running away with us,” noted one member of 
the Rhodesia Department.  “What I fear is that in his eagerness to get on, he is consciously or 
unconsciously concealing some of the difficulties, over-simplifying some of the issues, and 
possibly representing to us that Vorster on the one hand and the Africans on the other are more 
wholeheartedly in agreement with his plan than is actually the case.”250  While the British did not 
“detect or suspect any devious US attempt to deceive us,” they felt it wise “to keep our eyes open 
just in case.”251  A joint demarche to the Frontline Presidents offered a perfect pretext for 
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checking up on the Americans.  Because Gerald Ford was unwilling to act without Britain’s 
support, Kissinger had little choice but to acquiesce to the British request. 
Kissinger and Crosland intended to send a joint delegation to southern Africa, but this 
plan was abandoned at the last minute because the statesmen wanted to get separate readings of 
the Frontline Presidents’ attitudes “and compare notes afterwards.”252  The new plan called for 
an American delegation (headed by Schaufele and Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs 
William Rogers) to consult with Nyerere, Kaunda, and Mozambican President Samora Machel.  
A British team (headed by Minister of State for African Affairs Ted Rowlands and Tony Duff) 
would follow on the Americans’ heels.  Both delegations would work from a joint brief prepared 
in advance, and, in a further display of collaboration, Kissinger arranged for the American 
ambassadors to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and Maputo to brief their British counterparts about what 
had transpired during Schaufele and Rogers’s meeting with the host President.253  Through these 
consultations, the British and Americans would keep each other fully briefed about their findings 
and opinions.  If everything seemed promising, Kissinger would meet with Vorster to discuss the 
specifics of the package which the Americans and British were assembling and to confirm that 
the Prime Minister was still willing to tighten the screws on the Rhodesian Front. 
The Americans found Kaunda and Nyerere in a much more pessimistic mood than they 
had been a month earlier.  While they quibbled with various aspects of the Anglo-American 
package, it soon became apparent that they were primarily concerned about the disunity among 
the nationalist factions.  Nyerere, in particular, felt that ZANU and ZAPU were prepared to deal 
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with the Rhodesian Front but not with each other.
254
  As Schaufele surmised, there was “one 
basic reason” for the Tanzanian leader’s reluctance to support the Anglo-American-South 
African initiative: the “disarray” within the ranks of the Zimbabwean nationalists.255  Kenneth 
Kaunda echoed these concerns.
256
  So did Samora Machel, who glumly predicted that unless the 
rift between ZANU and ZAPU was healed, “an Angola-type civil war” was likely to erupt if and 
when Ian Smith agreed to cede power.
257
   
Despite these concerns, Henry Kissinger was determined to plow ahead with his 
Rhodesian diplomacy.  This push may have come at the behest of Gerald Ford, who had 
refrained from openly advocating majority rule throughout the 1976 Republican primary 
campaign.
258
  Once he had clinched his party’s nomination for the presidency, however, Ford 
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was eager to see progress in Rhodesia – perhaps in the hope that facilitating the colony’s 
transition to majority rule would appeal to independent voters.  “Now that we’ve gotten rid of 
that son-of-a-bitch Reagan, we can just do what’s right,” the President told his chief foreign 
policy advisers before an August 30 Cabinet meeting.
259
  James Callaghan shared this desire for 
haste.  He realized that Joshua Nkomo was rapidly losing ground to the “boys with the guns” and 
questioned whether Jimmy Carter, whom the British Embassy in Washington expected to capture 
the American presidency in November, would share Ford and Kissinger’s determination to 
resolve the Rhodesian crisis.
260
  Thus, although Nyerere, Kaunda, and Machel were pessimistic 
about their ability to unify the Zimbabwean nationalists, the transatlantic allies decided to 
proceed with their initiative.
261
   
On September 4, Kissinger met with the South African Prime Minister in Zurich.  Vorster 
seemed prepared to pull the rug out from under Smith, and the conversation shifted to tactics.  
The Secretary advised Vorster to try to compel Smith to publicly declare his intention to move 
toward majority rule within two years and to invite the Zimbabwean nationalists to negotiate 
with him.  Such an offer, Kissinger predicted, would be difficult for the nationalists to refuse.  As 
the meeting was winding down, Vorster requested that Kissinger meet with Smith.  The 
Secretary demurred.  “I haven’t got much heart for doing it,” he confessed.  However, Vorster 
was insistent.  “You think it’s a painful thing,” he stated, “we think it’s the logical thing to do.”  
The South African Foreign Minister reinforced this argument, pointing out that Rhodesia’s 1961 
constitution contained the seeds of majority rule.  With more than a trace of disdain, he claimed 
that a rapid transfer to majority rule was “the logical result of what they’ve been advocating for 
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years.”262  Kissinger was unenthusiastic about the prospect of meeting the Rhodesian leader, but 
he agreed to do so if such a tête-à-tête would drive home to Smith the fact that his regime was 
completely isolated.
263
  Thus, by September 1976, all the pieces for a successful resolution of the 
Rhodesian crisis seemed to be falling into place. 
On September 14, shortly after departing Zurich, Vorster summoned Ian Smith to 
Pretoria to let him know that the game was up.  In no uncertain terms, Vorster threatened to 
withdraw his country’s military and economic support unless Smith accepted the Anglo-
American-South African deal.  Smith vehemently protested this ultimatum, warning that the 
Rhodesians were a proud people and that there were limits to what they would accept.  If outside 
powers tried to push him too far in the direction of “abject surrender,” Smith vowed, he was 
prepared to “face the consequences” of going it alone.264  However, the Rhodesian leader must 
have known that these words would ring hollow; he knew better than anyone that his regime was 
doomed if the South African lifeline was severed.  With his back against the wall, Smith agreed 
to meet with the American Secretary of State and hear him out.   
On September 19, the Rhodesian leader returned to South Africa – this time to meet with 
Henry Kissinger.  It was a difficult meeting for both sides.  Before the negotiations commenced, 
Kissinger and Smith spoke privately for twenty minutes.  The Secretary acknowledged that the 
proposal he was about to put forward was far from perfect, but he insisted that it represented the 
best deal the Rhodesians were likely to get.
265
  When they returned, Kissinger assured the 
Rhodesians that he derived no joy from his task.  To the contrary, he considered it “a tragedy” 
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because both races would be worse off under majority rule.
266
  Nevertheless, he emphasized that 
a rapid transition to majority rule was the only way to forestall an all-out race war and a likely 
communist takeover.  Demonstrating a detailed knowledge of the bush war that impressed even 
the head of Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organization, Kissinger reminded the Rhodesians 
that their position was becoming untenable.  Unless they received substantial military and 
economic assistance, their country was likely to collapse within a matter of months.
267
  Such aid, 
Kissinger declared, could not be expected from the United States.  “There is no domestic support 
for it in America,” he asserted.  “There are many conservatives in America who are heroic in 
speeches until they have to vote for military spending.”  The Secretary then proceeded to lay out 
the terms of the Anglo-American-South African plan.  It required the Rhodesians to implement 
majority rule within two years.  In exchange, the British would lift sanctions and the Frontline 
Presidents would use their leverage to persuade the guerrillas tamp down the bush war.  To 
sweeten the pot, Kissinger pledged that Rhodesia would receive $2 billion in financial aid once a 
black government was in place.
268
  Confronted by Kissinger and Vorster, Smith saw no option 
but to acquiesce.
269
  He accepted Kissinger’s terms but maintained that he would have to 
persuade his Cabinet colleagues to agree to them as well.  Smith pledged he would do his best to 
convince them but refused to make any promises.
270
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On September 24, Smith took to the airwaves to announce his party’s decision.  The 
announcement was much anticipated throughout Africa and the West.  In his usual monotone, 
Smith announced that he had accepted Kissinger’s terms.  The Prime Minister made it clear that 
he did not regard the proposals put forth in Pretoria as the best solution to Rhodesia’s problems, 
stating that he had been forced to accept against his better judgment.  “The American and British 
governments, together with the major Western powers, have made up their minds as to the kind 
of solution they wish to see in Rhodesia and they are determined to bring it about,” he stated.  
“The alternative to acceptance of the proposals was explained to us in the clearest of terms, 
which left no room for misunderstandings.”  In an effort to reassure his audience, Smith listed 
the benefits of the Anglo-American-South African package: it would end the bush war, result in 
the lifting of sanctions, and bring a much-needed financial stimulus.  Despite his reservations, 
Smith encouraged his followers to rally behind the plan.  “What I have said this evening will be 
the cause of deep concern to you all, and understandably so,” he acknowledged.  “But we live in 
a world of rapid change, and if we are to survive, we must be prepared to adapt ourselves to 
change.”271 
 Reactions to Smith’s speech varied.  Many Rhodesians could only listen in disbelief as 
the man who, only six months earlier, had declared that there would be no majority rule in 
Rhodesia for another thousand years, publicly agreed to hand over power in a mere 24 months.  
Conversely, the Western media portrayed Kissinger as a miracle worker.  Time hailed Smith’s 
September 24 announcement as “the spectacular climax of a carefully and astutely planned push 
for peace.”272  The Washington Post praised Kissinger for displaying an unexpected degree of 
courage and imagination.  “He has added luster to his own reputation, and he has provided a 
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heartening example of the wise use of American power,” one editorial gushed.273  Thus, although 
Kissinger remained stoic while listening to the BBC feed of Smith’s speech as his Boeing 707 
sped back to Andrews Air Force Base, he had ample reason to be pleased with the results of his 
African diplomacy.  He had seemingly prevented a race war from erupting in southern Africa 
and deprived the communists of an opportunity to meddle in the region.  Moreover, if a 
negotiated settlement could be reached before the upcoming presidential election, it was possible 
that the agreement might help Gerald Ford win re-election.
274 
 
The Geneva Conference and its Aftermath 
Despite the media hoopla, Kissinger’s Rhodesian diplomacy did not lead to a settlement.  
The obvious question is: why not?  Some of the blame rests with the British – a theory Kissinger 
has espoused in his memoirs.
275
  Sour grapes aside, there is a good deal of substance to these 
charges.  As previously noted, the British were anxious to avoid becoming too deeply embroiled 
in Rhodesian affairs.  The Labour Party had historically been pessimistic about Britain’s ability 
to affect change in Rhodesia, and the country’s 1976 appeal to the International Monetary Fund 
for a bailout only served to increase this sense of impotence.  “In our Cabinet, there is a marked 
reluctance to get involved [in Rhodesian affairs] because we have been caught before,” James 
Callaghan remarked during a September 1976 meeting with Kissinger.  “You can imagine, in our 
present economic situation and [with] lots of other problems, there is no great rush in the Cabinet 
                                                          
273
 Washington Post, “An African Success,” September 26, 1976.  See also, NBC Nightly News, September 24, 
1976, VTVA. 
274
 The African media was far more restrained in its response to Smith’s address.  See, for instance, Editorial, 
Ghanaian Times, September 28, 1976 and Editorial, Daily News (Dar es Salaam), September 27, in ed. 
Baumhogger, The Struggle for Independence, vol. 2, 157 and 158. 
275
 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1014. 
91 
 
to get into the process again.” 276  British ministers had hoped that, with Kissinger serving as an 
interlocutor, Smith and the Zimbabwean nationalists would be able to reach an agreement on 
their own.  Assuming that their only duty would be to approve the deal struck by the two sides, 
British officials were caught off guard when they were asked to chair a Rhodesian conference.  
Having hoped to avoid wading back into the Rhodesian morass, they only agreed to do so only 
under a torrent of international pressure.
277
  There was, therefore, little optimism in London 
when Tony Crosland announced on September 29 that Britain would convene a conference in 
Geneva, the aim of which would be to work out the details of the interim government that would 
draft Zimbabwe’s independence constitution and oversee the country’s first set of elections.   
Shortly thereafter, the British tapped their representative to the United Nations, Ivor 
Richard, to chair the conference.  It was a strange choice.  Not only was it customary for the 
Foreign Secretary to chair such talks, but the nationalists distrusted Richard, who, in the words of 
Joshua Nkomo, “had consistently vetoed every helpful proposal anyone made for Rhodesia” at 
the UN.
278
  Some scholars have viewed the decision to send Richard to Geneva as proof that the 
British did not take the conference seriously.
279
  More likely, the decision underscored the fact 
that Britain expected the Rhodesians and the nationalists to make most of the running.  Whatever 
the case, Richard proved to be an ineffective chairman.  He failed to develop a strong rapport 
with either the Rhodesians or the nationalists and allowed the conference to become bogged 
down in trivial matters.  Not all of the blame can be laid on the chairman’s shoulders, however; 
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he was handicapped by the Foreign Office’s lack of preparation.  Operating under the 
assumption that the British role at Geneva would merely be to facilitate negotiations between 
Smith and the nationalists, the Foreign Office never developed a coherent strategy for prodding 
the sides toward an agreement.  As one high-ranking British official subsequently recalled, his 
pre-conference briefing consisted of little more than being told, “Well, good luck.  Have a good 
conference.”280  Combined with Richard’s poor chairmanship, this lack of a coherent strategy all 
but ensured that the talks would run aground. 
While acknowledging that the British did not handle the Geneva Conference particularly 
well, many scholars of the Rhodesian crisis have blamed Henry Kissinger for handing the British 
a poisoned chalice.
281
  Again, there is a good deal of truth to this claim.  In his haste to get a deal 
done, the Secretary promised more than he – or Ivor Richard – could deliver.  In his meeting 
with Ian Smith and John Vorster, Kissinger made two concessions that deviated from the Anglo-
American-South Africans proposals.  He told Smith that the Rhodesians could chair the interim 
government that would oversee Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule.  He also suggested that the 
Rhodesians could retain control of the army and the police during the transition.  Neither the 
nationalists nor the Frontline Presidents had agreed to these conditions.  When Kissinger 
subsequently met with Kenneth Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo, it quickly became clear that they 
had serious qualms about them.  The proposed structure of the interim government seemed to 
leave too much power in the hands of the whites, while the prospect of leaving one of Smith’s 
cronies in charge of the army and police raised questions as to whether these forces would be 
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used to undermine majority rule.
282
  Kissinger was so disturbed by the tepid reception that these 
proposals received from Kaunda and Nkomo that he resorted to a bit of deception, reassuring the 
Frontline Presidents that these matters were not set in stone while simultaneously intimating to 
Smith that the Presidents had okayed the terms of their September 19 agreement.
283
  Thus, it was 
only by “lying to all sides” that the Secretary managed to entice the Rhodesian Front and the 
Zimbabwean nationalists into coming to Geneva. 
Kissinger hoped that Smith’s September 24 address would generate enough momentum 
to make the Geneva Conference a success.
284
  Unfortunately for Ivor Richard and the British, this 
did not prove to be the case.  Smith believed he was going to Geneva to accept the deal that 
Kissinger had presented in Pretoria – including the crucial concessions regarding the make-up of 
the interim government and control of the army and police.  As Smith had indicated in his 
September 24 statement, the “Kissinger proposals” represented the limit to which he was 
prepared to go.  Once it became clear that the nationalists and the British regarded Kissinger’s 
terms as little more than “a basis for negotiations,” the Rhodesians quickly lost interest in the 
conference.  Rather than working to achieve a settlement, they angled to ensure that the 
conference would collapse – and that the blame would be pinned on the nationalists. 
The nationalists, for their part, had little interest in the “Kissinger proposals.”  This was 
particularly true of ZANU, which was beginning to make major inroads against the Rhodesian 
security forces.  Influenced by their ties to China, ZANU’s military commanders had adopted the 
Maoist techniques of infiltration, peasant mobilization, and guerrilla warfare.  By 1976, these 
tactics, along with their bases in Mozambique, had enabled ZANU to knock Smith’s army on its 
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heels.
285
  Unaware of the behind-the-scenes pressure Vorster was applying on Smith, ZANU 
officials believed that it was the bush war which had prompted the Rhodesian leader to concede 
the principle of majority rule.  They therefore assumed that an intensification of the war would 
bring the Rhodesians to their knees.  As Robert Mugabe told a cadre of guerrillas, “We shouldn’t 
worry about the Kissinger-British proposals…When Smith’s army is tired, he will come to us 
and say: ‘Gentlemen, let’s talk about the transfer of power.’  The only time for negotiations is 
that time.”286  Given ZANU’s military prowess and Mugabe’s desire to transform Zimbabwe into 
a socialist state, it is unlikely that the ZANU leader would have accepted anything less than 
Smith’s unconditional surrender at Geneva.  If, as some scholars have suggested, Mugabe felt 
compelled to assume an even more hardline position in order to appease ZANU’s guerrilla 
commanders, the chances of an agreement were virtually nil.
287
   
Mugabe’s intransigence left Joshua Nkomo in a bind.  The ZAPU leader had little 
appetite for guerrilla warfare and his views were more “moderate” than those of Mugabe and his 
“wild boys.”  Nevertheless, Nkomo’s star had been on the wane since his abortive negotiations 
with Ian Smith earlier that year.  In an attempt to revive his flagging fortunes, Nkomo did not 
resist when the Frontline Presidents urged ZANU and ZAPU to unite under the umbrella of the 
Patriotic Front.
288
  For both Mugabe and Nkomo, however, the Patriotic Front was little more 
than a marriage of convenience.  ZANU had the support of the guerrillas, while ZAPU had more 
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popular support within Rhodesia.  Unfortunately for Nkomo, the arrangement worked to his 
disadvantage.  He was the more senior politician, but his message of compromise and 
moderation was less appealing to a younger generation than was Mugabe’s call for “power to the 
people.”  Thus, even though Nkomo was interested in settling at Geneva, he was conscious of his 
need to avoid being labeled a “sell-out.”  This meant that he could not afford to be seen as more 
conciliatory than Mugabe and his ZANU colleagues, and in an effort to prove his nationalist 
credentials, Nkomo found himself swept along by the ZANU leader’s uncompromising 
positions.
289
  According to journalist Martin Meredith, the other nationalist leaders at Geneva 
(Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole) also felt unable to assume a more moderate 
position for fear of being discredited as “stooges.”290  In this way, the group dynamic among the 
nationalist leaders ensured that Ivor Richard’s task would be a Herculean one. 
Further contributing to the unlikelihood that an accord would be reached at Geneva was 
the fact that the South Africans and the Frontline Presidents refused to lean too heavily on their 
clients to settle.  According to Meredith and political scientist Stephan John Stedman, John 
Vorster accepted Smith’s view that the “Kissinger proposals” were non-negotiable.291  This 
seems plausible; for while Vorster wanted to install a moderate black government in Salisbury, 
he had no desire to see Robert Mugabe or his “radical” colleagues seize power.  Unfortunately 
for Ivor Richard, this meant that Vorster was unwilling to force Smith to compromise.  Nor were 
the Frontline Presidents willing to stick their necks out for what they regarded as a “Smith-
Kissinger-Vorster” arrangement.  They appreciated that the Secretary had compelled Smith to 
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publicly acknowledge the need for majority rule but insisted that the deal the Rhodesian leader 
had accepted in Pretoria represented nothing more than “a basis for negotiations.”  Thus, while 
the Frontline Presidents had compelled Mugabe and Nkomo to attend the Geneva Conference to 
see whether there was any give in Smith’s position, they were unwilling to force the co-leaders 
of the Patriotic Front to agree to terms once it became clear that Smith was not prepared to 
bargain in good faith.   
Because the positions of the two sides were irreconcilable, and because their respective 
patrons were not willing to coerce their clients into accepting a compromise agreement, it should 
come as no surprise that the Geneva Conference quickly ground to a halt.
292
  The Rhodesian 
delegation failed to table a single constructive resolution, clinging to its claim that the “Kissinger 
package” was non-negotiable.  For their part, the nationalists were equally unwilling to 
compromise at the very moment their armed struggle was beginning to bear fruit.  Mugabe, 
Nkomo, and their supporters spent most of their time in Geneva trying to brandish their 
revolutionary credentials by criticizing the British and making exorbitant demands.
293
  Amid 
bitter recriminations from both sides, Ivor Richard, spent nearly a month trying to get the 
delegations to agree upon a number of minor issues.  When the delegations finally began to 
discuss the actual powers and structure of the transition government, they made virtually no 
headway.  On December 3, after six weeks of frustration and stalemate, Richard informed the 
Foreign Office that an impasse had been reached.  “[T]here is no evidence that any delegation is 
prepared to take part in an actual negotiation.  Each delegation may be willing to criticise the 
proposals of the others, but each is likely to stand firm on his own position.”294  After consulting 
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with Tony Crosland and Henry Kissinger, the chairman adjourned the conference on December 
14.  British and American officials hoped to reconvene the conference after the new year, but 
neither the Rhodesians nor the nationalists were willing to return to Geneva.  Thus it was that 
Kissinger’s Rhodesian initiative ended, not with a bang, but with a whimper. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the underappreciated role played by the British, the 1976 Anglo-American-South 
African initiative bore Henry Kissinger’s unmistakable footprint.295  For this reason, it seems 
reasonable to briefly examine the merits and demerits of the Secretary’s Rhodesian diplomacy.  
Generally speaking, scholars have not tended to view Kissinger’s actions in a favorable light.  
On the one hand, these negative assessments probably reflect the fact that it is highly 
unfashionable to view anything Kissinger did in a favorable light.
296
  On the other hand, however 
these criticisms reflect that fact that Kissinger made a number of mistakes which undermined his 
efforts to play peacemaker in southern Africa.  Chief among these were his failure to take the 
wishes of the Zimbabwean nationalists and the Frontline Presidents seriously and his duplicitous 
negotiating style.  Kissinger’s tactics enabled him to get the Rhodesian protagonists to Geneva; 
however, they all but ensured that the conference would not succeed.
297
   
These criticisms are fair, but they are also somewhat misleading.  Implicit in them is the 
assumption that, if Kissinger had behaved differently, the Geneva Conference could have 
produced a workable arrangement – thereby sparing the people of southern Africa three years of 
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war and devastation.  Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that the Rhodesian leaders 
or the Zimbabwean nationalists were prepared to accept a negotiated settlement in 1976.  To the 
contrary, both sides still believed they could achieve their aims on the battlefield and therefore 
did not need to bother with negotiations.
298
  Given that the British were the only party interested 
in reaching a settlement at Geneva, it is difficult to fault Kissinger too much for the conference’s 
collapse.  Even if the Secretary had played his hand differently, the Rhodesian protagonists were 
simply not prepared to enter into a power-sharing agreement in 1976. 
While the Geneva Conference failed to resolve the Rhodesian crisis, Kissinger’s African 
diplomacy was not a complete loss.  First and foremost, it prevented southern Africa from sliding 
into an all-out race war.  Using only his prestige and America’s political and economic clout, the 
Secretary managed to convince John Vorster to put the squeeze on Ian Smith.  With Vorster 
threatening to sever the South African lifeline, Smith was left with no choice but to publicly 
accept the need for majority rule within two years.  Henry Kissinger (who appreciated the 
communist threat to southern Africa and refused to lecture the Afrikaners on the evils of 
apartheid) might have been the only statesman capable of persuading Vorster to sever South 
Africa’s ties to the Rhodesian Front.  The British had been trying to do so for years and had 
nothing to show for their efforts.
299
   Kissinger certainly benefitted from the poor state of South 
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African-Rhodesian relations in 1976, but his success cannot be attributed solely to the tension 
that existed between the regimes in Pretoria and Salisbury.  As will become clear in the next 
chapter, the Carter Administration’s hostility toward Pretoria prompted Vorster to reevaluate his 
willingness to support future Anglo-American initiatives in spite of his lingering disenchantment 
with the Rhodesian leadership.   
It can be argued that in spite of all the pressure on him, Smith continued to believe that he 
could find a way to postpone the advent of black majority rule.  His behavior at the Geneva 
Conference certainly suggests as much.
300
  Be that as it may, the psychological effect of his 
September 24 announcement cannot be gainsaid.  Overnight, the terms of the debate shifted from 
whether there would be majority rule in Rhodesia to when it would arrive.  This sudden reversal 
came as a shock to many Rhodesians, who had assumed that “good old Smithy” would continue 
to fight to preserve their privileged position.  Many of the young men fighting the bush war 
began to ask why they should risk their lives for a lost cause.
301
  Farmers and other Rhodesians 
who saw no future for themselves in a black-ruled country quietly absconded to South Africa, 
Britain, Australia, or the United States.  Thus, whatever Smith may have felt about his ability to 
preserve minority rule in 1976, many of his countrymen began to see the writing on the wall.  
Kissinger’s Rhodesian initiative also made a considerable impact north of the Zambezi 
River.  Most notably, it demonstrated America’s new-found commitment to the cause of majority 
rule in southern Africa.  Although the Geneva Conference came to naught, Kissinger’s shuttle 
diplomacy resuscitated the seemingly-moribund negotiating process.  This came as a great relief 
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to the Frontline Presidents – as evidenced by Kenneth Kaunda’s response to Kissinger’s Lusaka 
Address.  For despite their fiery rhetoric, the Presidents preferred a negotiated settlement to a 
prolonged and costly military showdown with the Rhodesian security forces.  By reviving the 
Presidents’ confidence that the Rhodesian crisis could be resolved by international mediation, 
Kissinger also managed to counter the appeal of the Soviet Union and Cuba, whose prestige in 
Africa had been at an all-time high after their decisive intervention in the Angolan civil war.   
Thus, although Kissinger was unable to bring the Rhodesian crisis to an end, the 
significance of his shuttle diplomacy should not be overlooked.  He may have been overly 
concerned with accommodating the Rhodesian whites and his methods may have been crude, but 
he managed to achieve about as much as could have been expected given the circumstances.
302
  
This was why – despite his tendency to view African affairs through the lens of the Cold War 
and his “lone ranger” style of diplomacy – the Zambians and the British had been so eager to 
involve him in the search for Zimbabwean independence.  As Prime Minister Callaghan 
explained to his West German counterpart, “Because of American power,” Kissinger “could do 
things which we could not in Southern Africa.”303  Thus, as happened so often in the post-1945 
era, British policymakers hoped to use American might to achieve a foreign policy objective that 
otherwise would have been unachievable.
304
  Unfortunately for the British, not even the “Doctor 
of Diplomacy” could bridge the gap between the Rhodesians and the Zimbabwean nationalists in 
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1976.   Moreover, it remained to be seen whether the Carter Administration would be as willing 
to promote a Rhodesian settlement as its predecessor had been. 
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Chapter Three 
The Limits of Idealism: Jimmy Carter and the Rhodesian Crisis, 1977-1978 
 
At 8:25 on the morning of August 9, 1976, an armed column of ten Rhodesian vehicles 
rumbled into a guerrilla training camp on the Nyadzonya River, approximately 20 miles inside of 
Mozambique.  The vehicles were painted to resemble those used by the Mozambican army, and 
the men inside (the majority of whom were black Rhodesians) were disguised as Mozambican 
regulars.  An estimated 5,250 guerrillas were present at the camp that morning.  Their numbers 
shocked the Rhodesians, who were accustomed to encountering small pockets of guerrillas 
numbering no more than one hundred.  “Jesus,” muttered one of the Rhodesian troops.  “I just 
hope we don’t run out of ammunition.”  The Rhodesians chanted guerrilla slogans as they 
approached the camp’s parade ground.  “Zimbabwe tatora,” they proclaimed.  “We have taken 
Zimbabwe.”  As hundreds of unsuspecting guerrillas rushed forward to hear the news, the 
Rhodesians opened fire at point-blank range.  The results were devastating.  According to one 
Rhodesian account, “Hundreds of terrorists fell to the ground with the first onslaught of bullets, 
as though a gale wind had blown them off their feet.”  This account was corroborated by a 
guerrilla report which described the camp as nothing short of a killing field.  “After the first shot, 
all hell broke loose, light machine guns, sub-machineguns…and other sophisticated machine 
guns on the armoured cars opened up.”  After roughly 40 minutes of carnage, the Rhodesians 
torched the camp and retreated back across the border.305   
  The raid left several hundred guerrillas (known in Rhodesia as terrorists, or “terrs” for 
short) dead.  Hundreds more were injured.  The commander in charge of the raid was particularly 
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pleased by the number of wounded enemy combatants because “wounded men gave the enemy 
the additional problems of long-term care in back areas and clogged up their administration.”  
Moreover, “[t]he sight of legless comrades…did little to raise the martial ardour of new terrorist 
recruits.”306  The Nyadzonya raid marked a turning point in the Rhodesian bush war (known in 
Africa as the Chimurenga) in that it was the first large-scale raid the Rhodesian security forces 
had launched against a guerrilla target in a neighboring country.  When restrictions against the 
use of air power were lifted in 1977, these cross-border assaults became even more lethal.307  
While many in southern Africa condemned the Nyadzonya raid on humanitarian grounds 
(especially after the Mozambican authorities claimed that the base had actually been a refugee 
camp), the Rhodesians’ incursion into Mozambique threatened to ignite a race war, the 
consequences of which were deemed “too ghastly to contemplate.”308  As one New York Times 
editorial opined, “Whatever the provocation, the attack on a newly-independent neighboring 
state [Mozambique] only diminishes the already-slim chances for negotiating a peaceful 
transition to majority rule in Rhodesia.”309 
Such wanton violence abhorred US president Jimmy Carter, a deeply religious man who 
had come to office in 1977 determined to fundamentally alter the direction of American foreign 
policy.  He had made his intentions clear from day one, pledging in his inaugural address that 
America’s commitment to human rights would be “absolute” under his stewardship.  Carter said 
relatively little about domestic issues in the address, dedicating the majority of the speech to 
foreign affairs.  Unlike his Cold War predecessors, however, Carter refrained from saber-rattling 
and chastising the Soviet Union for its sins.  Instead, he laid out a new vision of American 
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diplomacy based upon regionalism, multilateralism, and the promotion of human rights.  
“Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere,” the President 
proclaimed, adding that “there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to 
undertake on this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is 
truly humane.”310  While Carter’s bland speaking style may have detracted somewhat from his 
message, his inaugural address was hardly the “themeless pudding, devoid of uplift or insight” 
that former Nixon speechwriter William Safire described it as.311  To the contrary, it marked the 
first time during the Cold War era that an American president had articulated a foreign policy 
based on anything other than virulent anti-communism.  
This chapter will argue that Carter’s 1977 Rhodesian diplomacy reflected his desire to 
move away from the Cold War orthodoxy, or what he described as a foreign policy based on “an 
inordinate fear of communism.”312  Whereas Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger had viewed the 
Rhodesian crisis through the prism of the East-West struggle, Jimmy Carter and his chief foreign 
policy advisers also regarded it as an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to promoting 
human rights.  Ultimately, however, their efforts foundered on the rocky shoals of Rhodesian 
intransigence when Prime Minister Ian Smith rejected an Anglo-American plan that would have 
brought nationalist leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo into the government of an 
independent Zimbabwe.  Thus, this chapter will argue that for all his idealism, Jimmy Carter was 
initially no more successful in his efforts to play peacemaker in southern African than Kenneth 
Kaunda and Henry Kissinger had been. 
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Jimmy Carter, America’s Human Rights President? 
 When Jimmy Carter left office in January 1981, his image was in serious need of 
rehabilitation.  In a poll taken shortly before Ronald Reagan’s inauguration, only 3% of 
respondents believed that Carter would be remembered as an “outstanding” president.  More than 
half of those polled rated his performance as “poor” or “below average.”313  To many Americans, 
Carter had seemed in over his head.  Long lines at the gas pump, “stagflation,” and the “Killer 
Rabbit” incident were seen as illustrations of his weakness. The ledger seemed similarly bleak 
when it came to foreign affairs.  The hostage crisis in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
and the fall of sympathetic leaders such as Iran’s Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Nicaragua’s 
Anastasio Somoza convinced many Americans that Carter was incapable of protecting the 
nation’s interests abroad.  The well-publicized feud between his National Security Adviser and 
Secretary of State provided critics with further evidence of Carter’s ineffective leadership.  
Perhaps a New York Times article best captured the mood of the nation when it editorialized, 
“The most common view…is that while he can point to a few notable accomplishments, Mr. 
Carter will not bequeath a particularly distinguished legacy to the nation.”314  Many Americans 
agreed, viewing Carter as yet another in a string of failed presidents.    
The first wave of scholarship on Carter’s presidency tended to reflect this negative 
view.315  History has been somewhat kinder to Carter, as a number of scholars have attempted to 
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rehabilitate his image.316  These revisionists tend to focus less on Carter’s actual 
accomplishments than on his intentions, goals, and worldview.  To many scholars writing after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, Carter’s desire to downplay America’s struggle against the Soviet 
Union, promote human rights, forge stronger relationships with nations in the developing world, 
reduce America’s global military presence, and eliminate nuclear stockpiles seem noble, 
responsible, and farsighted.  Many of these revisionists see Carter’s foreign policy agenda as so 
different from that of his immediate predecessors that they have dubbed it a “post-Cold War” 
vision of American diplomacy.317  Nor do they tend to fault Carter for his inability to implement 
his agenda.  They note that he was confronted with a burgeoning neoconservative movement 
bent on returning to a more staunchly anti-communist foreign policy, a fractured Democratic 
Party, and a host of uncooperative foreign leaders.  Given these circumstances, they argue that 
few leaders could have done better.318  By focusing on Carter’s goals and the constraints under 
which he operated, these revisionists have gone some way toward resurrecting Carter’s legacy. 
 While Carter’s “post-Cold War” vision consisted of a number of elements (de-
emphasizing the US-Soviet contest, reducing the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, improving 
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relations with nations in the developing world, reducing America’s military presence abroad, 
slashing arms sales, and focusing on environmental and economic issues), scholars have tended 
to stress his human rights policy.  Indeed, Carter’s presidency is generally regarded by historians 
of US foreign relations as the apex of America’s interest in human rights – at least during the 
Cold War era.  Rather than allowing scholars to reach a consensus, however, this focus has 
raised new questions about the legacy of America’s 39th President.  For instance, some critics 
have asked whether Carter genuinely believed in the cause of human rights or whether his lofty 
rhetoric served some other purpose.319  Others have asked how effective Carter was in pursuing 
his human rights agenda.320  Whichever side of these debates one comes down on, it seems clear 
that human rights has become one of the central metrics by which scholars have come to evaluate 
Jimmy Carter’s presidency – to say nothing of his post-presidential career.321   
Although one or two critics have suggested otherwise, there can be little doubt that 
Carter’s interest in human rights was heartfelt.  In some respects, it was a natural outgrowth of 
his religious convictions.  One former Carter speechwriter described his boss’s interest in human 
rights as “pure Jimmy.”  In the words of another former speechwriter, “[T]he moral theme was 
something right in Carter’s soul.”322  Once in office, Carter moved quickly to institutionalize his 
human rights agenda.  Most notably, he elevated the head of the recently-established Bureau of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to cabinet status in an attempt to give the Bureau a 
major voice within his Administration.  Under the leadership of former Civil Rights activist 
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Patricia Derian, the Bureau released annual reports grading each nation on how it treated its 
citizens.  Some of the most egregious human rights violators were denied military and economic 
assistance.323  These actions stand in stark contrast to those undertaken by Henry Kissinger, who 
resisted Congressional efforts to place a greater emphasis on human rights because of his belief 
that it would be “dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a 
direct objective of American foreign policy.”324 
However, historians are beginning to realize that political expediency also played an 
important role in Carter’s emphasis on human rights.  During the 1976 campaign, the Georgian 
assailed Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger for rooting their diplomacy in realpolitik rather than 
traditional American values.325  This proved to be an effective strategy in the aftermath of 
Vietnam and Watergate, and it helped Carter capture the presidency.326  Once in office, Carter 
hoped to use human rights to unite the fissiparous Democratic Party.327  Whereas Democrats had 
generally agreed on the necessity of containing communism during the early years of the Cold 
War, the political landscape had shifted dramatically by the time Carter took the oath of office.  
Generally speaking, Democrats in the 1970s fell into one of two camps when it came to foreign 
affairs: the “new internationalist” camp or the neoconservative camp.  Led by Senator Frank 
Church of Idaho and Representatives Tom Harkin of Iowa and Donald Fraser of Minnesota, the 
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“new internationalists” believed that the Soviet Union posed less of a threat to America’s 
national security than did the nation’s misbehavior abroad.  Conversely, neoconservatives like 
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington believed that the United States needed to assume 
a more bellicose posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.  One of the few points these groups agreed 
on was that the United States should support human rights abroad – the “new internationalists” 
because they believed the United States had an obligation to ease the plight of peoples 
worldwide, and the neoconservatives because they hoped to use Soviet human rights violations 
to pillory leaders in Moscow.328  Thus, Carter’s focus on human rights was not simply a 
byproduct of his Southern Baptist faith.  Rather, he hoped that it could become the basis of a new 
consensus that would unite the Democrats as they moved into a post-Cold War era. 
Carter hoped to reap other benefits from his human rights policy as well.  For one, he felt 
that a more moralistic foreign policy would allow him to gain the support of an American public 
that had grown disillusioned by Henry Kissinger’s perceived cynicism and amorality.329  Carter’s 
promotion of human rights also dovetailed with his desire to forge closer ties with nations in the 
developing world.  Given the President’s interest in improving America’s image, it should come 
as little surprise that his Administration tailored its human rights policy to appeal to the 
international community.  Indeed, the authors of one particularly important State Department 
document (Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 28) urged Carter to include economic and 
social rights in his human rights policy in order to make it more attractive to people in the 
developing world.  “A policy which subordinated these rights would not be consistent with our 
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humanitarian ideals and efforts, but would also be viewed unfavorably in those countries where 
the tendency is to view basic economic and social rights as the most important rights of all,” they 
asserted.330  In light of these facts, it seems clear that Carter was hardly the starry-eyed idealist 
that many detractors (and some supporters) have made him out to be.  His human rights agenda 
reflected his own moral and ethical values, but it was also designed to strengthen America’s 
global position by winning support at home and abroad.   
What remained to be seen was how this focus on human rights would be translated into 
action.  Recently-declassified documents demonstrate that, in most cases, Carter and his advisers 
intended to move cautiously in implementing their agenda.  They were well aware that their 
ability to alter the behavior of other nations was fairly limited.  They also understood that 
criticizing foreign governments’ domestic policies ran the risk of provoking a backlash, thereby 
straining official relations and possibly leading to increased repression.  Perhaps for these 
reasons, the authors of PRM-28 advocated using carrots (rewarding nations for human rights 
improvements) rather than sticks (taking punitive measures against human rights violators).  In 
those cases in which the Administration felt it necessary to use coercion, the authors 
recommended a gradual escalation of pressures, beginning with quiet diplomatic demarches and 
moving to symbolic gestures, public statements, and finally, the cessation of military and 
economic assistance.  Despite this rather cautious approach, the authors of PRM-28 cited several 
“exceptional circumstances” in which the United States would seek “dramatic improvements” in 
the short-term.  Rhodesia was featured prominently on this list.331  Thus, from the very 
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beginning, the Carter Administration viewed the situation in Rhodesia as a human rights crisis 
which needed to be resolved quickly. 
 
Britain Looks “Down the Dark Rhodesian Tunnel”  
While Jimmy Carter and his advisers were settling into their new posts, the British 
government was falling deeper into despair about the Rhodesian situation.  The failure of the 
Geneva Conference had sent shockwaves throughout the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
where it had been assumed that once the protagonists in the Rhodesian crisis were gathered 
around the conference table, they would be able to reach a mutually-agreeable settlement.  When 
this assumption proved incorrect, officials in London became unnerved.  “[W]e have no idea 
what to do next,” Foreign Secretary Tony Crosland confessed to one high-ranking US official 
shortly after the collapse of the Geneva Conference.  “It’s as simple as that.”332  One particularly 
despondent member of Whitehall’s Rhodesia Department even suggested that the United 
Kingdom might want to contemplate washing its hands of the entire Rhodesian mess.333  As if to 
underscore the intractability of the Rhodesian question, Crosland suffered a fatal stroke on 
February 13 while examining papers on how to jumpstart the negotiating process.334   
After a brief period of soul-searching, the British reached two vital conclusions.  The first 
was that they could not afford to abandon their responsibility for Rhodesia’s fate.  One reason for 
this was that many Labourites felt a lingering sense of responsibility for ensuring that Britain’s 
last African colony achieved majority rule.  “Surely one of the major objectives of a Labour 
Government must be to solve the Rhodesian problem, and in doing so, complete the general 
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process begun two decades or more ago of freeing black Africans from colonialism,” Minister of 
State for African Affairs Ted Rowlands opined in a minute to the Prime Minister.  “Whatever the 
difficulties, the prize of having freed [Ian] Smith’s political prisoners and of implementing 
majority rule rapidly and constitutionally is the greatest one of all.  I believe we have this last 
crucial direct role to play in Africa.”335  Even more importantly, it was widely acknowledged that 
walking away from what was still regarded as a British problem would seriously damage 
relations with black Africa, the Commonwealth, and the United States.336  The second conclusion 
– and one with which David Owen, the new Foreign Secretary, wholeheartedly agreed – was that 
Her Majesty’s Government would not be able to make any headway in its search for a Rhodesian 
settlement without the full backing of the Carter Administration.337   
Unfortunately, members of Whitehall’s Rhodesia Department were not certain that such 
support would be forthcoming.  In retrospect, it may be easy to see that the Carter Administration 
was eager play an active role in the search for Zimbabwean independence, but the British did not 
have the gift of hindsight.  In fact, because Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy talking points had 
remained vague and cautious throughout the 1976 presidential campaign, there was a great deal 
of uncertainty about the incoming Administration and its likely foreign policy goals.  As Anatoli 
Dobrynin, the longtime Soviet Ambassador to Washington, later recalled, Carter seemed to have 
“no definite program” when he assumed office.338  Thus, while the British Embassy in 
Washington had been one of the few to accurately predict the outcome of the 1976 election, not 
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even the British were certain what to expect from the new Administration.  “We know less about 
President-elect Carter and his future intentions than has been the case with any other recent 
incoming President,” lamented one beleaguered British diplomat. “In his previous public office 
[Governor of Georgia] he had little to do with foreign policy and [he] has left little public 
evidence of strong views on foreign policy issues.”339  In the weeks following Carter’s election, 
members of the British Embassy in Washington poured over campaign statements and post-
election comments trying to divine the new Administration’s attitudes and likely goals. 
British officials were able to discern several signs that new Administration might be 
eager to promote majority rule in southern Africa.  The first was President’s human rights 
rhetoric.  If Carter was serious about promoting human rights, Rhodesia seemed as good a place 
as any to begin.  Indeed, the situation there was becoming increasingly bleak as the bush war 
raged on.  Not only were cross-border raids like the one at Nyadzonya becoming more common, 
but both the Rhodesian regime and the guerrillas were guilty of numerous atrocities.  One of the 
most egregious human rights violations committed by the government was its “protected 
villages” program.  In an effort to isolate them from the guerrillas, the Rhodesian Front required 
tens of thousands of rural Zimbabweans to abandon their villages and move to one of several 
protected villages.  The concept was modeled after the US army’s “strategic hamlet” program in 
Vietnam, and, as in Vietnam, it backfired.  The overwhelming majority of Zimbabweans 
resented being expelled from their homes, and the squalid conditions awaiting them at the camps 
did nothing to ease their ire.340  While black MPs decried the program as inhumane and unjust, 
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perhaps the most searing criticism came from a member of the Rhodesian Front, J.M. 
Williamson, who called the camps “a disgrace to those of us who purport to value civilized 
standards.”341  For their part, the guerrillas were also guilty of numerous human rights violations.  
In one particularly gruesome instance, a family of 23 Zimbabweans was burned alive when the 
family’s patriarch refused to swear allegiance to Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean African 
Nationalist Union (ZANU).342  Based upon the criteria set out in PRM-28, the situation in 
Rhodesia clearly constituted a full-fledged human rights crisis. 
In addition to this wanton violence, Jimmy Carter abhorred the very idea of minority rule.  
Having been born and raised in the segregated American South, he was appalled that so much 
blood was being spilt in defense of white privilege.  Indeed, nearly every account of Carter’s life 
has emphasized how his firsthand experience with Jim Crow made the man from Plains, Georgia, 
acutely sensitive to questions of racial discrimination.343  Moreover, Carter and several of his 
chief foreign policy advisers saw a direct parallel between the situation in southern Africa in the 
1970s and that of the American South prior to the Civil Rights Movement.344  Having witnessed 
the success of the Civil Rights Movement firsthand, Carter believed that the United States was 
uniquely positioned to help establish multiracial democracy in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South 
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Africa.  “[T]he analogy with the civil rights movement informed everything we did in southern 
Africa,” Vice President Walter Mondale later recalled.345  Armed with this historical analogy, the 
Carter Administration believed it possessed a blueprint which would allow it to facilitate 
southern Africa’s transition to majority rule. 
The personalities of the men Jimmy Carter selected to serve as his key foreign policy 
advisers shed further light upon the likely trajectory of his Administration.  Much to the relief of 
America’s European allies, the President-elect tapped Cyrus Vance to serve as his Secretary of 
State.346  A veteran of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and a renowned New York 
lawyer, Vance was regarded as the consensus choice for the position.347  In contrast to his 
predecessor at Foggy Bottom, Vance hoped to improve US-African relations from the moment 
he assumed office.  As historian Breck Walker has demonstrated, Carter’s chief diplomat shared 
his boss’s belief that African problems should be treated as regional problems to be resolved 
through diplomacy rather than as East-West problems to be resolved through the use of military 
force.348  In laying out the assumptions which undergird the Administration’s African policy, 
Vance explained to an audience in St. Louis, “We must proceed from a basic proposition: that 
our policies must recognize the unique identity of Africa.  We can be neither right, nor effective, 
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if we treat Africa simply as one part of the Third World, or as a testing ground of East-West 
competition.”  Vance then proceeded to criticize the Ford Administration’s African diplomacy 
by suggesting that “the most effective policies toward Africa are affirmative policies.  They 
should not be reactive to what other powers do, nor to crises as they arise…A negative, reactive 
American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both 
dangerous and futile.  Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities 
for external intervention.”349  Thus, although Vance’s highest priority when he took office was 
the rapid conclusion of a new strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviets (SALT II), he 
shared with Jimmy Carter a commitment to aggressively support the transition to majority rule in 
southern Africa.350   
Andrew Young, the man Carter selected to serve as America’s Ambassador to the United 
Nations, was even more adamant about the need for the United States to assume a leadership role 
in the search for Zimbabwean independence.  An African-American minister who had served as 
Martin Luther King Junior’s right-hand man in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 
Young quickly emerged as the Administration’s leading critic of minority rule.351  In part, 
Young’s interest in southern Africa stemmed from his African-American heritage.  More 
importantly, he shared Doctor King’s belief that the American Civil Rights Movement was only 
one component of a global quest for racial justice.  Described by one British official as “an 
idealist for whom ethical concerns are paramount,” Young hoped to use his ambassadorship as a 
platform from which to promote the equality of mankind.352   
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Domestic political considerations further suggested that the Carter Administration was 
likely to take a strong interest in the Rhodesian crisis.  In large part, Carter owed his razor-thin 
margin of victory in the 1976 election to African-American voters.353  Their unprecedented 
support had enabled the Democratic nominee to carry key battleground states such as Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and North Carolina despite the fact that few whites in those states had 
enthusiastically backed his candidacy.  One prominent Civil Rights leader and Carter partisan 
immediately grasped the significance of the election results, recalling that “when I heard that 
Mississippi had gone our way, I knew that the hands that picked cotton [had] finally picked the 
president.”354  Carter understood that his re-election hopes might well hinge upon his ability to 
retain this overwhelming degree of African-American support.  As a fiscal conservative, Carter 
was unwilling to expand many of the domestic programs that appealed to many black voters.  
Nevertheless, he believed that facilitating the transition to majority rule in southern Africa would 
demonstrate his concern for racial equality, thereby helping to maintain his popularity among 
African-American voters.  Thus, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, 
hit the nail on the head when he predicted that Carter was likely to “give our objectives in 
Rhodesia his full support” because he “abhors racial discrimination and will feel a commitment 
to the black community at home, which has given him overwhelming support.”355  In his own 
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way, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith seconded this opinion, alleging that Carter’s African 
policies were made “with one end in view – the Negro vote in the United States.”356 
 
London Calling: The March 1977 Anglo-American Summit 
In London, Prime Minister James Callaghan watched the events unfolding across the 
Atlantic with great interest.  The British had scored early points with several Carter 
Administration officials by predicting a Democratic victory in 1976, and the Prime Minister was 
eager to build upon this solid foundation.  Like so many of his predecessors in the postwar era, 
Callaghan hoped to establish a good personal and working relationship with his American 
counterpart.  In addition to forging a strong rapport with Carter (a task which the British 
Embassy in Washington predicted would be difficult to accomplish because of the President’s 
prickly personality), Callaghan sought to convince the new Administration that Britain remained 
a valuable ally in spite of its continued economic and military decline.357  The Prime Minister 
also hoped to probe Carter’s thinking about a host of international issues – most notably, the 
international economic downturn and the festering Rhodesian crisis.358  Eager to discuss these 
subjects with the new president, Callaghan pushed the Foreign Office to try to obtain an early 
US-UK summit meeting.  These efforts were rewarded when the Prime Minister received an 
invitation to visit the White House in March 1977, making him the first foreign head of state to 
call on Jimmy Carter.   
During the March summit, Callaghan succeeded in establishing an amicable rapport with 
his American counterpart, thereby helping to ensure that Britain would remain a valued ally and 
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consultative partner.  According to The Times of London’s Washington correspondent, the 
atmosphere of the summit was one of “uncommon jocularity.”359  Foreign Secretary Owen 
recounted in his memoirs that as Baptists, farmers, and erstwhile naval officers, Callaghan and 
Carter “got on very well together.”360  The two leaders engaged in all the “hands-across-the-sea” 
rhetoric associated with the US-UK “special relationship” and toasted each other in the most 
generous of terms.  “I don’t believe I have ever met anyone who was a distinguished political 
leader with whom I immediately felt more at home and a greater sense of genuine and personal 
friendship,” Carter remarked at a white-tie dinner held in Callaghan’s honor.361  By all accounts, 
the March 1977 summit marked the beginning of a friendship that transcended mere political 
expediency.  This “special, personal relationship” impressed National Security Adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and infuriated West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.362   
In addition to establishing a strong rapport with Carter, Callaghan hoped to persuade the 
President to assume a more proactive role in the search for a Rhodesian settlement.  Carter had 
evinced some interest in the subject, publicly condemning minority rule during the course of a 
January 23 press conference and dispatching Andrew Young to southern Africa in early February 
to consult with the Frontline Presidents.  Nevertheless, he was reluctant to become as deeply 
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entangled in the negotiating process as Henry Kissinger had been.  As Young privately informed 
the British after returning from Africa, Carter was primarily interested in repealing the Byrd 
Amendment and providing developmental assistance once Zimbabwe achieved majority rule.  He 
gave no indication that the President intended to become involved in the actual negotiations.363  
British officials recognized that these steps would be helpful in their efforts to mediate the 
Rhodesian crisis, but they were eager for the Americans to play a more direct role.  As Owen 
noted in a draft minute to the Prime Minister, “I must emphasise that the fullest support of the 
United States would be absolutely indispensable.  It would be folly for us to attempt such an 
exercise on our own.”364  Callaghan agreed that little progress could be expected without the 
Americans’ wholehearted assistance, which he hoped to obtain when he met with Carter. 
The Prime Minister would not be disappointed.  During a March 10 meeting of Foreign 
Office and State Department officials, Owen admitted that the United Kingdom had no “amour 
propre” about US involvement in Rhodesia.  To the contrary, he felt that “the more the United 
States and the United Kingdom could be seen to act together on all [s]outhern African problems, 
including Rhodesia,” the stronger Britain’s hand would be.365  Vance seconded this assessment 
and pledged that the United States would work “side by side with the United Kingdom” to 
resolve the Rhodesian conflict.366  Presumably briefed by his chief diplomat that he and Owen 
“saw eye to eye” on the need for Anglo-American collaboration, Carter promised to provide 
whatever assistance the British required to break the Rhodesian impasse.  According to the 
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British record, Carter pledged to “back us to the hilt” after Callaghan warned that “the choice 
might well be between civil war in [s]outhern Africa and a greater use of US muscle.”367  This 
agreement marked the beginning of perhaps the closest period of Anglo-American cooperation 
during the entire Rhodesian crisis.  Working in close consultation, British and American officials 
spent the next six months trying to prepare a draft of Zimbabwe’s independence constitution that 
would be acceptable to all sides.   
The British had every reason to be pleased with Carter’s pledge of support, which seemed 
to go much further than the steps Andrew Young had outlined when he met with British officials 
the previous month.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in spite of the “special personal 
relationship” that developed between Carter and Callaghan, the President’s promise to back the 
British “to the hilt” in their search for a Rhodesian settlement stemmed more from a calculated 
pursuit of American interests than from any desire to “pull the British chestnuts from the fire.”  
As recently-declassified documents make clear, the Administration regarded the resolution of the 
Rhodesian crisis as one of its highest priorities upon taking office, seeing it as an opportunity to 
demonstrate America’s newfound commitment to regional diplomacy and human rights.368  “It 
was essential to demonstrate to the Third World our understanding of and willingness to take a 
leading role in dealing with their problems,” Vance would later recall.  If the Administration had 
failed to champion majority rule in Rhodesia, the Secretary feared that black Africans would 
have “dismiss[ed] our human rights policy as mere [C]old [W]ar propaganda, employed at the 
expense of the peoples of Africa.”369  While Carter and his chief foreign policy advisers 
recognized that the Rhodesian crisis remained, at root, a British problem, they also understood 
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that they would need to play an active role if a solution was to be found.  As Brzezinski informed 
the President in his summary of a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting intended to 
iron out the Administration’s African policy, “Everyone agreed that for now the best course of 
action is to support the British as vigorously as possible.”370   
 
“Acting in the Closest Concert:” The Anglo-American Proposals  
After the March summit, Owen and Vance decided to alter their tactics.  At Geneva, the 
Rhodesians and the Zimbabwean nationalists had resisted Ivor Richard’s attempts to forge an 
interim government responsible for overseeing the colony’s transition to majority rule.  British 
and American officials hoped that once the sides had agreed on the terms of Zimbabwe’s 
independence constitution, the details of the transition period would become less controversial.  
Thus, Owen and Vance hoped to consult with the leading protagonists in the Rhodesian crisis 
and produce a draft constitution.  Once the draft had been completed, an “All-Party Conference” 
would be convened to scrutinize it.  Only after the constitution had been finalized would the 
parties sit down to hammer out the details of how to transfer power to a democratically-elected 
president.371  In part, this approach was designed to allay suspicions that Ian Smith and his 
followers would have too much say in the drafting of the Zimbabwean constitution.372  It was 
also intended to demonstrate to the Patriotic Front, the Frontline Presidents, and the rest of the 
international community that officials in London and Washington were doing everything in their 
power to defuse the Rhodesian crisis before it spiraled out of control.373   
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After consulting with the Americans and obtaining the Cabinet’s approval, Owen 
departed for the African subcontinent.  His primary objective was to determine whether the 
protagonists in the Rhodesian conflict were willing to support the new Anglo-American 
approach.374  However, it was clear from the outset that the Foreign Secretary’s maiden trip to 
southern Africa would be a baptism by fire.  Tensions were running high in the aftermath of the 
Geneva Conference’s collapse, and neither the Rhodesians nor the nationalists seemed eager to 
compromise.  Ian Smith remained committed to the idea of “responsible” rule, while Robert 
Mugabe (and, to a lesser degree, Joshua Nkomo) insisted that Smith and his followers would 
have to be driven from power by military force.  The visits of Cuban President Fidel Castro and 
Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny to Africa in the weeks preceding Owen’s arrival only served 
to exacerbate these tensions, rendering the Foreign Secretary’s task that much more difficult.375 
It was against this backdrop that Owen arrived in the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam 
on April 11.  The first African leader he met with was Robert Mugabe, the nominal head of 
ZANU.376  At this meeting, it quickly became apparent that the collapse of the Geneva 
Conference had sapped Mugabe’s interest in diplomacy.  The nationalist leader vowed to 
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continue the bush war unless the British agreed to transfer power directly to the Patriotic Front.  
Realizing that this would be unacceptable to Rhodesian opinion (as well as to a large segment of 
the British public), Owen demurred.  Mugabe lashed out at a subsequent press conference, 
revealing his lack of interest in returning to the conference table.  “The struggle might be bitter, 
protracted, and bloody, but this is the price Zimbabweans should be prepared to pay,” he told 
reporters.  “Dr. Owen has failed to convince us that Britain is in a position to effect [sic] the 
transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe.”377  Owen’s meetings with the Frontline Presidents 
and South African Prime Minister John Vorster were only slightly more encouraging.  The 
Presidents privately supported the new Anglo-American initiative but felt compelled to continue 
backing the guerrillas until the negotiations got off the ground.378  For his part, Vorster was 
reluctant to apply pressure on his Rhodesian counterpart – possibly because South African 
sentiment was rallying behind the Rhodesians.379 
After meeting with Mugabe, Vorster, and the Frontline Presidents, Owen continued on to 
Salisbury to parley with Ian Smith.  Although no Labour Cabinet Minister had set foot in 
Rhodesia since the colony had unilaterally severed ties with the British Crown in 1965, Owen 
was determined to discuss Rhodesia’s future with the Prime Minister in person.  Unfortunately, 
this tête-à-tête failed to produce any discernible movement.  Smith reiterated that he had no 
intention of allowing Robert Mugabe or Joshua Nkomo (both of whom he considered to be 
dangerous extremists) to seize the reins of power and took the opportunity to rail against the idea 
of one-man, one-vote democracy – which he likened to “the counting of sheep.”380  All things 
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considered, it is difficult to understand how Owen could have returned to London with a 
pronounced feeling of optimism, as he has claimed in his memoirs.381  All the major players in 
the Rhodesian drama remained deeply suspicious of each other and skeptical about the viability 
of any future Anglo-American initiative.382 
Perhaps the Foreign Secretary was not completely candid in his memoirs.  For, upon 
returning from his eight-day, seven-nation African mission, he described the chances of reaching 
a Rhodesian settlement as “not terribly high.”383  Yet, while Owen had become “increasingly 
unenthusiastic” about the idea of calling an early constitutional conference, he feared that any 
slowdown in the negotiating process would lead to an escalation of the bush war.  Cyrus Vance 
shared these concerns.  Consequently, although the statesmen opted not to call a constitutional 
conference as they had originally intended to do, they agreed to commence “a phase of intensive, 
detailed consultations with the parties” about the nature of the Zimbabwean constitution.384  
British and American officials hoped that conducting bilateral talks with the Rhodesians and the 
nationalists “away from the glare of publicity” would prevent either side from making 
extravagant demands intended for public consumption.385  They also hoped that these 
consultations would reveal areas of consensus among the protagonists.  To this end, Owen and 
Vance agreed to form a joint consultative team headed by John Graham, Britain’s Deputy 
Undersecretary for African and Middle Eastern Affairs, and Stephen Low, America’s 
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Ambassador to Lusaka.386  The pair spent the next four months shuttling from one African capital 
to another, discussing their constitutional proposals with the protagonists and seeking to piece 
together a mutually-acceptable constitution. 
On their first swing through southern Africa, Graham and Low (who quickly developed a 
good working relationship) solicited suggestions about the nature of the Zimbabwean executive, 
judiciary, and legislature – as well as ideas about how to provide for a peaceful and orderly 
transition period.387  The only items they considered non-negotiable were the establishment of a 
democratically-elected government and a bill of rights that would protect the liberties of all 
individuals.388  However, it quickly became apparent that no paper guarantees could overcome 
the enmity that had built up between the Rhodesians and the nationalists over the years.389  
Graham and Low, therefore, sought to assemble a package deal that would satisfy the 
Zimbabweans that the transition to majority rule would be irreversible while also reassuring the 
Rhodesians that their interests would be safeguarded after independence.390  Between May and 
August, the pair cobbled together such a package, which came to be known as the Anglo-
American Proposals.391  British and American diplomats hoped that the package would contain 
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enough incentives to lure both sides back to the conference table.  “There are…elements in the 
package which will be unwelcome to both sides,” David Owen’s speaking note for a July 1977 
meeting of the Ministerial Group on Southern Africa pointed out.  “Nevertheless, taken as a 
whole, we believe that it amounts to a fair and feasible proposition.”392  With these proposals in 
hand, the Foreign Secretary returned to southern Africa to present the package to the protagonists 
in August 1977. 
 
The Collapse of the Anglo-American Proposals 
Unfortunately for British and American officials, neither the nationalists nor the 
Rhodesians regarded the Anglo-American Proposals as “fair and feasible.”  The transatlantic 
allies had long questioned the Patriotic Front’s commitment to democracy, and its growing 
military strength, coupled with its lack of popular support in Rhodesia, did little to instill 
confidence in the nationalists’ democratic leanings.  “[T]he Popular Front in Zimbabwe has 
questionable electoral strength but good prospects for shooting their way to power,” noted 
Thomas Thornton, one of the National Security Council’s African specialists.  In Thornton’s 
estimation, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo preferred the military path to power over the 
democratic one.  “[The] P[atriotic] F[ront] see things as going in their direction and would regard 
elections as an unnecessary risk that would inevitably dilute their power,” he opined.  “Conquest 
by power of arms is an honorable tradition [in Africa] and avoids a lot of problems.”393  The 
Consultative Group’s discussions with the Patriotic Front confirmed these suspicions. With their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
new constitution based on the principle of one-man-one-vote democracy, a bill of rights to protect the rights of 
individuals regardless of their race or ethnicity, a development fund worth approximately £15 million, and 
arrangements covering the composition of the Zimbabwean army and police force.  For the complete text of the 
proposals, see “Rhodesia – Proposals for a Settlement, Text of Proposals,” Department of State Bulletin online, 
October 3, 1977, vol. 77 (October-December 1977): 424-439. 
392
 Brief: Meeting of the Ministerial Group on Southern Africa at 11 am on Friday 1 July 1977, FCO 36/1973, TNA. 
393
 Memorandum, Thomas Thornton to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Elections in Africa,” April 1, 1977, Southern Africa – 
[3/77 – 4/77] folder, Brzezinski Donated Material Collection, Geographic File, Box 14, JECL.  
128 
 
military prospects on the rise, Mugabe and Nkomo became increasingly disinterested in a 
negotiated settlement which envisioned some form of power-sharing.394  Consequently, they 
displayed scant interest in the Anglo-American Proposals throughout the summer of 1977.  
Although it is more difficult to determine Ian Smith’s true intentions, a number of high-
ranking State Department and Foreign Office officials believed that the Rhodesian leader was 
coming to accept the need for majority rule.395  This may sound like wishful thinking, but there 
were several reasons why Smith might have been prepared to cut a deal in 1977.  First and 
foremost was the escalation of the Chimurenga.  Many of Smith’s military advisers regarded the 
bush war as unwinnable and had been pressing the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues to 
negotiate with the nationalists for some time.396  So had Ken Flower, the head of Rhodesia’s 
Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).397  Moreover, the Rhodesian economy was sputtering, 
and white morale was rapidly declining – as evidenced by the steady stream of whites emigrating 
from Rhodesia.398  In addition to these domestic factors, the South African Government had been 
leaning on Smith to abdicate in favor of a moderate black government for some time.  Thus, 
Graham and Low were not delusional for thinking that Smith might be willing to cut a deal.  
However, they recognized that he was not prepared to settle at any cost.  “Mr. Smith is not at the 
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end of the road yet and is not prepared for unconditional surrender (a ‘sell-out’),” the envoys 
noted after meeting with the Prime Minister in May 1977.  “He demands safeguards for the white 
Rhodesians sufficient to win their confidence in the new arrangements and to encourage them to 
remain in Rhodesia.”399 
What were these safeguards?  And were they really as important to Rhodesians as Smith 
alleged?  In his dealings with the Consultative Group, Smith made it clear that he hoped to obtain 
a qualified franchise (based on property ownership and education) as well as a parliamentary 
blocking mechanism that would prevent the Zimbabwean constitution from being altered without 
the consent of the white community.  He also wanted assurances that the Zimbabwean 
government would assume responsibility for pension obligations racked up under his regime and 
a guarantee that the new government would not confiscate white-owned lands.  Finally, Smith 
was anxious that “law and order” should be maintained after the Rhodesian Front ceded power.  
Because he doubted the guerrillas could be trusted to ensure that the transition to majority rule 
would be orderly or to safeguard the white community’s interests after independence, Smith 
dismissed the Patriotic Front’s calls to disband the existing army, police force, and civil service 
and replace them with their own followers.400  Throughout the summer of 1977, the issue of “law 
and order” emerged as the Rhodesians’ greatest concern.  Based on their consultations with the 
Rhodesian leadership, Graham and Low concluded that if they could somehow persuade the 
Patriotic Front and the Frontline Presidents to compromise on this issue (especially when it came 
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to the composition of the Zimbabwean army), Smith was likely to drop many of his other 
demands and go along with the Anglo-American Proposals.401   
However, convincing Ian Smith to accept the Anglo-American Proposals was only the 
first step on the road toward a negotiated settlement.  As the Rhodesian Prime Minister 
repeatedly reminded the Consultative Group, he had to be able to “sell” the proposals to his 
public.  To some extent, this was a negotiating ploy intended to extract greater concessions from 
the British and Americans.  Nonetheless, certain influential segments of the Rhodesian populace 
remained stridently opposed to the idea of majority rule.402  According to historians Peter 
Godwin and Ian Hancock, the business community and a tiny group of liberals could be counted 
on to accept majority rule but not the farmers who comprised the backbone of the Rhodesian 
Front.  Indeed, only two months earlier, 12 Rhodesian Front MPs (out of 50 white MPs) had 
rebelled when Smith proposed repealing the Land Tenure Act – a piece of legislation which 
prevented blacks from purchasing certain residential, agricultural, industrial, and commercial 
lands.  Although few blacks would have been able to afford the newly-available tracts, the 12 
MPs denounced Smith as “a dangerous liberal” and charged that “the government was not 
adhering to party principles and election promises.”403  They formed the Rhodesian Action Party 
(RAP) in July 1977 and challenged the Rhodesian Front from the right.404  The RAP never posed 
a serious threat to Smith’s hold on power, but its very existence demonstrated that right-wing 
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opinion remained alive and well in Rhodesia.405  Thus, while many Westerners scoffed when 
Smith voiced concerns about his ability to convince the Rhodesian public that minority rule was 
no longer viable, a substantial number of hardliners continued to live in what Zambian President 
Kenneth Kaunda described as “cloud cuckoo-land.”  But whether liberal or hardliner, almost all 
Rhodesians (and many Zimbabweans) insisted that the army and police should remain intact.406   
Jimmy Carter was aware of this sentiment but ignored it an attempt to retain the support 
of the Frontline Presidents.407  During the course of an August 1977 state visit to Washington, 
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere persuaded Carter that the Rhodesian security forces should 
be dismantled and replaced by an army “based on liberation forces.”408  Historians have not 
offered a plausible explanation as to why Carter agreed to include this provision in the Anglo-
American Proposals – perhaps because the record of the meeting remains classified.  Whatever 
Carter’s motivation, the outcome was predictable.  Ian Smith rejected the proposals, which he 
publicly denounced as “insane” when David Owen and Andrew Young presented them to him in 
September 1977.409  In Smith’s estimation, allowing the Zimbabwean army to be “based on 
liberation forces” was tantamount to handing the reins of power to the Patriotic Front.  Nor was 
the Prime Minister alone in his concern.  Low reported that the Rhodesian officials he met with 
“did not even try to disguise their surprise and dismay” when they learned that, under the Anglo-
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American Proposals, the Zimbabwean army would be comprised primarily of former 
guerrillas.410  Convinced that the West was determined to foist the Patriotic Front on his country, 
Smith decided to take matters into his own hands.   
It is entirely possible that Smith would have rejected the Anglo-American Proposals even 
without Carter’s concession.  There were indications that the Rhodesian leader had been looking 
for an excuse to do so for some time.411  Nevertheless, the provision stipulating that the army 
should be “based on liberation forces” provided him with the perfect pretext.  Even worse, it 
allowed him to convince most Rhodesian and South African whites that the Anglo-American 
Proposals were nothing more than an underhanded effort to install Mugabe and Nkomo in 
power.412  Neither the Rhodesians nor the Afrikaners wanted to see the communist-backed 
Patriotic Front in control of Zimbabwe, and Smith exploited this fact to convince Rhodesian and 
South African whites to rally behind his “internal settlement,” a scheme designed to bring 
“moderate” nationalist leaders like Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole 
into the government while excluding Mugabe, Nkomo, and their followers.   
 
“Kicking the South Africans in the Teeth” 
When he rejected Ivor Richard’s proposals on January 24, 1977, Smith had hinted that he 
intended to pursue an “internal settlement” which would sideline the Patriotic Front.  He hoped 
that by unilaterally implementing the “Kissinger package” he would be able to create a moderate, 
multiracial regime that would eventually gain international recognition.  The outside world 
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viewed the ploy as a major gamble (would Smith be able to convince any of the nationalist 
leaders to join his coalition? would such an arrangement be acceptable to the international 
community? would it be sufficient to convince the guerrillas to lay down their arms? could he 
bring a majority of Rhodesians to accept power-sharing?), but Smith viewed it as his best hope 
of preserving the Rhodesian way of life.  With international opinion rapidly turning against his 
regime and guerrilla activity on the rise, Smith scrambled to reach an agreement that would 
prevent Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo from attaining positions of authority. 
Smith’s gambit received a major boost when the South African Government decided to 
back it.  Based solely on racial considerations, it seems obvious that South Africa’s apartheid 
regime would have supported Smith’s efforts to preserve white privilege in Rhodesia.  However, 
concerns about national security – not race – were paramount for the Afrikaners as they decided 
how to handle the Rhodesian situation.
413
  And it was quickly becoming apparent to some in the 
South African Government that Ian Smith’s Rhodesia had outlived its usefulness.  In fact, it had 
become an embarrassment and a hindrance to Prime Minister John Vorster’s attempts to improve 
relations with black Africa and with the West.  This is why Vorster had pressured Smith to attend 
the Geneva Conference in 1976 and why he continued to “hanker” after a negotiated settlement – 
provided that it would lead to the emergence of a “moderate” black government.414  For this 
reason, South African support for Smith’s internal settlement was not immediately forthcoming.   
Despite his desire to see a “moderate” black regime assume power in Salisbury, John 
Vorster’s worldview was quite different from that of Jimmy Carter.  His willingness to cooperate 
in the search for Zimbabwean independence stemmed from his perception of what was in South 
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Africa’s national interest rather than from any inherent sympathy for the idea of majority rule.  
Indeed, Vorster remained a staunch defender of apartheid even while working toward majority 
rule in Rhodesia.  But whereas the Ford Administration had been willing to refrain from 
criticizing apartheid as long as the South Africans cooperated on the Rhodesian question, Carter 
was unwilling to make this tradeoff.  The South Africans got their first glimpse of what was in 
store for them during a May 1977 summit meeting with Vice President Walter Mondale in 
Vienna.  As the Vice President made clear before leaving Washington, his chief objective in 
meeting with the South Africans was to demonstrate the Administration’s commitment to 
majority rule throughout southern Africa.  “The absence of a clear-cut position on [s]outhern 
Africa, and especially apartheid by the past Administration may have led Vorster (and others) to 
conclude that we were really not serious about majority rule…and that we would accept 
solutions the principal impact of which would be to stem the threat of communism,” Mondale 
commented shortly before leaving for Vienna.  His task was to inform Vorster and his colleagues 
that the Carter Administration saw apartheid as a violation of its human rights agenda and had no 
intention of ignoring the situation inside the Republic.  Thus, while Mondale hoped to persuade 
Vorster “to make it clear to [Ian] Smith that the day of decision has come,” he also intended to 
serve notice that US-South African relations had reached “a watershed.”  Unless Vorster was 
prepared to commit to a “progressive transformation” of South African society, the United States 
would be forced to fundamentally reassess its relationship with the Republic.
415
   
The Afrikaners did not respond favorably to this ultimatum.  Nor did they appreciate 
Mondale’s suggestion that they begin moving toward a democratic system based on universal 
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suffrage.
416
  Foreign Minister Pik Botha (a liberal by South African standards) described the 
demand as a “knife in the back.”417  The bellicose Vorster was more direct.  “I can take kicks in 
the pants,” he shot back at Mondale, “but don’t kick me in the teeth.”418  The South Africans 
regarded such interference in their domestic affairs as both misguided and wrongheaded, 
maintaining that the Americans did not understand the complexities of the situation in southern 
Africa and that Carter’s policy prescriptions were likely to result in “chaos and anarchy.”419  
When the Carter Administration elected to ignore such warnings, US-South African relations 
plummeted.  Around the same time, American envoys in South Africa soon noticed a “laager” 
(siege mentality) setting in amongst the Afrikaners.
420
   
The events of September and October 1977 further strained the bond between the United 
States and South Africa.  On September 12, “black consciousness” leader Stephen Biko died in 
police custody after being brutally beaten, making him the 21
st
 black detainee to die in police 
custody in 18 months.  Justice Minister Jimmy Kruger issued a lengthy statement the following 
day, in which he attempted to reassure South Africans and the international community that 
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Biko’s death was the result of a weeklong hunger strike and not foul play.  Many (including the 
State Department) suspected otherwise, and the incident sparked a wave of domestic protest and 
international outrage.
421
  Vorster responded in the only way he knew how: by cracking down on 
South African dissidents.  On September 15, the government arrested more than 1,200 black 
students who had gathered to mourn Biko’s death.422  As the protests grew in number and 
intensity, the police were placed on nationwide alert.  And when two newspapers confirmed that 
Biko had indeed died of police brutality, Vorster’s regime moved to crush all political dissent.  
On October 19, several leading black protest groups (including Biko’s Black Consciousness 
movement and the Christian Institute of South Africa) were banned – as was the nation’s leading 
black newspaper, The World.  More than 50 anti-apartheid activists were arrested, and scores 
more were served with banning orders which effectively barred them from political activism.
423
  
A defiant Vorster declared that he would never bow to domestic or international pressure when it 
came to apartheid.  “I am definitely not going to let anybody prescribe to me what I should do 
and what I should not do,” he lectured the press.424   
By this time, the South African Government had also decided to abandon its support of 
the Anglo-American Proposals.  While the South Africans had convinced Ian Smith not to reject 
the proposals throughout the summer of 1977, there was a discernible shift in Pretoria’s policy 
after David Owen and Andrew Young presented the package to the South African Cabinet in 
late-August.
425
  The South Africans were aghast at Carter’s decision to incorporate guerrillas into 
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the Zimbabwean army, seeing it as yet another unnecessary concession to the Patriotic Front.  In 
their eyes, basing the army on former guerrillas seemed like a recipe for disaster.  Vorster had 
always harbored doubts about the West’s resolve “when it came time to crack heads.”426  His 
August 29 meeting with Owen and Young provided all the proof he needed on this point.  Faced 
with the choice of supporting Smith’s internal settlement or witnessing a Mugabe-Nkomo 
“takeover,” Vorster chose the former.427   
Assured of Pretoria’s support, Smith moved rapidly to implement his internal settlement.  
After denouncing the Anglo-American Proposals as “insane,” he intensified his courtship of 
Muzorewa and Sithole.
428
  A formal agreement to bring them into a governing coalition was 
reached in March 1978.  Much to the dismay of the British and American governments, it was 
the so-called “Salisbury Agreement” – and not the Anglo-American Proposals – which would set 
the terms of the debate about Rhodesia’s future for the next two years. 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, Jimmy Carter attempted to bring a new sense 
of purpose to American foreign policy.  While his human rights policy was also politically 
expedient, it formed the cornerstone of his “post-Cold War” vision of American diplomacy.  This 
approach impressed many Western liberals and African leaders who had grown weary of Henry 
Kissinger’s callous realpolitik.  Unfortunately for the people of southern Africa, Carter was no 
more successful in convincing Ian Smith to accept majority rule than Kissinger had been.  As his 
Administration began to suffer a number of setbacks in its foreign policy, Carter gradually 
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jettisoned his “post-Cold War” approach to international relations in favor of a more 
conventional “Cold Warrior” approach.  Beginning in the Horn of Africa in 1978, Soviet and 
Cuban adventurism in the developing world and domestic political considerations combined to 
derail his “post-Cold War” agenda.  As Carter reluctantly came to embrace the very Cold War 
orthodoxy he had once hoped to discredit, his interest in Rhodesia came to be shaped less by 
concerns about human rights violations and more by a desire to prevent the Soviets and Cubans 
from gaining a predominant position in southern Africa. 
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Chapter Four 
 
“Keeping Faith” in Rhodesia, 1978-1979 
 
 On May 15, 1979, a second-term Senator rose to address his colleagues about the Carter 
Administration’s Rhodesian policy.  The speaker lauded the recent election of Bishop Abel 
Muzorewa, a Zimbabwean nationalist with widespread grassroots support, as Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia’s first black prime minister.  The Senator described Muzorewa as “a man who is 
deeply interested in his people” and a leader who was determined “to bring…peace and 
prosperity” to his war-torn country.  The Senator also praised the process by which Muzorewa 
had come to power, describing the recent Rhodesian election as “the most free and open…in the 
history of the continent of Africa.”  Finally, he commented upon the impressive voter turnout of 
64%, wryly remarking that he could not recall “a record such as that in any election in the United 
States.”  The feat was all the more remarkable given that the election had been held in the midst 
of a guerrilla war and that some voters had been forced to trek up to 10 miles to reach the nearest 
polling station.  Given that majority rule had seemingly been achieved in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 
the Senator urged President Carter to lift sanctions against the fledgling nation.  They had served 
their purpose, and the Senator could find “no further justification” for maintaining them.429 
 Nor was Senator Jesse Helms alone in his thinking.  A recently-completed report by 
Freedom House (a non-governmental organization dedicated to the promotion of democracy, 
political freedom, and human rights) described the Rhodesian elections as “the most democratic” 
to have taken place anywhere on the African continent.  The report carried special gravitas in 
some circles because it had been co-authored by Bayard Rustin, an African American and civil 
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rights activist.  According to Rustin and his colleagues, the Rhodesian elections had been “fair 
and free.”  The candidates had been allowed to campaign publicly, the balloting had been 
conducted in secrecy, and governmental pressure had been minimal.  In addition to singing the 
praises of the Rhodesian election, the Freedom House report speculated about the positive impact 
that a successful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe could have for the rest of southern 
Africa.  “Moderate South African leaders have stated that if the multi-racial experiment in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia succeeds, their own hand will almost certainly be strengthened sufficiently 
to move their own country toward more liberal and just racial policies.  However, if the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia experiment fails…then the hard liners in South Africa will be 
correspondingly strengthened, and racial progress may be set back for years.”  The report also 
mentioned the Cold War implications of the elections, noting that, “Zimbabwe seems likely to be 
an important test case to see whether the challenge of Soviet armed dissidents can be met and a 
truly free economy and a democratic multi-racial society established...in the southern part of the 
African continent.”  For these reasons, the authors recommended that the Carter Administration 
recognize the new state and lift sanctions.430 
 It may seem strange that Jesse Helms (who had made his name disparaging the Civil 
Rights Movement – and other liberal causes – as a television pundit) and Bayard Rustin (the 
longtime Civil Rights activist) found themselves on the same side of the Rhodesian issue.  It may 
seem even more surprising that Helms would need to prod Jimmy Carter (America’s self-
appointed “human rights president”) to recognize Rhodesia’s first black Prime Minister.  After 
all, Carter had committed his Administration to ending minority rule in Rhodesia, and many 
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international observers concluded that Muzorewa’s election accurately reflected the will of the 
Zimbabwean voters.  Moreover, Muzorewa was expected to pursue capitalist economic policies 
and seek a close partnership with the West.  This chapter will seek to explain why Jimmy Carter 
was reluctant to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and lift sanctions, arguing that his reticence was 
fuelled by both strategic and humanitarian concerns.  It will also seek to demonstrate the limits 
of American influence in southern Africa.  For while Carter was sympathetic to Muzorewa (a 
soft-spoken man of the cloth), foreign and domestic pressures ultimately prevented him from 
accepting what many Americans considered to be an ideal solution to the Rhodesian crisis.431 
 
“Absolutely Nobody Has Anything to be Happy About” 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ian Smith had only reluctantly entered into the 
internal settlement.  In essence, he was gambling that bringing Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau 
into the government would give his regime a veneer of respectability and convince the guerrillas 
to lay down their arms.  He also hoped that their presence in the Executive Council would 
persuade the international community to lift sanctions.  But while sanctions were beginning to 
take a serious toll on the Rhodesian economy by 1978, the de-escalation of the bush war was 
Smith’s highest priority.432  Indeed, the number of guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia had 
tripled since 1976, from approximately 2,100 to 6,400.433  As a result of their increasing 
numbers, the guerrillas had seized control of many of the rural Tribal Trust Lands and 
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undertaken a campaign of urban terror against Rhodesia’s white population.434  In an effort to 
stem this violence, the Salisbury Group launched a series of raids (“external operations” in 
Rhodesian military parlance) against guerilla targets in Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana.435  
These raids were effective in a military sense, but they made negotiations with the Frontline 
Presidents and the Patriotic Front next to impossible.  They also threatened to internationalize the 
Chimurenga by forcing the Frontline Presidents to call upon the Soviets and Cubans for military 
assistance.  Thus, although neither side was expected to gain a decisive advantage in the bush 
war in the foreseeable future, US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski speculated that 
the Frontline Presidents might eventually “feel compelled to break the stalemate” by asking for 
more Soviet and Cuban assistance if the conflict remained stalemated.436   
Unfortunately for Smith, his gambit began to unravel almost immediately.  As one of 
Brzezinski’s advisers informed him in July 1978, “[W]ith regard to the effectiveness of the 
[i]nternal [s]ettlement, the evidence is clear: the Salisbury Group has failed to end the fighting 
and win the sympathies of the guerrillas.”437  Indeed, Zimbabwean support for Muzorewa and 
Sithole quickly began to dissipate when the Executive Council failed to repeal discriminatory 
laws, dismantle the “protected villages,” or lift the dusk-to-dawn curfew which affected the 
entire countryside.  To many Zimbabweans, this lack of progress raised concerns as to whether 
the internal settlement would result in genuine majority rule.438  Given Muzorewa and Sithole’s 
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apparent inability to stand up to Smith, coupled with their constant bickering, it should come as 
no surprise that very few guerrillas agreed to lay down their arms under the terms of the 
Executive Council’s amnesty program.  Nor were most Rhodesians enamored with the Executive 
Council’s performance.  The group seemed no more capable of ending the war or reviving the 
economy than the Rhodesian Front had been, and an estimated 19,000 Rhodesians (eight percent 
of the colony’s white population) showed their lack of confidence by emigrating in 1978 
alone.439  These developments were not lost on Ian Smith, who tacitly admitted that the internal 
settlement was in trouble when he sent out feelers to determine whether his old negotiating 
partner, Joshua Nkomo, was willing to join the Executive Council.440 
Although the internal settlement was not off to an auspicious start, Smith remained 
convinced that the scheme was the only way to sideline the more extreme members of the 
Patriotic Front.  He therefore refused to enter into negotiations with the guerrilla leaders.441  For 
their part, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau had no interest in sharing power with Nkomo or 
Mugabe.  “The men in the bush are not ours,” commented one of Chirau’s aides who worried 
that, “We may be the first to face the firing squads” if the Patriotic Front seized power.442  The 
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Salisbury Group’s unwillingness to negotiate in good faith was hardly seen as cause for concern 
by the leaders of the Patriotic Front.  Not only had their ranks swelled in recent months, but the 
Soviets and Cubans were in the process of redoubling their support for the guerrillas.  Indeed, 
Soviet military shipments to the Patriotic Front had tripled between 1976 and 1977, with large 
quantities of heavy artillery, armored vehicles, and anti-aircraft weapons arriving in southern 
Africa for the first time.443  Even more weaponry was expected after Joshua Nkomo concluded an 
arms deal with the Soviets during a January 1978 visit to Moscow.444  Confident that the tide was 
turning in their favor, Nkomo and Mugabe refused to countenance any deal which did not give 
them sufficient political and military power during the transition period to ensure that they would 
govern Zimbabwe after independence.445  Against this backdrop of increasing violence and 
intransigence, American and British calls for a negotiated solution had little effect.  The best the 
transatlantic allies could do was to try to “keep…the diplomatic ball in play” while the Salisbury 
Group and the Patriotic Front tested their strength.446   
If British and American officials had been pessimistic about their ability to mediate the 
Rhodesian crisis in the immediate aftermath of the internal settlement, subsequent events did 
nothing to bolster their confidence.  One blow occurred when word leaked that Ian Smith and 
Joshua Nkomo had met in Zambia (unbeknownst to Robert Mugabe, Smith’s “partners” in the 
Executive Council, or the other Frontline Presidents) under the auspices of President Kenneth 
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Kaunda.447  Not only did this news undermine the fragile union between Nkomo and Mugabe, it 
caused the Patriotic Front and Smith to publicly reject all possibility of a compromise in order to 
prove that they were not contemplating a “sell out.”448  The situation was thrown into further 
disarray when a team of ZAPU operatives downed an Air Rhodesia passenger jet in September 
1978 and slaughtered ten of the 18 survivors – six of whom were well-to-do white women.449  
Smith attempted to douse the flames, but the Rhodesian public would have none of it.  When 
Nkomo boasted about the attack during a radio interview, they demanded vengeance.  Smith 
acquiesced and ordered the Rhodesian Special Air Service to launch a massive raid against 
ZIPRA camps in Zambia and to assassinate “the Fat Man” at his Lusaka residence.450  Nkomo 
survived the attempt on his life, but it was clear to all that the negotiating process had been 
derailed.  “The fiasco resulting from the Smith-Nkomo meeting was bad enough,” lamented 
Stephen Low, the US Ambassador to Lusaka, “but Nkomo’s taking credit for the shoot down of 
the Rhodesian airliner has made further negotiations all but impossible for the time being.”451  
The British glumly agreed with this assessment.452  When asked about his willingness to attend 
an All-Parties Conference shortly after the attempt on his life, an enraged Nkomo told one senior 
American diplomat to “forget about the whole damn thing.”453   
Further dimming the prospects of obtaining a negotiated settlement was the fact that 
neither the Frontline Presidents nor the South Africans seemed willing or able to rein in their 
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respective clients.  Kenneth Kaunda’s efforts to bring Smith and Nkomo together had caused 
considerable discord among the Frontline Presidents.454  Moreover, Tanzanian President Julius 
Nyerere, the unofficial chairman of the Frontline Presidents and the strongest advocate of the 
Anglo-American Proposals, was preoccupied by his country’s war against Uganda and was 
unable to play a constructive role in the Rhodesian negotiations.455  Nor did South Africa’s new 
Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, show any sign of withdrawing his country’s support for the 
Salisbury Group.456  If anything, the attacks he launched against the leading Namibian nationalist 
organization earlier in the year seemed to suggest that “the Crocodile” would redouble his 
support for the Salisbury Group rather than allow the “extremist” leaders of the Patriotic Front to 
seize power in Salisbury.457  Thus, there was seemingly little the British and Americans could do 
as the Rhodesian situation deteriorated.  Unconstrained by their patrons, Smith, Nkomo, and 
Mugabe did not evince even the slightest interest in attending an All Parties Conference when a 
British envoy visited southern Africa in December.458  As Stephen Low remarked, American and 
British officials seemed to be “going through the motions of support for a policy…that is no 
longer viable.”459  Thus, as southern Africa drifted toward an all-out race war, there seemed to be 
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nothing that policymakers in Washington and London could do but wait for events to unfold in 
the hope that an opportunity for a new initiative would present itself. 
As the situation in southern Africa deteriorated, a pervasive sense of defeatism settled 
over the White House.  Zbigniew Brzezinski saw little chance of obtaining a solution along the 
lines of the Anglo-American Proposals and urged the President to quietly disengage from the 
negotiating process, turning the problem over to the United Nations or the British.  The National 
Security Adviser first suggested that the Administration begin planning for “the possibility that a 
peaceful solution is not in the cards” in June 1978 and returned to this theme several weeks 
later.460  “We plunged heavily into African problems – which, alas, the British created,” 
Brzezinski wrote in one of his weekly reports to the President.  “But should we be so heavily 
engaged?”  While the National Security Adviser acknowledged that disengagement would not be 
an ideal outcome, he argued that “it may be better than being drawn into a massive conflict 
between the forces of apartheid and Soviet/Cuban dominated guerrillas.”  Jimmy Carter may 
have been experiencing doubts of his own, for he wrote in the margins of Brzezinski’s 
memorandum that quiet withdrawal was “a good possibility.”461  Whether this comment betrayed 
Carter’s true intention or merely a burst of frustration, the Rhodesian conflict was clearly 
proving to be far more intractable than the President had initially imagined. 
Nor did the Rhodesian situation look any better from across the Atlantic.  After meeting 
with Nkomo and Mugabe on the island of Malta, British Deputy Undersecretary for African 
Affairs Johnny Graham was left questioning the viability of reaching a negotiated settlement.  
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“[W]hile I think that the Anglo/American Proposals remain as a sort of yardstick, I see little 
prospect of their ever being put into effect,” he reported to the Foreign Office.462  Even more 
disconcerting to British policymakers was the seeming divergence which had emerged between 
their own priorities in southern Africa and those of the Carter Administration.  As the Anglo-
American initiative bogged down, Whitehall officials began to wonder whether the Americans 
were more interested in maintaining good relations with the Frontline States and Nigeria than 
they were in mediating an end to the Rhodesian crisis.463  Indeed, it was well known that 
Brzezinski was advising Jimmy Carter to abandon the negotiating process, and there were signs 
that the President was leaning in that direction.464   Thus, as 1978 wound down, there seemed 
little reason for optimism.  Not only did the Anglo-American Proposals seem increasingly 
irrelevant, but the British and Americans no longer even seemed to be on the same page 
concerning how to move forward. 
 
Toward the Rhodesian Elections 
As the Anglo-American initiative floundered, events in Rhodesia continued apace.  On 
January 30, 1979, Rhodesians accepted a new constitution which called for majority rule on the 
basis of universal adult suffrage.  To the surprise of many international observers, a whopping 
85% of Rhodesia’s white electorate voted in favor of the constitution.465  In some respects, the 
vote was a monumental one.  Ian Smith, the man who had once vowed that majority rule would 
not come to Rhodesia in his lifetime, had convinced his followers to transfer power to the 
colony’s black majority.  The Rhodesian leader made little attempt to hide his displeasure about 
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the course of events, but he insisted that there was no alternative.  Anyone hoping to preserve 
minority rule, he maintained, was living in a “fool’s paradise.”466   
Despite the fact that the new constitution ceded control of parliament to Rhodesia’s black 
majority, most commentators agree it would hardly have deprived Rhodesians of their privileged 
position in society.  For while it did ensure that there would be a black prime minister, the 1979 
constitution left virtually every other instrument of power in white hands for a period of five to 
ten years.467  International observers were quick to pick up on this fact.  African, Asian, and 
Caribbean members of the Commonwealth denounced the constitution as a “racist and anti-
democratic document,” and few within the Callaghan government or the Carter Administration 
disagreed.468  For while granting concessions to white settlers was not exceptional in the context 
of British decolonization, many observers felt that Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau had gone too 
far in their efforts to appease Smith.469  Perhaps nothing better symbolized the shortcomings of 
the constitution than the fact that the new state was to be called “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia” rather 
than simply “Zimbabwe.”  While seemingly only a symbolic concession, journalist Martin 
Meredith later reflected on the significance of the change.  “For more than twenty years the 
nationalists had been united on little else but the name Zimbabwe.  It had symbolized all their 
aspirations; in a sense, it had been their ultimate goal.  Now it had been distended in a way which 
even many whites thought clumsy.”  In Martin’s estimation, “[N]othing emphasized more how 
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far the nationalists negotiating with Smith were prepared to go in placating the whites than their 
agreement on the new state’s name.”470   
 But whatever foreigners thought of the new constitution, Smith and his colleagues in the 
Executive Council maintained that what mattered most was the reaction of the Zimbabwean 
people.  And the best way to gauge their attitude, the Salisbury Group averred, was by measuring 
the turnout for the elections slated to be held in April 1979.  In making this case, Smith, 
Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau were attempting to transform the upcoming election into a 
referendum on the new constitution.  They asserted that a high turnout would demonstrate not 
only the popularity of the new government but also the acceptance of the Zimbabwean people of 
the new constitution.471  A low turnout, by contrast, would have the opposite effect.   
Because they were excluded from the elections, a low turnout was exactly what Robert 
Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo hoped to see.  And to this end, they ratcheted up the guerrilla 
campaign.  In December 1978, a team of Mugabe’s ZANLA operatives destroyed a major fuel 
depot in Salisbury, igniting a fire which took five days to douse.  The following February, a 
cadre of Nkomo’s ZIPRA operatives downed a second Rhodesian jetliner.  According to Martin 
Meredith, roadside ambushes became so common that all major roads were deemed unsafe to 
travel on after dark.  The Salisbury Group responded by mobilizing as many men as possible to 
prevent the elections from being disrupted.  All leave for regular troops and police was 
cancelled, and white men between the ages of 50 and 59 were called upon to help protect urban 
areas.  By April 1979, the government had mobilized nearly 100,000 men – the largest display of 
force in the colony’s history.472   
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The Salisbury Group simultaneously launched a propaganda campaign designed to 
convince Zimbabwean voters to turn out in high numbers.  “We have to work up a frenzy – 
almost an hysteria,” remarked one government official.  “A maximum percentage poll is our 
future.”473  This mindset was reflected in the slogan, “We are all going to vote,” which appeared 
on nearly every political poster that appeared in Rhodesia during the 1979 campaign.474  In an 
effort to appeal to voters, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau pledged to create jobs, build schools, 
and open new health clinics.  These issues were undoubtedly important to Zimbabweans, but 
their overwhelming concern was the de-escalation of the Chimurenga.  Consequently, the 
candidates sought to assure their supporters that a high turnout would bring peace and prosperity.  
They promised that a black government would be recognized by the international community, 
that sanctions would be lifted, and that the war would wind down.475  It was an alluring message 
for a people who had suffered so much for so long.  "We have had the war because we had no 
African leader,” one Zimbabwean voter told reporters.  “Now that we are voting one in, we hope 
he will bring an end to the fighting."  Another Zimbabwean was even more succinct.  “Peace is 
really what we want," he declared.476  Many Zimbabweans seem to have shared this sentiment, 
for voter turnout far exceeded expectations.  Out of an estimated 2.8 million eligible black 
voters, nearly 1.9 million ballots were cast (a 64% turnout).477   
When all the votes were tallied, it was clear that Muzorewa and his United African 
National Congress (UANC) party had scored a commanding victory.  The UANC won 67% of 
the votes cast and took 51 of the 72 black seats in parliament.  Sithole, perhaps the only person to 
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have questioned Muzorewa’s chances prior to the election, finished a distant second.  To no 
one’s surprise, the Rhodesian Front captured all 28 white seats.478  After a transition period of 
several weeks, Muzorewa was sworn in as the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia on 
June 1, 1979.479  And so, 15 months after the conclusion of the Salisbury Agreement, minority 
rule in Rhodesia came to an end.  After more than 13 years of UDI, Ian Smith had done the 
unthinkable: he had ceded power to a black leader selected by the Zimbabwean people.  Despite 
these heretofore unthinkable changes, it remained to be seen whether Muzorewa’s election 
would lead to the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous state or whether the exclusion of 
the Patriotic Front from the elections would lead to the further stoking of the flames raging 
across southern Africa.  It was at this moment that all eyes turned west toward the United States, 
where Jimmy Carter and his advisers pondered whether or not they should lift sanctions and 
recognize the new state.   
 
The Rhodesia Lobby 
 
As Carter agonized over his decision, many Americans urged the President to recognize 
Muzorewa’s government and lift sanctions.  This should come as no surprise given that 
Rhodesian whites had enjoyed a fair amount of support in the United States since their unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1965.  Consequently, the Carter Administration’s Rhodesian 
diplomacy, which focused on building bridges between the Salisbury Group and the Patriotic 
Front, had attracted many domestic critics.  It may be tempting to assume that these critics were 
primarily motivated by racial considerations, but historian Carl Watts has shown that the so-
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called “Rhodesia lobby” in the United States was more diverse than might be expected.480  
Undoubtedly, some of its members saw the situation in southern Africa as analogous to that in 
the US South prior to the Civil Rights Movement and were determined to hold the line this time 
around.481  However, there were other reasons for conservatives to oppose the Administration’s 
Rhodesian policy.  Some politicians and activists simply saw an opportunity to rally their bases 
and score political points.  Other critics – most notably former Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
– argued the United States had no business meddling in Rhodesia’s domestic affairs.482  Still 
others were opposed to collaborating with the United Nations or the British.483  But in spite of the 
varied motives of its members, the “Rhodesia lobby” had actively and effectively promoted the 
Rhodesian cause since the 1960s – organizing American tours to Rhodesia, sponsoring 
sympathetic speakers, orchestrating letter-writing campaigns, and raising funds to support Ian 
Smith’s regime. 
This support remained strong throughout the 1970s – as evidenced by the outrage that 
Henry Kissinger’s Rhodesian diplomacy generated in 1976.  Members of the “Rhodesia lobby” 
were further enraged by the March 1977 repeal of the Byrd Amendment and the guerrillas’ 
escalating terror campaign.  But perhaps the most important reason for the “Rhodesia lobby’s” 
renewed activism in 1978 was the conclusion of the Salisbury Agreement, which provided Ian 
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Smith’s American supporters with a plan around which they could rally.  To many conservatives, 
the arrangement seemed to offer an opportunity to transform Rhodesia into a multiracial state 
while preserving its status as an anti-Communist bulwark.  Thus, support for some type of 
“internal settlement” began to mount in the United States even before the Salisbury Plan was 
unveiled.484  In a letter dated December 27, 1977, Senator Bob Dole of Kansas urged Jimmy 
Carter to support Smith, Muzorewa, and Sithole in their efforts to sponsor elections based on the 
principle of universal suffrage.  The alternative, he warned, would be to see “the Soviet-
supported guerrilla leaders” – a clear reference to Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe – seize the 
reins of power in Salisbury.485  Less than a month later, a group of eight Congressmen expressed 
similar sentiments in a letter to the President.  “We believe that the United States should give its 
support to the constructive endeavors of [the] political leaders in Rhodesia who are prepared to 
submit their aspirations to the test of the ballot box, and not to a militant faction that is openly 
scornful of the democratic order,” they admonished in what would become an all-too-familiar 
critique.486   
Indeed, the most successful criticism of the Carter Administration’s Rhodesian policy 
was that it amounted to pandering to a group of Communist-backed agitators who were more 
interested in securing power for themselves than they were in building a prosperous, democratic 
Zimbabwe.  In the months after the internal settlement was concluded, groups such as the 
Friends of Rhodesian Independence, the American-Southern Africa Council, the American 
Conservative Union, and the Coalition of Peace through Strength sought to contrast the 
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“democratic,” “peaceful,” and “multiracial” Salisbury Group against the “Marxist” and 
“terrorist” leaders of the Patriotic Front.  This strategy proved effective in rallying support from 
an American public that tended to be poorly informed about developments in sub-Saharan Africa 
– especially once the guerrillas began to escalate their urban terror campaign.  For while 
members of the “Rhodesia lobby” often turned a blind eye to the atrocities committed by the 
Salisbury regime, the slaying of missionaries, the downing of civilian airliners, and the murder of 
unarmed civilians horrified many Americans.487  Under these circumstances, it was not long 
before some prominent academics and members of the press began to condemn the 
Administration’s determination to include the Patriotic Front in any Rhodesian settlement.  “If 
mediation rather than partisanship is called for, why do we tilt so consistently on the side of [the] 
guerrilla groups led by Joshua Nkomo and his nominal Patriotic Front ally, Robert Mugabe?” 
queried Chester Crocker, an academic destined to become Ronald Reagan’s top African 
diplomat.488  Nor was Crocker alone in condemning the “Carter-Young policy” of discrediting 
the internal settlement.489   
However, the guerrilla campaign was not the only development fuelling criticism of the 
Administration’s Rhodesian policy.  Criticism also mounted when it became apparent that the 
Soviets and Cubans were willing to use military force to expand their influence in Africa – a 
trend which first became apparent during the conflict in the Horn of Africa.  Located on the 
continent’s northeast corner, astride the shipping lines through which most of the world’s oil 
supplies pass, the region was considered strategically important.  Thus, US officials took note in 
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July 1977, when Somalia’s army invaded a sparsely-populated stretch of desert in southeastern 
Ethiopia known as the Ogaden.  There has been much debate as to whether the United States 
inadvertently encouraged Somali President Siad Barré to launch the invasion. And, indeed, the 
evidence seems to suggest that the Administration had been seeking to cozy up to Somalia in the 
early months of 1977.490  Nevertheless, US officials understood that they could not publicly 
support Siad (whose disregard for human rights prompted one senior US official to dub him “one 
of the least attractive figures who has stepped through the backwaters of modern history”) or his 
irredentist agenda.491  Therefore, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance urged the President to keep his distance and allow the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) to take the lead in mediating an end to the conflict.492  Jimmy Carter 
heartily agreed and supported the OAU’s initiatives to broker a settlement.493   
Initially, the war in the Horn garnered little publicity in the American press.  It was seen 
as simply the latest in a seemingly-endless string of African crises.  However, the 
internationalization of the conflict caused some Americans to take notice.  The turning point 
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came in November 1977, when it became apparent that the Soviets and Cubans were far more 
deeply involved in the Horn than they had initially let on.  In mid-November, US officials 
learned that the Soviets and Cubans had been pouring military aid into Ethiopia for months, 
culminating in a massive airlift of Soviet equipment (including artillery, armor, and aircraft) and 
Cuban military personnel.494  By early 1978, the influx of Soviet and Cuban support (which, by 
April 1978, consisted of an estimated 15,000 Cuban troops and more than $1 billion in Soviet 
military equipment) had enabled the Ethiopians to repel the Somali invasion.495  When the dust 
settled, the communist powers had solidified their relationship with Ethiopia (a nation which had 
been a close American ally since World War II) and rescued their new allies from certain defeat 
at the hands of the Somalis by mounting what one US official described as “one of the most 
massive efforts at foreign intervention in Africa that has taken place in recent years.”496   
The outcome of the crisis in the Horn enraged many conservatives, who decried the 
Administration’s diplomacy in the Horn as amateurish and ineffective.  Nowhere was this 
outrage felt more strongly than in the halls of Congress, which had shifted considerably to the 
right since the 1974 midterm elections.  Indeed, Congressional critics seized upon the crisis as 
manna from heaven – for it not only allowed them to argue that the Soviets were playing fast and 
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loose with the “rules” of détente, it also enabled them to question the Administration’s 
willingness to stand up to the challenge.  Speaking on behalf of his “concerned” Republican 
colleagues, Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee described the Administration as 
“weak, ineffective, soft in critical negotiations, and unwilling to resist Soviet adventurism.”  In a 
wide-ranging critique of the Administration’s foreign policy, Baker mocked the “hypocrisy of 
Moscow’s attempts to portray itself as a peace-loving nation concerned about the oppressed 
peoples of the world.”  He charged that the Soviet Union had “taken advantage of tribal, racial 
and regional disputes…to forge its own brand of 20th century colonialism with Cuban rifle-
bearers” and expressed amazement that some Administration officials seemed “unwilling or 
unable to recognize or acknowledge that the Soviets and Cubans have and will continue to 
exploit situations of opportunity in Africa wherever and whenever they can.”  This included 
Rhodesia, which, Baker argued, the Administration seemed intent on delivering into Soviet 
hands.  “The Administration should abandon its rigid insistence on the inclusion of Soviet 
supported and armed guerrillas in the establishment of a black majority government,” the 
Minority Leader crowed, adding that “the settlement negotiated between the black moderate 
leaders and the Smith government should be given a chance.”497  Other friends of Rhodesia, 
including Senator Harry Byrd Junior of Virginia, heartily agreed.498  Thus, while Congressional 
conservatives were primarily interested in blocking the Panama Canal treaties and SALT II in the 
early months of 1978, they were more than willing to take the Carter Administration to task for 
what they regarded as its failure to protect American interests in Africa.   
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Two of the most outspoken opponents of the Administration’s Rhodesian diplomacy 
were Senators Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa of California.  
Ardent supporters of the internal settlement, Helms and Hayakawa were eager to overturn 
Carter’s Rhodesian policy by forcing the President to lift sanctions.  On June 28, 1978, Helms 
introduced a bill which would have forced the President to do exactly that.  From the Senate 
floor, he described the internal settlement as a major accomplishment that deserved American 
support.  He praised the moderation of Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole, and Chief Chirau, 
juxtaposing them against Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, who seemed wedded to “their 
bloody and murderous campaign against the missionaries, women and children of Rhodesia.”499  
Senators Hayakawa, Byrd, Dole, and Goldwater spoke in favor of the “Helms Amendment,” 
arguing that unless the United States supported the internal settlement, “[T]he next African 
nation to become a Soviet-dominated one will be Rhodesia.”500  As these statements illustrate, 
conservative Senators were increasingly coming to view events in Africa through the lens of the 
Cold War.  After the communist powers’ unprecedented intervention in the Horn, their logic was 
difficult to refute. 
The Helms Amendment came uncomfortably close to making it out of the Senate, falling 
only four votes shy.  Undeterred, Helms and his allies made no secret of their intention to renew 
their efforts to force Jimmy Carter to lift sanctions.  In an effort to undercut the North Carolinian, 
Administration officials backed a compromise bill co-sponsored by Senators Clifford Case of 
New Jersey and Jacob Javits of New York.  The so-called “Case-Javits Amendment” required 
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that the President lift sanctions by December 31, 1978, if he determined that the Salisbury Group 
had held “free and fair” elections and displayed a willingness to attend an all-parties conference 
with the leaders of the Patriotic Front.501  The bill was considered less damaging than the Helms 
Amendment because it bought the Administration some breathing room and left the final 
decision in the hands of the President.  Nevertheless, it was a bitter pill for many Administration 
officials to swallow.  Not only did it reflect a rightward shift in Congress, but it also revealed that 
the Administration’s argument that any settlement which excluded the Patriotic Front would fail 
had fallen on deaf ears.  In the words of one New York Times editorial, the Case-Javits 
Amendment reflected the Senate’s belief that the Administration was showing “too little 
sympathy” for the efforts of the Salisbury Group and too much for the guerrillas.502 
Unfortunately for the President and his allies, the assaults on their Rhodesian policy had 
gained considerable traction by the time the Rhodesian elections were held in April 1979.  A host 
of influential editors, journalists, and academics had come to accept the conservatives’ position 
and were urging the Administration to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.503  According to public 
opinion polls, many everyday Americans were coming to share this sentiment.  “[W]e have lost, 
hands down, the battle of gut images,” concluded one Administration official.  “Our position is 
seemingly vague, hopelessly complex, paints no good and bad guys, and offers no simple game 
plan.  Muzorewa/Smith and their supporters paint a vivid picture of good (multiracial, 
democratic, pro-Western, anti-terrorism) against bad (guerrillas/terrorists, guns instead of ballots, 
Soviets & Cubans...).  Moreover, the public is told that the solution is simple and costless: lift 
                                                          
501
 For more on the Case-Javits Amendment, see DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome, 266-268. 
502
 New York Times, “The Senate’s Two Votes on Foreign Policy,” July 28, 1978. 
503
 As of October 1978, editorials in major newspapers opposed the Administration’s Rhodesian policy by a 3-to-1 
margin.  Memorandum, Hodding Carter III to Richard Moose, “Editorial Comment on Rhodesia Prior to the Smith 
Visit,” October 13, 1978, CO 129: Executive 7/1/78-12/31/78 folder, White House Central File, Subject File, Box 
CO-51, JECL.  See for instance, Washington Post, “Sanctimony and Rhodesia,” April 23, 1979. 
161 
 
sanctions.”504  This sentiment was becoming increasingly widespread on Capitol Hill as well – 
especially after the 1978 midterm elections gave Congress a more conservative hue.505  Indeed, 
even the Democratic House Majority Leader seemed to favor lifting sanctions under the terms of 
the Case-Javits Amendment.506  It was against this background of rising conservatism that Carter 
had to decide whether to reverse his Rhodesian policy or defy an increasingly-restless Congress.  
Making the President’s decision all the more difficult was his awareness that he would need all 
the allies he could muster if he hoped to get major legislation – including the controversial SALT 
II treaty – through Congress.  
 
Countervailing Forces 
At the same time that Congress and the “Rhodesia lobby” were pushing Jimmy Carter to 
lift sanctions, the President faced countervailing pressures from influential groups who 
vehemently opposed his doing so.  In the United States, this movement was spearheaded by a 
number of prominent African Americans – some of whom had regarded the Rhodesian crisis as 
an important issue dating back to 1965.507  Because many African American leaders supported 
the Patriotic Front (which they regarded as the legitimate voice of the Zimbabwean people) 
rather than the Salisbury Group, Carter’s advisers fully expected to hear from opponents of the 
“internal settlement” before the President made his decision about whether or not to lift 
sanctions.  “I have talked with Blacks in various Washington circles, and there is no doubt in my 
mind that if it [Rhodesia] is not a big ‘domestic’ issue with them yet, it will become one,” NSC 
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staffer Madeline Albright informed Zbigniew Brzezinski shortly after the Rhodesian elections.508  
Louis Martin, Carter’s liaison with the African American community, seconded this assessment.  
“While the rank and file of US Blacks may not be well-informed about political developments in 
Rhodesia, they can be expected to support the Black organizations and Black leadership that are 
opposing the lifting of sanctions,” he predicted in a memorandum to the President 509   
As anticipated, letters from prominent African Americans poured into the White House 
mail room while the President weighed his options.  Almost all of them urged him not to lift 
sanctions.  Coretta Scott King, the widow of Martin Luther King Junior (who had himself taken a 
strong stand against UDI in 1965), called the lifting of sanctions “both premature and 
unconscionable.”510  She regarded Ian Smith as a “world outlaw” and urged US officials not to 
have anything to do with his schemes.511  Atlanta’s Mayor, Maynard Jackson, called the White 
House to reiterate the importance that black voters attached to the issue, assuring the President 
that a decision to lift sanctions would undermine the credibility of his human rights agenda and 
cost him at the polls.  “Africa is our Israel,” Jackson warned.512  Other political and professional 
organizations, including the Congressional Black Caucus, the National Conference of Black 
Mayors, the National Urban League, and the National Bar Association echoed these 
sentiments.513   
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While his Republican predecessors might have been able to disregard the opinions of 
African American leaders, Jimmy Carter could not.  As previously noted, Carter owed his slim 
victory in the 1976 presidential election to black voters.  Given his mixed record in office, the 
Georgian’s re-election hopes were likely to rest in their hands again in 1980.  Taking domestic 
politics into consideration, Madeline Albright strongly recommended against lifting sanctions 
under the terms of the Case-Javits Amendment.  “I do not believe that the President is in a 
position to alienate that constituency further,” she remarked in reference to African Americans.514  
Thus, while the “Rhodesia lobby” was busy rallying support for Muzorewa’s regime in the 
spring of 1979, domestic political considerations ensured that Jimmy Carter would think twice 
before lifting sanctions.  To UN Representative Andrew Young, this high degree of African 
American activism signaled the emergence of a “new constituency for US-African affairs.”515  It 
was a constituency which would not only help to shape the Carter Administration’s Rhodesian 
policy, but which would also play a major role in forcing Ronald Reagan to impose economic 
sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s.  
 However, African Americans were not the only influential group urging Jimmy Carter to 
maintain sanctions.  African leaders were equally dismissive of the April elections and insisted 
that the United States not do anything to aid Muzorewa.  Although Rhodesia was legally a 
British problem, African leaders attached special importance to the US decision because several 
“moderate” states (including Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Zaire) were expected to follow 
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America’s lead.516  Given that opposition to minority rule was one of the few issues holding the 
OAU together, a decision by even a handful of member states to lift sanctions had the potential 
to destabilize the body and unleash a wave of acrimony across the continent.  For this reason, 
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere publicly warned the United States not to recognize the 
Rhodesian elections.517  So did the Nigerians.  “The Federal military government of Nigeria 
unequivocally rejects the bogus elections recently held in Rhodesia with the regrettable aim of 
installing an African puppet regime as the convenient vehicle for perpetuating the enslavement 
of our African brothers and sisters,” declared the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs.  “Any 
attempts to accord recognition or respectability to the outcome of the illegal and pretentious 
elections, therefore, offend against reason and the peace of Africa,” the Minister added in a not-
so-subtle warning to US officials.518  Coming from Africa’s most populous nation and America’s 
second largest supplier of crude oil, these words could hardly have failed to make an impression.  
Even Liberia’s pro-Western President informed American leaders that a decision to lift sanctions 
would seriously damage US-African relations.519  Given this chorus of voices, it was clear that a 
decision to recognize the Rhodesian elections and lift sanctions would have undermined the 
Administration’s standing throughout black Africa – a point which officials opposed to the 
lifting of sanctions spelled out in no uncertain terms.520   
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 While previous scholars of the search for Zimbabwean independence have examined the 
ways in which African American and African pressure influenced the Carter Administration’s 
thinking, they have tended to overlook the fact that Cold War considerations also weighed 
heavily on policymakers’ minds as they considered their next move in Rhodesia.  As previously 
noted, many of the Administration’s leading figures had been concerned about Soviet and Cuban 
involvement in southern Africa since assuming office.  The communist powers’ involvement in 
the Horn of Africa only served to heighten these anxieties – particularly those of National 
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who, like his predecessor and academic rival, Henry 
Kissinger, had little interest in the global periphery.  This was especially true of Africa, which he 
regarded as a “morass.”521  But while Brzezinski had little sympathy for Africans’ struggles to 
overcome the legacies of colonialism, he was well aware that the continent had the potential to 
become a sparring ground for the superpowers.  And despite his disinterest in African affairs, 
Brzezinski was not prepared to stand by as America’s chief Cold War rivals expanded their 
influence on the continent.  “Current African events can be seen in terms of two broad 
interpretations, each yielding a contradictory conclusion,” Brzezinski postulated in one of his 
weekly reports to the President.  “The first is that Africa is in the midst of a social-political 
upheaval, with post-colonial structures simply collapsing.”  In this case, he argued that it was 
“clearly inadvisable” for the United States to become involved.  “On the other hand,” he noted, 
“events in Africa can also be seen as part of a broad East-West struggle, with pro-Western 
regimes being challenged by pro-Soviet regimes.  This dictates resistance to Soviet efforts.”522  
This memorandum conveyed Brzezinski’s basic approach to African affairs: unless the Soviets 
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and Cubans were involved, the United States should seek to avoid entanglements in the African 
“morass.” 
Given this attitude, it should come as little surprise that the National Security Adviser 
urged caution when the Ogaden crisis first erupted.  He regarded it as a skirmish between two 
unsavory despots and urged the President to allow the OAU to take the lead in mediating an end 
to the conflict.523  But once it became clear that the Soviets and Cubans were providing the 
Ethiopians with massive amounts of military assistance, Brzezinski quickly reversed his position.  
He had never been as optimistic about US-Soviet relations as Jimmy Carter or Cyrus Vance 
(perhaps because of his background as a Polish émigré) and events in the Horn seemed to 
confirm his suspicions.524  To Brzezinski, the Soviet airlift demonstrated that Leonid Brezhnev 
and his Politburo colleagues were more interested in improving Moscow’s global position than 
they were in promoting a stable world order.  Thus, while Brzezinski was initially unsure 
whether the Soviets were acting “merely in response to an apparent opportunity” or whether their 
actions in the Horn were “part of a wider strategic design,” it hardly mattered.525  By seeking to 
cooperate only in fields where it was to their advantage, the Soviets had “stomped all over the 
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code of détente” and demonstrated their untrustworthiness.526  Having concluded that genuine 
partnership with the Soviets was not possible, Brzezinski began to doubt the viability of the 
Carter Administration’s “post-Cold War” agenda and instead began to champion a more hawkish 
foreign policy based upon the containment of the Soviet Union.527    
As Brzezinski became increasingly skeptical of Soviet intentions, he began to worry 
about the broader implications of events in the Horn.  During the course of a March 1978 
meeting of the National Security Council’s Special Coordination Committee (SCC), he 
wondered aloud whether the Soviets and Cubans would be tempted to intervene elsewhere in 
Africa in the aftermath of their successful intervention in the Horn.  He cited Rhodesia as the 
most likely target.528  “The longer term problem,” he warned, “is how to deter further 
interventions of this sort by the Soviets [and Cubans], particularly in [s]outhern Africa where 
[Ian] Smith’s internal settlement may provide a pretext for similar large-scale intervention.”529  
Given his anxieties, Brzezinski could not have taken solace in an April 1978 CIA report which 
revealed that the Soviets were providing increasing quantities of sophisticated weaponry to the 
Patriotic Front – primarily to their longtime ally Joshua Nkomo and his Zimbabwe African 
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People’s Union.530  After witnessing the communist powers’ brazen intervention in the Horn, 
Brzezinski sensed that the African “dominoes” were about to start falling.531  
Concerned that America’s credibility was at stake, the National Security Adviser 
clamored for an aggressive response to the communist powers’ intervention in the Horn.  He 
urged his SCC colleagues to quietly encourage regional allies such as Iran, Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia to transfer weapons to Somalia in the hopes that the Somalis would be able to “make the 
Soviets and Cubans bleed.”532  He also lobbied to deploy an aircraft carrier task force to the 
Indian Ocean as a show of strength.  Even if the action proved to be little more than a symbolic 
gesture, Brzezinski maintained that it was important to undertake some action to try to deter the 
Soviets and reassure America’s allies in the region.533  When Brzezinski’s colleagues rejected his 
proposed countermeasures, he raised the possibility of linking Soviet actions in the Horn to other 
aspects of the US-Soviet relationship (a practice which had been known as “linkage” during the 
Kissinger years).  Delaying talks on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, halting technology 
transfers, and cancelling space agreements all appealed to him as levers with which to influence 
Soviet policy.534  However, Brzezinski soon concluded that these measures did not go far enough 
and began considering more controversial ones – such as linking Soviet actions in the Horn to 
progress on SALT II or to the transfer of American technology (and possibly the sale of 
advanced weapons) to China.  A red-faced Cyrus Vance reacted sharply to these suggestions.  
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“This is where you and I part,” he chided Brzezinski.  “The consequences of doing something 
like this are very dangerous…[W]e are on the brink of ending up with a real souring of relations 
between ourselves and the Soviet Union.”535  Rebuffed by his colleagues, Brzezinski took his 
case to the President.  He decried the Soviets’ “insistence on defining détente in a purely 
selective way, retaining for [themselves] the right to use force in order to promote wider political 
objectives.”  He also warned that a passive response to Soviet and Cuban adventurism in the 
Horn would have negative ramifications at home, predicting that, “It is only a matter of time 
before the right wing in this country begins to argue that the above demonstrates our 
incompetence as well as our weakness.”  Having outlined his case for a more confrontational 
response, Brzezinski offered Carter a list of options.  These included many of the measures the 
SCC had rejected just days earlier.536 
The President never had a chance to respond to these proposals as events overtook the 
Administration’s contingency planning.  On March 9, 1978, Siad agreed to withdraw what was 
left of his army from the Ogaden.  Despite concerns that the Ethiopians would carry the battle to 
Mogadishu, the Ethiopian forces halted at the border, thus restoring the status quo ante.  From an 
American standpoint, however, what is most significant about the incident was not its 
denouement but the effect it seems to have had on Jimmy Carter’s worldview.  The evidence 
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suggests that the President became far more pessimistic about US-Soviet relations after the crisis.  
He began to wonder whether the Soviet leadership harbored hegemonic intentions after all.537  
Thereafter, Carter became increasingly suspicious of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the 
developing world and increasingly attracted to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s more hardline policy 
prescriptions.538  A May 1978 crisis in Zaire, which bore all the hallmarks of Soviet and Cuban 
involvement, convinced Carter and Brzezinski that the crisis in the Horn was not an isolated 
incident but rather the opening salvo of an overarching challenge to America’s position in the 
developing world.539  From that point onward, they increasingly tended to view events in Africa 
through the lens of the Cold War.  Indeed, so dramatic was this shift that it prompted one 
concerned Nigerian envoy to ask Brzezinski’s deputy “whether US policy towards Africa had 
slipped backwards to pre-Carter conceptions of Africa solely in East-West terms?”540      
Officials in Moscow and Havana did nothing to allay these fears.  Buoyed by their 
success in the Horn, the Soviets and Cubans seemed more determined than ever to help the 
Patriotic Front shoot its way to power.  Soviet leaders reiterated that they would “never 
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compromise” on their right to aid “progressive” movements in the developing world.541  
Similarly, the Cuban Vice President told a US contact that his nation reserved “the right to help 
its friends” in Africa – including those in Rhodesia.542  With this support in hand, it became more 
apparent than ever that a settlement which excluded the Patriotic Front stood little chance of 
success.  Rather than ending the Chimurenga, any “internal” solution was likely to exacerbate 
it.543  Policymakers in Washington feared that a military victory by the Patriotic Front would 
deliver Zimbabwe into the hands of their Soviet and Cuban backers.  Along with Angola and 
Mozambique, this would have given the communist powers unprecedented access to Africa’s 
mineral-rich “southern sixth.”  Seemingly the only way to prevent such an outcome was to keep 
the negotiating process in Rhodesia alive.  And since it was only the African community’s faith 
in Jimmy Carter as a “moral man” which made negotiations credible, a decision to lift sanctions 
might well have discredited Carter and foreclosed the possibility of achieving a negotiated 
settlement – and with it, the possibility of limiting Soviet and Cuban influence in southern 
Africa.544  Nor were Carter and Brzezinski alone in their concerns; even Richard Moose (one of 
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the Administration’s most ardent “Africanists”) was becoming concerned about the increasing 
threat of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Rhodesian bush war.545 
 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, there were compelling reasons for Jimmy 
Carter to lift sanctions and compelling reasons for him not to do so.  Champions and opponents 
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia eagerly awaited the President’s decision once Bishop Abel Muzorewa 
assumed the prime ministership on June 1, 1979.  The interested parties would not have long to 
wait.  During a June 7 press conference, Carter announced that he would not lift sanctions.  In his 
opinion, the April elections had not been “free or fair” enough to justify doing so under the terms 
of the Case-Javits Amendment.  The President described his decision as one of principle.  “It 
means a lot to our country to do what’s right and what’s decent…and what is principled,” he told 
the reporters gathered in the White House Briefing Room.
546
  During a subsequent press briefing, 
Cyrus Vance reiterated this message, emphasizing that the President’s decision “was taken for 
reasons of deep principle.”547  Few of Carter’s advisers seem to have been caught off guard by 
the decision.  “It is the President’s policy and always has been and that’s why I didn’t really have 
any doubts about where he would come down,” an aide later remarked.548 
Despite these appeals to high morals, the question remains: did Carter’s decision really 
come “from the heart” – as one New York Times article alleged it had?  Previous scholars of the 
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search for Zimbabwean independence have tended to take the President at his word.
549
  And to 
some extent, they are probably right.  While even the President’s most sympathetic aides were 
forced to admit that the elections had been administered in a reasonably unbiased manner, the 
new nation’s constitution was so riddled with compromises that few international observers 
doubted that power would remain in white hands even after the election of a black prime 
minister.  Under the constitution (which Zimbabweans had not voted on), the Rhodesians would 
continue to enjoy disproportionate representation in parliament.  They would also retain effective 
control of the army, police, judiciary, and civil service.
550
  Furthermore, the CIA predicted that 
white opposition would require the new government to move slowly and cautiously when it came 
to providing Zimbabweans with better housing, education, and health care facilities.
551
  As a 
Southerner who was acutely sensitive to issues of racial discrimination, Jimmy Carter must have 
felt uneasy about such compromises.  Perhaps these concerns are what fuelled his belief that 
maintaining sanctions was “the right thing to do.”552   
Nevertheless, the decision facing the President was hardly a matter of black and white.  
According to watchdog organizations such as Freedom House, the elections had been more “free 
and fair” than many in Africa.  The parties had been allowed to campaign openly, overt 
intimidation was minimal, the secrecy of the ballot had been respected, and the results, as far as 
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anyone could tell, accurately reflected the preferences of the Zimbabwean people.
553
  British and 
Australian observers reached much the same conclusion.
554
  Furthermore, while the new 
constitution was imperfect, many saw it as an acceptable compromise.  Thus, National Security 
staffer Jerry Funk put it best when he informed Zbigniew Brzezinski that “a good case on paper 
can be made either way on the Case-Javits Amendment.”555  Given the conclusions reached by 
the British, Freedom House, and Administration officials, there would have been ample 
justification for recognizing the Rhodesian elections and lifting sanctions had Carter wished to 
do so.  Such a decision might have placated Americans who wanted to wash their hands of the 
Rhodesian affair and could have paved the way for smoother relations with Congress.  
But he did not – a decision that seems all the more baffling given that the outcome of the 
April 1979 election was exactly what the Ford and Carter Administrations had hoped for since 
1976.  Muzorewa was a moderate nationalist with genuine grassroots support.  He had no desire 
to run the whites out of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and was eager to develop close ties with the West.  
The fact that he was an ordained Methodist minister made him all the more attractive to many 
Americans – including Jimmy Carter, a born-again Christian.556  These factors made Carter’s 
decision all the more bewildering to many Americans – including Idaho Senator Roger Jepsen, 
who declared, “I find it strange that we find fault with our friends and give aid and comfort to 
our enemies.”557  Many Americans, who could not understand the Administration’s apparent 
infatuation with the Patriotic Front voiced similar opinions.  “Is it not possible for Jimmy Carter 
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to say, just for once, that the elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia were an impressive feat for a place 
that has never had multiracial elections before; that they were a lot more impressive than the fake 
polls and military grabs by which power is sorted out in most other African countries,” queried 
one Washington Post editorial.
558
  Indeed, without understanding the broader constraints which 
Jimmy Carter felt himself to be under, his decision not to accept what many Americans 
considered an ideal solution to the Rhodesian conflict certainly seems puzzling.  
One explanation is that Carter was acting upon moral impulses when he decided not to 
lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  However, it seems likely that he was also influenced 
by other, less spiritual considerations.  By keeping sanctions in place, he hoped to solidify his 
standing with African American voters, preserve America’s improved relations with black 
Africa, and keep the Soviets and Cubans at bay.  Interestingly, Carter dwelled at much greater 
length on the ways in which his decision would protect American interests during his June 7 
press conference than he did on the ways in which it would benefit the people of Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia.  “It should preserve our diplomatic and ties of trade with friendly African 
governments,” Carter remarked.  He also asserted that the decision to maintain sanctions would 
“limit the opportunity of outside powers [a clear reference to the Soviets and Cubans] to take 
advantage of the situation in southern Africa at the expense of the United States” – a factor 
which he considered “very important.”  Only at the end of his remarks did Carter describe his 
decision as a matter of principle.559  If this speech is any indication, Jimmy Carter’s human rights 
agenda had taken a backseat to political and geostrategic concerns – a conclusion at which some 
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scholars of Carter’s Latin American policy have recently arrived.560  And if Carter did place his 
human rights agenda on the backburner as Cold War considerations resurfaced, scholars would 
be wise to view the President as less of a starry-eyed idealist and more of a hard-nosed 
pragmatist.  But whether inspired by principle, pragmatism, or some combination thereof, 
Carter’s decision not to lift sanctions left the Rhodesian situation in limbo.  It would be up to the 
new government in the United Kingdom to bring the long-festering crisis to an end.  As the 
President told his advisers shortly before announcing his decision to maintain sanctions, “[T]he 
monkey is now back on Britain’s back.”561 
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Chapter Five 
The Limits of Western Influence: Nigeria, The Frontline States, and the Lancaster House 
Settlement of 1979 
On May 4, 1979, Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives trounced James Callaghan’s 
Labour Party at the polls.  The outcome was generally attributed to a decade of economic 
stagnation and social unrest that had culminated in the “winter of discontent” – during which a 
spate of strikes had caused garbage to go uncollected and corpses to go unburied.562  Although 
the election had been fought primarily over domestic issues, the change in governments raised 
considerable uncertainty as to the direction of Britain’s Rhodesian policy.  During the campaign, 
the Tories had assailed Labour’s handling of the Rhodesian crisis and pledged that, if elected, 
they would move to recognize Abel Muzorewa’s regime and lift sanctions.563  Francis Pym, the 
frontrunner to succeed David Owen as Foreign Secretary, publicly stated that the Labour 
government would be committing a “diplomatic error” if it ignored the Rhodesian elections.564  
As long as the elections took place “in reasonably free and fair conditions and with a reasonable 
turnout,” Pym asserted “it would be the responsibility of the British Government to bring 
Rhodesia back to legality and do everything possible to make sure that the new independent state 
receives international recognition.”565  Since Pym was widely regarded as Thatcher’s “yes man,” 
many international commentators saw his speech as proof that the Tories intended to recognize 
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Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as long as the April 1979 Rhodesian elections went ahead as scheduled.566  
An interview that Thatcher gave to Time magazine just days after her election further fuelled 
speculation that the Conservatives intended to recognize Muzorewa’s government and wash their 
hands of the Rhodesian problem once and for all.567  
While some scholars have questioned how serious the Tories’ campaign rhetoric really 
was, many African leaders regarded Thatcher’s ascension to the prime ministership as cause for 
concern.568  Zambian officials were particularly concerned about Britain’s new leader, whom 
they regarded as nothing short of a “colonial cardboard cut-out.”569  In the estimation of L.P. 
Chibesakunda, the Zambian High Commissioner to London, Thatcher had displayed “total 
ignorance” about African affairs during the election campaign.  The Zambians therefore feared 
that Thatcher would quickly move to lift sanctions and recognize Muzorewa’s government.570  
Zambian officials were not alone in their concern.  Several other governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa – including those of Nigeria, Tanzania, and Angola – expected Thatcher to recognize the 
newly-elected government in Salisbury.571  So did many members of Muzorewa’s entourage, 
which explains why many of them rejoiced when they learned of Thatcher’s electoral victory.  
Ken Flower, the head of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), was 
particularly confident that Thatcher would adhere to her party’s election manifesto and recognize 
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Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  Once Britain had done so, he expected the European Community and 
several countries in Francophone Africa to follow suit.572   
While there was reason for optimism in May 1979, the Rhodesians’ hopes hinged upon 
Thatcher acting quickly and decisively.  Contrary to expectations, she failed to do so – a decision 
which rankled in Salisbury.573  This chapter will seek to explain why Thatcher decided to push 
for a settlement that included guerrilla leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo rather than 
recognizing Muzorewa’s “internal settlement.”  It will argue that the diplomatic and economic 
pressure leveled by members of the Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) influenced Thatcher’s policy to a degree that scholars have not previously appreciated.  It 
will also seek to demonstrate that an influential group of African leaders played an 
underappreciated role in ensuring that the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations yielded a 
settlement.  By highlighting the role that British, African, and (to a lesser extent) American 
statesmen played in facilitating Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule, this chapter will seek to 
emphasize the international dimensions of the Rhodesian settlement.
574
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Explaining Thatcher’s Volte-Face 
Although some scholars have questioned whether Thatcher actually intended to recognize 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, recently-declassified documents reveal such doubts to be unfounded.  The 
Prime Minister believed that the Rhodesian elections had been as “free and fair” as any that had 
taken place south of the Sahara.575  Moreover, she did not view Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s 
constitution as deficient – at least not within the African context.  As she pointedly reminded the 
Commonwealth Secretary General, the United Kingdom (along with many other nations) had 
recently recognized “a number of African regimes – for example, Uganda and Ghana – who did 
not owe their authority to any kind of democratic elections and whose constitutions were in no 
way superior” to that of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.576  Thatcher’s willingness to accept the Rhodesian 
elections at face value was likely bolstered by the hostility she felt toward the leaders of the 
Patriotic Front.  In her memoirs, Thatcher recalled that she was “not at all keen” to deal with 
Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo.577  Recently-declassified documents suggest that this 
account drastically understates Thatcher’s reluctance to negotiate with the guerrilla leaders.  
“[P]lease do not meet [with the] leaders of the Patriotic Front,” she instructed a British envoy 
headed to southern Africa for consultations with the Frontline Presidents.  “I have never done 
business with terrorists until after they became Prime Ministers.”578  A number of other 
documents confirm that, upon assuming office, Thatcher planned to recognize Muzorewa’s 
government, leaving Mugabe and Nkomo out in the cold.579   
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In addition to Thatcher’s disdain for the guerilla leaders, she was under considerable 
pressure to recognize the newly-elected regime in Salisbury.  Among the most vocal of 
Muzorewa’s supporters were members of the Monday Club, an ultraconservative organization 
which one prominent newsmagazine described as “not really to the right of Genghis Khan.”580  
Preoccupied with racial issues at home and abroad, one of the group’s highest priorities was 
rallying support for their “kith and kin” in Rhodesia.  Its leaders demonized any politician they 
deemed too eager to sell the Rhodesians down the river – a group which included Thatcher’s 
Foreign Secretary, Peter Carrington, who had the temerity to suggest that any agreement which 
excluded the Patriotic Front was unlikely to produce a lasting settlement.  The Monday Club 
responded by displaying “Hang Carrington” banners at its meetings.581  Few Britons quite so 
emotionally invested in the Rhodesian issue.  Nevertheless, the “internal settlement” enjoyed 
widespread support from mainstream Conservatives as well as the British press.582  Given these 
pressures, Thatcher appreciated that she probably would not be able to persuade her 
parliamentary colleagues to renew sanctions when they lapsed in November.583  With only 
months before sanctions were set to expire, she may have felt resigned to recognizing 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and hoping for the best.584 
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Given that Thatcher and many of her Conservative colleagues supported the “internal 
settlement,” those African leaders who feared that she would recognize Muzorewa’s regime 
seem justified in their concern.  However, this raises the question: why did Thatcher ultimately 
opt against this course of action?  Perhaps the most important factor was the economic and 
diplomatic pressure applied by African nations.  As noted in the previous chapter, most African 
leaders dismissed the “internal settlement” as a ruse designed to perpetuate white rule in 
Rhodesia.585  Their fears were reaffirmed when the Salisbury Group unveiled its independence 
constitution.  After studying the document, the OAU Secretary General concluded that, “The 
Rhodesian constitution did not solve the country’s problems.”  Because it left the whites in 
effective control of the army, judiciary, and economy (in addition to enabling them to veto any 
proposed constitutional amendment), the Secretary General asserted that the new constitution 
“seemed to institutionalize a form of discrimination.”586  The OAU Liberation Committee 
reached a similar conclusion and branded Muzorewa and his ministers as “traitors” guilty of 
“betraying the people of Zimbabwe.”587  Member states were urged not to recognize the 
Salisbury regime or provide its leaders with any aid or assistance.588  Some “moderate” African 
leaders were sympathetic to Muzorewa’s position, but none were willing to deviate from the 
OAU line.589  To the contrary, Margaret Thatcher received “[t]elegram after telegram” from 
African leaders informing her that until some of the more egregious shortcomings of Zimbabwe-
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Rhodesia’s constitution had been rectified, the country stood no chance of gaining international 
recognition.590 
In the months following Muzorewa’s election, the OAU did everything in its power to 
isolate the Bishop and his regime.  In May, the organization issued a statement denouncing the 
“sham elections” that had brought “a few misguided and ambitious black politicians” to power.  
“[T]he issue in Zimbabwe is not just ensuring that a black face is at the head of a government,” 
the statement began.  “The whole struggle is to ensure that there is black majority rule in which 
the blacks have real power.”  Because the 1979 constitution failed to place the country’s black 
and white citizens on an equal footing, the OAU pledged to continue its support for the 
Chimurenga.  The statement concluded with a warning to those nations considering recognizing 
Muzorewa’s regime.  “While there is still time they should work toward an internationally 
accepted solution in Zimbabwe.  To defy reason and African opinion is to plunge themselves into 
a situation the consequences of which they cannot predict.”591  The OAU issued a more pointed 
statement at the conclusion of a July meeting held in the Liberian capital of Monrovia.  It urged 
member states to take whatever cultural, political, or economic measures they deemed 
practicable against any nation that lifted sanctions or recognized Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.592  As 
these resolutions demonstrated, OAU members stood united in their opposition to a regime that 
sought to protect the interests of Rhodesia’s white minority at the expense of its black majority. 
Noble as such expressions of pan-African solidarity may have been, international 
commentators realized that it would take more than moral suasion to convince Margaret 
Thatcher to reverse her Rhodesian policy.  For, as the Zambian High Commissioner to London 
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noted, Britain’s new Prime Minister “tended to view all international issues only in relation to 
British interests.”593  While the Zambian High Commissioner lamented Thatcher’s approach to 
foreign affairs, other nations sought to exploit it.  Foremost among those seeking to influence 
British policy at this crucial juncture was the Federal Military Government of Nigeria.
594
  
Without having conducted research in the Nigerian archives, it is difficult determine exactly why 
the Nigerians were so opposed to Muzorewa’s regime.  Peter Carrington suspected that the 
Nigerian leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo, harbored a grudge against the Bishop.595  Other 
British officials believed the Nigerian leader was simply opposed to a constitution that left too 
much power in the hands of the whites.596   And the British High Commissioner to Lagos, 
Mervyn Brown, suspected that Obasanjo was seeking to bolster his legacy as he prepared to 
retire from public life.597 
Whatever the Nigerian government’s motives, it was clear that Obasanjo was unlikely to 
accept the new regime in Salisbury.  Moreover, the Nigerian government was capable of severely 
damaging Britain’s international position if Thatcher acted too hastily in Rhodesia.  Perhaps no 
one was more alert to this fact than Mervyn Brown, who warned that early recognition of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia could have “disastrous” consequences for Britain.  The High Commissioner 
predicted that lifting sanctions (which the Nigerians regarded as the first step toward recognition) 
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would lead to anti-British riots, a breach in diplomatic relations, and economic reprisals.598  
While policymakers in London were concerned about the safety of British nationals in Nigeria, 
they were primarily worried about the possibility of Nigeria waging economic warfare against 
them.  This concern is not surprising since Nigeria was Britain’s ninth largest export market and 
most important trading partner outside of Western Europe and North America.  And at a time 
when the British economy was in the doldrums, Nigeria was one of the few countries with which 
Britain maintained a favorable balance of trade.599  Furthermore, Nigeria was just beginning to 
benefit from the oil-boom of the late-1970s.  British officials predicted that if they could 
maintain their share of the Nigerian market (which stood at a remarkable 22%), British firms 
could expect to reap the benefits as Nigeria began to modernize its military and infrastructure.600 
Conversely, Britain stood to lose a great deal if relations between the two countries 
soured.  For, while highly profitable, Britain’s economic links with Nigeria were far from secure.  
“[T]he bulk of the goods and services we supply, and the technology and expertise we provide, 
could be met relatively quickly and easily from other sources if the Nigerians decided on a 
boycott,” concluded one British official.  Moreover, British firms were “highly vulnerable” to 
Nigerian reprisals.601  The oil giant British Petroleum (BP) had invested heavily in Nigeria, and 
British officials worried that General Obasanjo might nationalize the company’s Nigerian 
holdings as punishment for recognizing Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  In addition to taking action 
against BP, the British Deputy High Commissioner to Lagos warned of a range of punitive 
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measures the Federal Military Government had under consideration.  These included: 
embargoing British imports, preventing British firms from bidding on public sector contracts, 
and nationalizing British assets in Nigeria.602  By contrast, the scope for effective 
countermeasures was deemed to be “negligible.”  Britain’s balance of trade with Nigeria was so 
favorable, and British firms stood to profit so handsomely from Nigeria’s economic boom, that 
almost any retaliatory measure was likely to redound to Britain’s disadvantage.  At a time when 
the British economy was in a shambles, Margaret Thatcher and her advisers must have had 
serious qualms about risking such lucrative ties for the sake of Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa.603   
Fears in London were exacerbated by the fact that the Nigerians seemed prepared to use 
their economic leverage.  The state-owned New Nigerian, which had described Thatcher’s 
victory as “a major disaster” for Africa, carried a string of editorials warning the Prime Minister 
not to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.604  Nigerian officials reiterated these warnings in private 
contacts with their British counterparts.  As one prominent Nigerian explained to Mervyn 
Brown, Thatcher’s Rhodesian policy had placed their countries on a “collision course.”  If forced 
to choose between “a Muzorewa government backed by Britain and the Patriotic Front backed by 
the Front Line States,” there would be no question as to where Nigeria’s loyalties would lay.  It 
would side with “the forces of black liberation.”605  In early June, the Nigerians barred British 
firms from bidding on public sector contracts until the Tories “clarified” their position on the 
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Rhodesian situation.  The decision, which was allegedly taken at the behest of General Obasanjo, 
left little doubt but that the Nigerians meant business.606   
Important as these commercial ties were, they were not the only source of leverage the 
Nigerians held over the Thatcher government.  British officials were also worried by Obasanjo’s 
threats to bring the Commonwealth crashing down.  The Nigerian press had been speculating for 
some time about the nation’s membership in the Commonwealth, and shortly after Thatcher’s 
election, the Nigerians began publicly linking their country’s future participation in the 
organization to Britain’s Rhodesian policy.  A decision to recognize Muzorewa’s regime, the 
New Nigerian warned “must mean the end of the Commonwealth.”607  Although Nigeria was not 
the first African nation to threaten to withdraw from the Commonwealth, British officials viewed 
this threat with special concern.  Because Nigeria exercised considerable clout in international 
forums, its withdrawal would have represented a serious blow to the Commonwealth.  Moreover, 
policymakers in London had ample evidence to suggest that the Federal Military Government 
was prepared to make good on its threat.  Not only was Nigeria’s “sentimental commitment” to 
the Commonwealth deemed to be “virtually nil,” but it was well known that some members of 
the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been pushing for withdrawal for some time.608  Nor 
were British officials alone their concern.  Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser warned 
Margaret Thatcher that the Rhodesian issue “has the potential to split the Commonwealth at a 
time when all the other signs have been pointing in the direction of enhanced Commonwealth 
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unity.”609  Given the importance that British officials attached to their country’s role as the leader 
of a multiracial Commonwealth, the threat of its demise provided further incentive for Thatcher 
to reconsider her stance on Rhodesia.   
In his memoirs, Peter Carrington credited the Nigerians with orchestrating the opposition 
to Muzorewa’s regime.610  While this recollection probably reflects the fact that British officials 
were more concerned about the Nigerians’ “bite” than the OAU’s “bark,” it ignores the 
important role that other Commonwealth states played in opposing to the “internal settlement.”611  
The Zambian and Tanzanian governments played especially important roles in marshaling 
support against Muzorewa’s regime.  In large part, this opposition was based on principle; 
neither Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda nor Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere believed that 
the “internal settlement” would result in a genuine transfer of power.  Both agreed with the 
Zambian High Commissioner to Gaborone, who concluded that the 1979 constitution would 
permit Ian Smith and his followers to “remain in effective control of things.”612  The Zambians 
were particularly cognizant of the need for Africa to present a united front – not only to deter 
Britain from recognizing the newly-elected regime in Salisbury,613 but to keep other African 
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nations in line.614  In the months following the 1979 Rhodesian elections, Nigerian, Zambian, and 
Tanzanian officials worked to preserve an African consensus on the Rhodesian issue.   
Other Commonwealth countries also protested the Tories’ Rhodesian policy.  On May 18, 
the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa met to discuss the recent developments in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  Those present agreed that the April elections did not represent a genuine 
transfer of power.  While the Nigerian representative was among the most strident critics of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s constitution, the Zambian and Ghanaian representatives echoed his 
sentiments.  Non-African nations such as India and Jamaica also voiced their opposition to the 
“internal settlement.”615  As Britain’s Undersecretary for Southern Africa subsequently reported, 
“There was no doubt…about the anxiety felt by all Commonwealth representatives” over the 
Rhodesian issue.  He added that concern had not been limited “to those who are instinctively 
hostile to the Bishop (e.g., Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania)” but had included “other more moderate 
and uncommitted Commonwealth representatives who genuinely feared that Rhodesia was an 
issue which could pull the Commonwealth apart.”616  As a follow-up, eight High Commissioners 
met with Peter Carrington to express their concern about Thatcher’s apparent tilt toward 
Muzorewa.617  The British recognized that “[n]o other African country can hurt us the way the 
Nigerians can.”  Nevertheless, they could hardly afford to disregard such widely-held concerns 
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about the Rhodesian constitution – for fear that the OAU and the Commonwealth could do 
“lasting damage” to Britain’s reputation and interests if they acted collectively.618   
 
Winning the Commonwealth Seal of Approval 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office got the message loud and clear.619  More 
importantly, so did the Prime Minister.  Indeed, this deluge of protest seems to have convinced 
Thatcher to reassess her Rhodesian policy.  As the Acting Zambian High Commissioner to 
London reported in June, concerns about a hostile Commonwealth and OAU reaction “seem to 
be producing a sense of caution” in spite of the fact that right-wing pressure on Thatcher to 
recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia continued unabated.620  This pause for reflection enabled the 
Prime Minister, who, in the words of her Foreign Secretary, “had not particularly bent her mind 
to Africa” to appreciate that the “internal settlement” was not a panacea for her Rhodesian 
dilemma.621  Few (if any) African or Commonwealth countries could be expected to recognize 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia regardless of what Britain did.  Not only was premature recognition likely 
to jeopardize British interests abroad, therefore, it was unlikely to bring the Chimurenga to an 
end.622  After a month on the job, Thatcher was coming to appreciate that international 
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recognition was what Zimbabwe-Rhodesia needed.623  She therefore abandoned her earlier 
determination to recognize the “internal settlement” and decided to seek a settlement that would 
attract “the widest possible international acceptance.”624 
The first indication of Thatcher’s more cautious approach was her decision to send an 
envoy to liaise with the African leaders most directly involved in the Rhodesian crisis.  David 
Harlech, a former ambassador to the United States, was selected for the mission.  He embarked 
on a seven-nation tour of southern Africa on June 12.  His consultations reaffirmed Peter 
Carrington’s belief that not even the most moderate African leaders were prepared to accept the 
current set-up in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  “It was obvious that not one of the governments whose 
leaders I met would give us even tacit support if we granted Rhodesia independence on the basis 
of the status quo,” Harlech reported at the conclusion of his mission.  However, a glimmer of 
hope did emerge when Harlech learned that African leaders’ opposition to the “internal 
settlement” stemmed primarily from their dissatisfaction with the 1979 constitution.625  If the 
constitution could be amended so as to give more power to the Zimbabweans and if new 
elections were held, the Frontline Presidents seemed prepared to accept any regime that emerged 
in Salisbury.626  Thus, despite getting off to a rocky start in her handling of Rhodesian affairs, it 
seemed that Margaret Thatcher might attain her internationally-acceptable settlement after all. 
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While Harlech’s consultations offered a roadmap for achieving an internationally-
acceptable Rhodesian settlement, they also revealed that no constitution produced in Salisbury 
would be acceptable to African opinion.  “There was a unanimous view that, whatever the 
content of the eventual settlement, in form it must be seen to be British and not merely the 
legalisation after the event of a solution which Britain, the colonial power, had played no role in 
working out,” Harlech informed the Foreign Office.627  In order to avoid charges of colluding 
with the Salisbury regime (charges that would have delegitimized the revised Zimbabwean 
constitution in African eyes), the Patriotic Front would have to be included in the drafting 
process.  For whatever British policymakers may have felt about Robert Mugabe and Joshua 
Nkomo, the guerrilla leaders had many supporters in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  More importantly, 
they had the backing of the Frontline Presidents and the OAU.  By late June, therefore, Thatcher 
and Carrington had arrived at a familiar formula: they would need to convene an all-parties 
conference to hammer out the details of Zimbabwe’s independence constitution, implement a 
ceasefire, and sponsor internationally-supervised elections to determine who would lead the new 
state to independence.628   
Having decided on how to proceed, Thatcher was determined to get the Commonwealth 
behind her plan.  The upcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting offered the 
Prime Minister an ideal opportunity to make her case.  Since the conference was slated to be held 
in the Zambian capital of Lusaka (a mere 250 miles north of Salisbury), the Rhodesian issue 
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figured to be at the top of the meeting’s agenda.629  Unfortunately for Thatcher, the atmosphere in 
Lusaka promised to be highly charged.  Many international commentators expected the debate 
over Rhodesia’s future to be acrimonious.630  Kenneth Kaunda, the conference’s host, fuelled 
such speculation when he publicly acknowledged that the Rhodesian issue might cause the 
conference – and perhaps the Commonwealth itself – to collapse.631  General Obasanjo’s decision 
to nationalize BP’s Nigerian assets on the eve of the meeting (an action which one British 
official described as “an immature and inept attempt at pressure”) only served to ratchet up 
tensions.632  Thus it was that on July 30, 1979, Margaret Thatcher stepped into a veritable lions’ 
den when her RAF VC10 touched down in Lusaka.633 
In an effort to allow tempers to cool, the conference planners decided to delay the 
discussion of Rhodesian affairs until the third day.  The debate got off to an auspicious start 
when Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere gave a restrained opening speech in which he 
described the “internal settlement” as an important step in the search for Zimbabwean 
independence.  What the colony needed next, Nyerere maintained, was a constitution that would 
guarantee immediate majority rule and new elections in which all parties could compete.634  
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Thatcher surprised many of her colleagues by responding in kind.  Although she insisted that 
“the change that has taken place in Rhodesia cannot be dismissed as of no consequence,” she 
adopted a conciliatory tone.  She conceded that the constitution under which Muzorewa had been 
elected was “defective in certain important respects” and stated that her aim was “to bring 
Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international 
community as a whole will find acceptable.”635  These opening speeches greatly improved the 
atmosphere in Lusaka, demonstrating that the gap between Thatcher’s position and that of her 
Commonwealth colleagues was not as wide as many had assumed.  
Ultimately, however, the formal sessions proved less important than the informal 
gatherings which Thatcher and Carrington used to sound out their Commonwealth colleagues.  
With the support of a small but influential group of leaders (which included Kenneth Kaunda, 
Julius Nyerere, Malcolm Fraser, and Jamaica’s Michael Manley), Thatcher and Carrington 
persuaded their colleagues to endorse Britain’s plan to draw up a new constitution, convene a 
constitutional convention to which Muzorewa, Mugabe, and Nkomo would be invited, and 
sponsor a fresh set of elections.  In return, the other Commonwealth members pledged to allow 
Britain to conduct the conference as it saw fit and to do everything in their power to ensure that 
the negotiations bore fruit.  The sailing was far from smooth, and Thatcher recalled that “some 
very pointed comments” were made in Lusaka.636  Nevertheless, she and her Foreign Secretary 
obtained the Commonwealth’s seal of approval – a prize which would prove invaluable during 
the difficult negotiations that lay ahead. 
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On the whole, Commonwealth members were elated by the Lusaka agreement.  Because 
the British had played their cards close to the vest, most delegates had expected Thatcher to press 
for the immediate recognition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  They were shocked to find the “Iron 
Lady” so willing to accommodate their concerns.  As Peter Carrington later recalled, “Those 
present, or most of them, did not expect a Tory Prime Minister – and one whose reputation was 
well to the right – to be so forthcoming, so apparently ready to welcome all antagonists in the 
Rhodesian imbroglio to sit around one table in London.”637  The host government was 
particularly pleased with the deal that had been struck.  The government-owned Times of 
Zambia, which had been especially critical of Thatcher, described the outcome as “a spectacular 
success.”638  The Americans agreed.  Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wrote his British 
counterpart to congratulate him for the “great skill” with which he and the Prime Minister had 
handled the Rhodesian issue at Lusaka.639  The Soviets and Rhodesians were among the few 
critics of the agreement.640  Overall, the 1979 Commonwealth Conference marked an important 
turning point in the search for Zimbabwean independence.  Whereas many had expected the 
meeting to be marred by bitter clashes over the Rhodesian issue, Thatcher managed to convince 
her Commonwealth colleagues of her sincerity.  As a result, she left Lusaka with their support in 
hand.  
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A “First Class” Solution at Lancaster House? 
The British wasted little time in moving to implement the Lusaka agreement.  On August 
10, only four days after the conclusion of the Commonwealth Conference, Thatcher’s Cabinet 
agreed to convene an all-parties conference in London.  Its aims were: to amend Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia’s constitution so as to ensure that power rested in the hands of the country’s black 
majority; to convince Muzorewa, Mugabe, and Nkomo to participate in a fresh set of elections; 
and to arrange for a cease-fire so that the Zimbabweans could cast their ballots without fear of 
intimidation or retaliation.641  As a symbol of her determination to settle the Rhodesian crisis 
once and for all, Thatcher opted to conduct the talks at Lancaster House, a 19
th
-century palace 
which had hosted several prior constitutional conferences.642  On August 14, Abel Muzorewa, 
Robert Mugabe, and Joshua Nkomo were invited to participate in the negotiations.  
However, the speed with which the British acted belied a deep sense of pessimism.  They 
had obtained the Commonwealth’s seal of approval, yet few Whitehall officials were optimistic 
that the Lancaster House negotiations would produce a mutually-acceptable settlement.643  Not 
even Peter Carrington, the man charged with overseeing the conference, was betting on a 
successful outcome.  “I thought it likely that the invited parties would come, and then create 
trouble at the moment they decided most favourable, break off the proceedings, [and] walk out,” 
he recounted in his memoirs.644  In fact, Carrington was so confident that the conference would 
fail that he saw one of his primary objectives as simply keeping the negotiations going until after 
the Nigerian elections – in the hopes that the new Nigerian president would be less likely to 
                                                          
641
 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 10 August 1979, CAB 128/66/13, TNA. 
642
 For more on the significance of the venue, see Jeffrey Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster 
House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984): 104-105. 
643
 Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy, 30.   
644
 Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, 297.   
197 
 
retaliate against British interests than Olusegun Obasanjo.645  Many international commentators 
were similarly pessimistic.  “It sounds difficult because it is,” is how one New York Times 
editorial described the Foreign Secretary’s task at Lancaster House.646   
The attitudes of the Rhodesian protagonists seemed to justify this sense of gloom.  Years 
of isolation from the global community had left Ian Smith and his followers with little 
conception of international expectations and norms.  They had difficulty accepting that the 
“internal settlement” was incapable of garnering widespread support and refused to contemplate 
any further curtailment of their constitutional powers.647  Because Muzorewa’s ability to remain 
in office rested on his ability to retain the confidence of Rhodesia’s white community, he was 
also reluctant to bargain away the white community’s privileged position.648  British officials 
eventually managed to disabuse Muzorewa of his belief that the “internal settlement” would 
attract widespread support, but the Bishop continued to worry that any drastic constitutional 
changes would unnerve the Rhodesians and trigger a mass exodus.649  British officials therefore 
recognized that it was not going to be easy to convince the Salisbury regime to implement the 
types of reforms that the Lusaka agreement called for.650 
                                                          
645
 Undated minute, Peter Carrington to Margaret Thatcher, “Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference,” PREM 19/348, 
TNA. 
646
 New York Times, “The Thatcher Gambit in Africa,” August 8, 1979.  The CIA agreed that the odds of the sides 
reaching an agreement at Lancaster House were “not good.”  CIA National Foreign Assessment Center Paper, 
“Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: Settlement Prospects,” August 1979, NLC-133-66-12-5-3, JECL.  For an overview of the 
British press’s skepticism, see Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa, 53.  For an example of the African press’s 
skepticism, see, “Commentary, Radio Maputo, September 10, 1979,” in ed. Goswin Baumhogger, The Struggle for 
Independence: Documents on the Recent Developments of Zimbabwe, (Hamburg: Institute of African Studies, 
1984): vol. 6, 1047.  
647
 This misplaced faith in the “internal settlement’s” ability to placate international critics is in line with the 
conclusion of two Rhodesian scholars who have averred that many Rhodesians possessed “an almost infinite 
capacity for self-deception.”  Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, “Rhodesians Never Die,” The Impact of War and 
Political Change on White Rhodesia, c. 1970-1980, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 11. 
648
 Telegram, Derek Day to FCO, “Meting with Bishop Muzorewa,” June 14, 1979, FCO 36/2652, TNA. 
649
 Minute, Charles Powell to Tony Duff and PS, “Meeting with Rhodesian Delegation,” September 14, 1979, FCO 
36/2437, TNA. 
650
 “The Bishop will not, of his own volition, move at the speed we would wish in order to enhance the credibility of 
his government in the Third World,” reported one British official.  “We will have to urge him on.”  Memorandum, 
Derek Day to Tony Duff and PS/PUS, “Prospects for a Settlement,” June 21, 1979, FCO 36/2652, TNA. 
198 
 
The guerrilla leaders, for their part, were even less interested in returning to the 
negotiating table.  This was especially true of Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) colleagues.  They saw that white morale was disintegrating and that the 
Salisbury regime was riven with divisions.  Time seemed to be on their side, and they were in no 
hurry to reach an agreement unless it ensured that they would gain unfettered control of 
Zimbabwe when independence came.651  Given Mugabe’s incentive structure, British and 
American officials predicted that he would not come to the conference with any intention of 
negotiating seriously.652  Joshua Nkomo and a number of his Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU) compatriots were seen as less committed to the bush war than their ZANU counterparts, 
yet few believed that Nkomo would run the risk of tarnishing his nationalist credentials by 
accepting a deal that Mugabe and his followers found wanting.653  Thus, despite the initial burst 
of optimism generated by the successful conclusion of the Commonwealth Conference, it 
seemed unlikely that the agreement reached in Lusaka would actually be implemented. 
Further contributing to this sense of pessimism was the fact that the Lancaster House 
Conference nearly failed to get off the ground.  Muzorewa grudgingly agreed to participate, but 
the leaders of the Patriotic Front demurred.  In part, this opposition reflected Mugabe and 
Nkomo’s outrage that the Commonwealth leaders had endorsed a plan which called for them to 
negotiate with the Salisbury regime.  From their perspective, the timing of the Commonwealth 
agreement – coming only weeks after the Organization of African Unity had anointed the 
Patriotic Front “the sole, legitimate, and authentic representative” of the Zimbabwean people – 
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could hardly have been worse.654  In addition to their reluctance to negotiate with Muzorewa’s 
“puppet” government, Mugabe and Nkomo harbored serious reservations about certain aspects of 
the Commonwealth plan.  Most notably, they rejected the principle of special parliamentary 
representation for whites and questioned Britain’s ability to impartially oversee a fresh set of 
elections.  Because of these concerns, the guerrilla leaders announced that they would not attend 
the Lancaster House Conference.655   
What Mugabe and Nkomo had overlooked, however, was that their patrons’ commitment 
to the Chimurenga was beginning to ebb.  The Zambian and Mozambican economies were in a 
shambles as a result of the Salisbury regime’s “external raids,” and an increasing number of 
Zambians and Mozambicans were beginning to question whether their support for the guerrillas 
was worth the cost.656  This sentiment was especially pronounced in Zambia, where Nkomo’s 
forces had worn out their welcome.  The increasing number of armed robberies, murders, and 
rapes committed by ZAPU guerrillas in 1978 and 1979 prompted one British official to quip, 
“[T]he Zambians seem to suffer as much from the depredations of their guests as from those of 
their enemies.”657  Parliamentary backbenchers and other educated Zambians scorned Kenneth 
Kaunda’s preoccupation with the Rhodesian crisis at a time when conditions at home were 
rapidly deteriorating.658  In Dar es Salaam, Julius Nyerere was facing his own problems.  The war 
against Uganda – combined with food shortages, a cholera outbreak, and Nyerere’s disastrous 
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economic policies – had generated considerable dissatisfaction.659  Faced with such grave 
challenges, the Frontline Presidents were eager for a settlement that would restore peace to the 
region.  They therefore exerted considerable pressure on the leaders of the Patriotic Front to 
attend the Lancaster House Conference.  Mozambican President Samora Machel threatened to 
discontinue his country’s support for the bush war unless Mugabe and Nkomo attended the 
conference, while Nyerere told the guerrilla leaders that they could either go to London or “they 
could go to hell.”660     
Given how difficult it had been to get the rival factions to show up at Lancaster House, 
Peter Carrington realized that his task would not be an easy one.  In an effort to prevent the 
conference from becoming another Geneva-type fiasco, the Foreign Secretary decided to adopt a 
“step-by-step” approach.  He would tackle one issue at a time, and negotiations would not 
proceed to the next stage until both parties had reached an agreement on the question at hand.  
This strategy was intended to prevent either delegation from stringing out the negotiations by 
continually referring back to other matters.  It was also designed to generate a sense of 
momentum that would make it more difficult for either side to walk away from the table.661  
Cognizant of the role the Frontline Presidents had played in securing the Patriotic Front’s 
attendance at the conference, Carrington made sure to obtain their support for his strategy.662  For 
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he understood that his ability to get the leaders of the Patriotic Front to negotiate in good faith 
“will depend to a considerable extent on the attitudes of the Front Line States.”663   
The first issue Carrington decided to tackle when the conference convened on September 
10 was the constitution.664  The draft constitution Carrington tabled on September 12 bore a 
striking resemblance to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s 1979 constitution – although the British had taken 
care to alter the document’s most objectionable clauses.  One major difference was that, under 
the British proposals, the whites would not be permitted to thwart constitutional change.  They 
would receive a handful of extra seats in the Zimbabwean House of Assembly for a short period 
after independence, but they would not have enough votes to veto any measure that had the 
unanimous support of the country’s black MPs.665  The other major difference was that the 
British proposals empowered the Zimbabwean head of government to appoint anyone he wanted 
to fill senior posts in the army, police force, judiciary, and civil service.  Once tabled, the British 
stood firmly behind their proposals, making only a few minor alterations – for fear that any sign 
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of flexibility would encourage both delegations to engage in an endless process of wrangling as 
they had done in Geneva.666    
Predictably, neither delegation was satisfied with the British proposals.  Ian Smith, 
reinvigorated by the hero’s welcome he had received from conservative supporters in England, 
lashed out against the British terms.667  He averred that there was no need to amend the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution and vowed to do everything in his power to defend the 
safeguards contained within it.  Peter Carrington lamented the former Rhodesian leader’s 
decision to fight “a protracted rearguard action against our constitutional proposals.”668  Despite 
the fact that Smith still carried considerable clout in some Rhodesian circles, his ability to derail 
the negotiations was limited.  His influence was on the wane (Finance Minister David Smith 
privately referred to him as a “has been”), and he found himself in a minority of one when the 
other members of the Salisbury delegation recognized that Carrington’s terms represented the 
best deal they were going to get.669  On September 21, all but one member of Muzorewa’s 
delegation voted to accept the British proposals (Ian Smith was the lone dissenter).  The Bishop 
publicly announced the decision on October 5.670 
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Having secured the Salisbury group’s approval, Carrington went to work on the Patriotic 
Front.671  In what would emerge as a familiar pattern, Mugabe and Nkomo initially rejected 
Carrington’s proposals, claiming (with some justification) that Britain’s draft constitution was 
more concerned with protecting the rights of the white community than with meeting 
Zimbabwe’s future needs.  They were particularly appalled by the idea of reserving 20% of the 
seats in the House of Assembly for whites for seven years after independence.  Mugabe and 
Nkomo protested this clause for two weeks before mysteriously dropping their opposition on 
September 24.672  What caused the Patriotic Front’s sudden quiescence?  Many scholars believe 
it was the result of pressure applied on them by the Frontline Presidents.673  This suggestion 
seems plausible.  African nations such as Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania had all included 
provisions guaranteeing white settlers additional parliamentary seats for a short period after 
independence, and it seems unlikely that the Frontline Presidents would have wanted to see the 
conference falter over a relatively uncontroversial point.     
The Patriotic Front’s acquiescence represented an important step forward; however it did 
not mean that the remaining obstacles would be easily overcome.  Far from it.  Mugabe and 
Nkomo may have found their backs against the wall on the issue of white representation, but 
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they found the Frontline Presidents more sympathetic on the issue of “land redistribution.”674  
Julius Nyerere was particularly adamant that there could be no true majority rule in Zimbabwe as 
long as 3% of the population (the whites) owned 80% of the best land.675  By contrast, the British 
proposals barred the Zimbabwean government from confiscating land without paying the 
(presumably) white landholders “fair market value.”  Since this clause could not be amended for 
a period of ten years, it drastically limited the possibilities for immediate “land redistribution.”  
Nyerere and his Frontline colleagues recognized that the British could not accept a constitution 
that allowed for the expropriation of property without compensation, but they maintained that the 
Zimbabwean government could not be expected to remunerate white landowners who had stolen 
the land in the first place.  Nyerere therefore insisted that if white farmers were to receive any 
compensation, the funds would have to come from London.676  Backed by the Frontline 
Presidents, Mugabe and Nkomo stood their ground.  “Land is what we have been fighting the 
war about,” Nkomo told reporters in London.  “Can they really expect us to yield?”677  
When the British balked at this demand, the Lancaster House negotiations seemed to be 
on the verge of collapse.  If the British were not prepared to compromise, the guerrilla leaders 
warned, they would return to the bush and resume the Chimurenga.678  Some scholars have 
questioned whether Mugabe and Nkomo were prepared to follow through on this threat – or 
whether the Frontline Presidents would have allowed them to break up the conference over the 
issue of “land redistribution.”679  Without documentary evidence, it is difficult to determine 
                                                          
674
 Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe, 264 and Time, “The Zimbabwe Rhodesia Breakthrough,” October 29, 
1979.  This Frontline support seems to substantiate the Rhodesian security chief’s claim that Mugabe and Nkomo 
were under pressure to settle, but not at any cost.  Flower, Serving Secretly, 232. 
675
 BBC News, “US Backed Zimbabwe Land Reform,” August 22, 2007,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6958418.stm  
676
 Telegram, Turner to FCO, “Rhodesia: Front Line Meeting,” October 18, 1979, FCO 36/2536, TNA.   
677
 New York Times, “Land Issue at Heart of Rhodesia Impasse,” October 15, 1979. 
678
 Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa, 63.  
679
 See, for instance, Meredith, The Past is Another Country, 379, Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe, 263-265, 
and Jaster, Africa’s Front-Line States, 15. 
205 
 
whether or not the guerrilla leaders were bluffing.  But given that they seemed to have the 
Frontline Presidents in their corner, British officials took this threat seriously.680  So did the 
Commonwealth Secretary General, who later recalled, “We were at a stage where Mugabe and 
Nkomo were packing their bags.”681   
Thus, the land issue brought the British face-to-face with a choice they had hoped to 
avoid: whether or not to proceed without the Patriotic Front.  Some scholars of the Rhodesian 
crisis have assumed that Britain would not have dared exclude the Patriotic Front from any 
settlement because of the adverse ramifications such a decision would have had on British 
interests abroad.682  However, the memoirs of former British officials as well as a spate of 
recently-declassified documents show that the British were prepared to reach a deal that omitted 
the Patriotic Front.683  Peter Carrington and a number of his Foreign Office colleagues certainly 
hoped to achieve a “first class solution” (that is, one which included both the Salisbury regime 
and the Patriotic Front), but they agreed that Mugabe and Nkomo could not be given a veto over 
the negotiations.  If the guerrilla leaders refused to accept the terms put forth at Lancaster House, 
Carrington was prepared to settle for a “second-class solution” that excluded them.   
It was his willingness to accept a “second-class solution” that provided Carrington with 
his principal source of leverage throughout the proceedings.  As the head of Britain’s Rhodesia 
Department later explained, the British strategy at Lancaster House was to first convince the 
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Salisbury delegation to accept their proposals and to then threaten to cut a separate deal with the 
Bishop if the Patriotic Front refused to yield.
684
  In order to maintain the viability of the “second-
class solution,” however, Carrington needed to be able to portray the Salisbury delegation as “the 
reasonable party” if the negotiations broke down.685  This strategy required the Salisbury 
delegation to accept Britain’s terms quickly and with minimal ado.  Carrington was able to 
exploit Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s economic plight in order to entice them into going along with his 
proposals.  With its counterinsurgency efforts consuming 37% of the colony’s GDP, Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia was in dire financial straits by the time the Lancaster House Conference got underway.  
The Salisbury regime desperately needed the British to lift sanctions (both in order to maintain 
its war efforts and to invest in social programs that would bolster the regime’s popularity), and 
Carrington pledged to do so as long as the Salisbury delegation accepted his proposals.
686
   
Once the Salisbury delegation had come to terms, the British planned to use the threat of 
a “second-class solution” to pressure the Patriotic Front into accepting the proposals that 
Muzorewa’s delegation had already accepted.687  In the event that Mugabe and Nkomo refused to 
do so, Carrington hoped that the Frontline Presidents would pressure them into reconsidering 
their position.688  If the Frontline Presidents failed to bring the guerrilla leaders into line, the 
British hoped to rally international support for a “second-class solution” by placing the blame 
squarely on the shoulders of the Patriotic Front.  As Carrington told the British Ambassador to 
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Washington, it was “very important” to ensure that “if the Patriotic Front got off the train, it was 
seen to be their fault.”689  By pinning the blame on Mugabe and Nkomo, the British hoped to 
minimize the fallout that was bound to result from their decision to proceed without the guerrilla 
leaders.690  In this way, the British hoped to use the possibility of a “second-class solution” to 
prod both delegations toward a compromise agreement. 
This approach worked well during the constitutional negotiations.  In an effort to grease 
the wheel, a British envoy had gone to Salisbury on the eve of the conference to explain exactly 
what types of constitutional changes Carrington had in mind.691  The British also went to great 
lengths at Lancaster House to reassure Muzorewa and his supporters that their chief aim was “to 
see the Bishop confirmed in office as [the] Prime Minister of a moderate, pro-Western 
government.”692  Despite Ian Smith’s obstinacy, the Salisbury delegation accepted the British 
proposals relatively quickly.  Carrington then turned the screws on the Patriotic Front.  After 
Mugabe and Nkomo ignored two ultimatums, Carrington announced during an October 15 press 
conference that he would begin the next round of negotiations with the Salisbury delegation the 
following day.  He stressed that Mugabe and Nkomo were welcome to join the discussions – but 
only after they had accepted the constitutional proposals to which the Salisbury delegation had 
already agreed.  International commentators had little difficulty reading between the lines.  
“Carrington Decides to Go Ahead Without the P[atriotic] F[ront],” declared The Guardian.693  “A 
‘Second-Class Solution’ for Rhodesians,” announced the New York Times.694  The Patriotic 
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Front and its supporters howled about the Foreign Secretary’s tactics, but to no avail.695  
Carrington was prepared to move ahead with or without them.  
Ultimately, some behind-the-scenes diplomacy spared the British from having to resort to 
a “second-class solution.”  On October 12, the British asked for the Carter Administration to help 
foot the bill for “land redistribution.”696  Unbeknownst to them, Commonwealth Secretary 
General Shridath Ramphal had approached the US Ambassador to London with a similar request.  
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski urged Jimmy Carter to provide the necessary 
funds, and the President agreed to do so.  On October 15, the American Ambassador to London 
informed the British that his country was willing to contribute $40 million for “general 
development assistance” in Zimbabwe.697  Tanzanian and Zambian officials were elated when 
they learned of the offer.  Satisfied that the Patriotic Front’s concerns had been met, the Frontline 
Presidents instructed their representatives in London to “put the heat” on Mugabe and Nkomo.698  
They did, and the guerrilla leaders accepted Carrington’s constitutional proposals shortly 
thereafter.  Joshua Nkomo publicly lauded the Carter Administration’s timely intervention.  “[I]f 
the US had not stepped in it would have been very difficult to move on this question,” he told 
reporters.699  Whether or not he and Mugabe were pleased to be moving on, Carrington’s plan 
seemed to be working.  A combination of his no-nonsense style, American largesse, and pressure 
from the Frontline Presidents enabled the conference to clear its first major hurdle. 
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Arriving at a “First Class” Solution 
With the constitutional negotiations behind them, the parties at Lancaster House turned to 
the details of the period leading up to elections, known as the “interim” or “transition” period.  
British officials expected these negotiations to be even more contentious than the constitutional 
wrangling that they had endured for the previous five weeks because, while the constitution 
could be altered at a later date, the transitional arrangements were likely to play a major role in 
determining who would emerge as Zimbabwe’s first post-independence leader.  Disagreements 
over who should hold power during the run-up to elections had derailed both the Geneva 
Conference and the Anglo-American Proposals, and there was every reason to believe that the 
pre-independence arrangements would frustrate the Lancaster House negotiations as well.  
“[W]e’re not quite home and dry yet,” Peter Carrington cautioned his American counterpart, 
Cyrus Vance.  “Fasten your seat belt.”700  International commentators agreed with this 
assessment.  While substantial progress had been made at Lancaster House, the path ahead 
remained fraught with uncertainty.701 
As he had done during the constitutional negotiations, Carrington tabled a series of 
proposals to serve as the basis for negotiations.  His plan called for a British governor to exercise 
executive and legislative authority over Rhodesia during the transition period.  According to 
Carrington’s proposals, the governor (with the assistance of a group of Commonwealth 
representatives) would be responsible for administering the elections and ensuring that the results 
accurately reflected the will of the Zimbabwean people.  The governor would also be responsible 
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for maintaining law and order during the interim period, relying on the existing police force and 
army to do so.702  While Thatcher and Carrington understood that Britain would have to sponsor 
the elections and oversee the cease-fire if they were to convince the international community that 
the results of the election were legitimate, they had no desire to remain in charge of Rhodesia 
any longer than they deemed absolutely necessary.  Carrington therefore insisted that the interim 
period would last no longer than two months.703   
Predictably, neither delegation viewed the British arrangements with equanimity.  
Muzorewa and his ministers hardly relished the idea of abdicating in favor of a British governor, 
whom they suspected would tilt in favor of the Patriotic Front when push came to shove.  As far 
as they were concerned, they had been elected to govern Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and should 
therefore be the ones to organize the elections and administer the country during the interim 
period.704  Mugabe and Nkomo were equally unenthusiastic about the idea of a British governor 
in Salisbury.  Deeply suspicious of the Tories’ intentions, they feared that the governor would do 
everything in his power to “fix” the elections in Muzorewa’s favor.705  Carrington’s insistence 
that the interim period be no longer than two months further angered Mugabe and Nkomo, who 
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felt they would need at least six months to adequately prepare for elections.  On account of these 
concerns, the Patriotic Front rejected the British plan.  Instead they called for an elaborate 
power-sharing scheme and a United Nations peacekeeping force during the transition period.706 
In an effort to bridge the gap between the delegations, Carrington utilized the approach 
that had worked so well during the constitutional negotiations.  He first went to work on the 
Salisbury delegation, insisting that Muzorewa and his ministers abnegate their offices so that the 
governor could exercise complete authority during the interim period.  After many hours of 
prayer, the Bishop agreed to stand down.  In his memoirs, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s security chief 
stressed Muzorewa’s selflessness, noting that his decision to relinquish power was without 
precedent in post-colonial Africa.707  In reality, however, the Bishop had little choice.  Faced 
with the prospect of an endless civil war, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s military and intelligence leaders 
insisted that he accept Britain’s terms.708  Seeing no alternative, Muzorewa heeded this advice.  
Peter Carrington praised the Bishop for his “statesman-like” decision – a not-so-subtle criticism 
of Mugabe and Nkomo, who were continuing to fight the British proposals tooth and nail.709 
Having convinced the Salisbury delegation to accept his plan for the interim period, 
Carrington employed a familiar strategy to bring the Patriotic Front into line.  He first made a 
few concessions – the most significant of which was his decision to establish a Commonwealth 
group to monitor the cease-fire that would eventually be enacted.  He also agreed to extend the 
interim period by two weeks and reaffirmed his intention to employ a team of Commonwealth 
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observers to ensure that the elections were truly “free and fair.”710  The Foreign Secretary then 
used the threat of a “second-class solution” to force the guerrilla leaders’ hand.  On November 7, 
Carrington’s deputy introduced the Southern Rhodesia Bill (a piece of legislation which 
empowered Margaret Thatcher to implement the agreed-upon constitution, appoint a governor, 
hold new elections, and return Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to legality) in the House of Commons.  In 
subsequent interviews, the Deputy Foreign Secretary refused to deny that the bill was designed 
to pave the way for a “second-class solution.”711  Carrington clarified the Foreign Office’s 
position in a statement delivered before the House of Lords.  “We want, and shall continue to 
strive for, a settlement involving all parties,” the Foreign Secretary vowed.  “But, if that is not 
attainable, we cannot allow the best to become the enemy of the good.”712  The Salisbury regime 
had already accepted Britain’s constitutional proposals and agreed to participate in a new round 
of elections under the supervision of a British governor, Carrington reminded his fellow Lords.  
Nothing more could be asked of them.  A settlement was at hand, and if Mugabe and Nkomo 
refused to join in, they would have no one to blame but themselves.713 
Once again, the Foreign Secretary’s high-wire act succeeded because of some behind-the-
scenes diplomacy by the Frontline Presidents.  The Presidents were sympathetic to the Patriotic 
Front’s concerns, but they were unwilling to support the guerrilla leaders’ demands to 
                                                          
710
 Tamarkin has claimed that these concessions were made at the behest of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, 
who flew to London on November 8 in an effort to break the impasse.  Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe, 268.  
The Commonwealth Secretary General played a major role in convincing Carrington to grant the Commonwealth 
observers a substantive role.  Michael Charlton, The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of 
Rhodesia, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990): 109-110. 
711
 Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa, 72. 
712
 Statement by Lord Carrington at the second reading of the Southern Rhodesia Bill in the House of Lords, 
November 13, 1979, in ed. Baumhogger, The Struggle for Independence, vol. 6, 1164-1165. 
713
 By this point, British officials were preparing for the possibility of a “second-class solution.”  On November 2, 
Carrington informed the British High Commissioner to Lusaka that a break down seemed inevitable.  The High 
Commissioner was instructed to warn British nationals in Zambia to be prepared for a hostile ZAPU reaction if the 
Patriotic Front walked out of the negotiations.  British officials also began trying to convince “moderate” African 
leaders to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in the event that Carrington had to settle for a “second-class solution.”  
Telegram, Peter Carrington to British High Commission Lusaka, “Rhodesia Conference,” November 2, 1979, FCO 
36/2626 and Note, Roderic Lyne to D.B. Alexander, “Rhodesia,” November 7, 1979, FCO 36/2454, TNA.  
213 
 
superintend the transition.714  The Presidents’ support for the British proposals was made 
manifest when a frustrated Robert Mugabe flew to Addis Ababa on November 10 to determine 
whether the Ethiopians would be willing to provide any assistance if the Lancaster House talks 
broke down.  Despite his reputation as a “radical” anti-imperialist, Ethiopian leader Haile 
Mengistu refused to make any promises – allegedly at the behest of the Frontline Presidents.715  
With nowhere to turn, Mugabe and Nkomo grudgingly accepted Carrington’s proposals on 
November 15.716  Much to everyone’s surprise, the conference had cleared another hurdle. 
Having progressed further than anyone had thought possible, the conference moved on to 
its third and final topic: the terms of the cease-fire that would bring the Chimurenga to an end.  
Despite what some scholars have subsequently written, there was no sense of inevitability as the 
cease-fire discussions got underway.717  Both delegations had been forced to accept a number of 
unsatisfactory compromises during the first two rounds of negotiations, and there were questions 
as to how far each side would be willing to bend when it came to the military arrangements.  The 
Times of London informed its readers that, “[The] coming negotiations on a ceasefire may prove 
                                                          
714
 This stance was due less to the Frontline Presidents’ enthusiasm for democracy (Tanzania, Mozambique, and 
Zambia were all one-party states) than their confidence that the Patriotic Front would trounce Muzorewa in a free 
election.  Minute, Richard Luce to Peter Carrington, “Visit to Africa: 19-25 October,” October 26, 1979, FCO 
36/2565; Telegram, Cyrus Vance to US Embassy London, “London Conference on Rhodesia,” September 5, 1979, 
FCO 36/2453; Telegram, Mr. Maguire to US Embassy London, “London Conference on Rhodesia: Mozambique 
Observers,” September 4, 1979, FCO 36/2453; and Telegram, Leonard Allinson to FCO, “Rhodesian Conference,” 
October 30, 1979, FCO 36/2140, TNA.  
715
 Telegram, R.M. Tesh to FCO, “Mugabe Visit to Ethiopia,” November 12, 1979, FCO 36/2409, TNA. 
716
 As a face-saving measure, Carrington agreed to declare that the British governor would treat the guerrilla armies 
and the Rhodesian security forces as equals.  Given that the Rhodesian police and army would be used to maintain 
law and order during the interim period while the guerrillas would be confined to a set of assembly points, it was 
clear that Carrington’s pledge was little more than a paper concession.  Nevertheless, it enabled Mugabe and Nkomo 
to “sell” the agreement to their followers, thereby facilitating the Patriotic Front’s agreement.  Tamarkin, The 
Making of Zimbabwe, 268; Meredith, The Past is Another Country, 383; and Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa, 
75-76. 
717
 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson have claimed that “an air of inevitability hung over Lancaster House.”  Martin 
Meredith has asserted that “no one expected it [the conference] to fail when so much had already been achieved.”  
Similarly, M. Tamarkin has posited, “The success of the conference at that stage was a foregone conclusion.”  
Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 318; Meredith, The Past is Another Country, 383; and Tamarkin, 
The Making of Zimbabwe, 269. 
214 
 
as difficult as anything that has gone before at the Lancaster House talks.”718  The British press 
was not alone in its skepticism.719   
In an effort to prevent the agreement from unraveling, Peter Carrington wasted no time in 
tabling Britain’s cease-fire proposals, presenting his plan the morning after the Patriotic Front 
had accepted Britain’s transition arrangements.  True to form, the Salisbury delegation quickly 
accepted the British terms.  While this acquiescence probably reflected the regime’s desire to 
preserve its image as “the reasonable party,” it also reflected the fact that the deal was highly 
favorable from Salisbury’s point of view.  It left the existing military forces intact during the 
transition period while confining the guerrilla forces to 14 assembly points around the country’s 
perimeter.720  If the ceasefire broke down, the Rhodesians’ superior air- and fire-power would 
have enabled them to eliminate many of the guerrillas corralled at the assembly points.  The 
Salisbury delegation’s rapid acceptance of the British terms also reflected the regime’s belief that 
the sooner an agreement was reached, the better.  It was little secret that Mugabe and Nkomo had 
infiltrated thousands of their supporters into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia since the negotiations had 
gotten underway.721  Every day that went by without a settlement meant that there would be more 
guerrillas inside the colony to influence the election results.  “At present the advantage lies with 
Muzorewa,” the Bishop’s intelligence chief remarked.  “But in six months, even in three months’ 
time, the position could have changed.  Every week, every day, in fact, is crucial to us.”722   
                                                          
718
 Times of London, “Crux of Rhodesian Ceasefire is Separation of Forces,” November 17, 1979.  
719
 See, for instance, The Globe and Mail (Toronto), “Talks on Ceasefire Start Today,” November 16, 1979. 
720
 Perhaps these favorable terms should come as no surprise since Peter Walls had spent nearly a month discussing 
the terms of the cease-fire with British officials before the Foreign Secretary unveiled his proposals.  Davidow, A 
Peace in Southern Africa, 78. 
721
 CIA Foreign Assessment Center Intelligence Memorandum, “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: Meeting Patriotic Front 
Concerns in the London Talks,” October 1979, NLC-6-89-3-3-2, JECL.  This infiltration became more rampant as 
the negotiations wound to a close.  Telegram, Peter Carrington to British High Commission Canberra, “Rhodesia,” 
December 9, 1979, FCO 36/2443, TNA. 
722
 Meredith, The Past is Another Country, 384.  
215 
 
Also true to form, the Patriotic Front rejected the British proposals, listing a series of 
objections.  Following his established practice, Carrington ignored most of the Patriotic Front’s 
counterproposals, made a few concessions, and threatened to proceed to the “second-class 
solution.”  When the Patriotic Front ignored his December 3 deadline, the Foreign Secretary 
issued a thinly-veiled ultimatum.  “I do not despair of reaching an agreement: but I am as close 
to despairing as I have been in the whole three months of this negotiation,” he stated.  “No doors 
have been finally closed: but we simply cannot wait forever for the Patriotic Front’s reply.”723  
After a week of silence, Carrington pressed ahead.  Aware that his inability to drag the 
conference across the finish line was making the Salisbury delegation jittery, the Foreign 
Secretary announced that Christopher Soames would serve as Britain’s governor.724  The 
Conservative Party leader in the House of Lords, a former ambassador to Paris and Brussels, and 
the son-in-law of Winston Churchill, Soames was a man of considerable renown.  His 
appointment reaffirmed Britain’s determination to resolve the Rhodesian crisis.  On December 7, 
in an effort to increase the pressure on the Patriotic Front, Carrington announced that Soames 
would depart for Rhodesia within the next week – regardless of whether an agreement had been 
reached with all parties.  Sanctions would be terminated upon the governor’s arrival.725  Sending 
a British governor into the middle of a civil war was a major gamble on Carrington’s part.  It was 
not one that James Callaghan’s Labour government would have taken.  Nevertheless, Carrington 
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felt he had no choice.  Unless he acted quickly, he feared that the Patriotic Front would string out 
the negotiations to the point where the Salisbury delegation would abandon them, thus 
preventing Britain from achieving a “first-class” or a “second-class” solution.726 
By this time, Joshua Nkomo was ready to settle.  At 62 and in poor health, British 
officials suspected that “Father Zimbabwe” was anxious to end his time in exile.  In case Nkomo 
required any additional incentive to compromise, it was supplied by Kenneth Kaunda, who left 
his protégé in no doubt about his need to accept the Lancaster House proposals.  Two days into 
the negotiations, Kaunda sent a personal envoy to deliver the following message to Nkomo: 
“Zambia has taken all the punishment that it can on behalf of ZAPU; it is time ZAPU came to a 
settlement and moved back to their own country.”727  Kaunda made a similar statement several 
weeks later, publicly acknowledging that he would not give shelter to any Zimbabwean faction 
that refused to take its chances at the polls.728  The message was unmistakable: if Nkomo and his 
ZAPU compatriots wished to continue the bush war, they would have to do so from another 
country.  They would not be welcome back in Zambia.729  Under such pressure from his primary 
patron, Nkomo became increasingly amenable to Carrington’s proposals. 
Unlike his ZAPU counterpart, Robert Mugabe remained unwilling to compromise.730  
Scholars continue to debate whether the ZANU leader was motivated by his distrust of the 
British, his desire to return to Rhodesia as a conquering hero, or his concern that a compromise 
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settlement would limit his ability to transform Zimbabwe into a socialist state.731  Whatever his 
motivations, Mugabe decided to break up the Lancaster House negotiations and take his case 
before the United Nations.  Only the forceful intervention of Mozambican President Samora 
Machel prevented him from doing so.  British officials had long recognized that the Mozambican 
President might play a decisive role if the negotiations became bogged down, and this is exactly 
what happened.732  During a November 24-25 meeting between the Frontline Presidents and the 
Patriotic Front, Machel dismissed the guerrilla leaders’ concerns about the British cease-fire 
proposals.  “We hear what you are saying,” he told Mugabe and Nkomo, “but we know you will 
hear us when we say the war must end.”733  When Mugabe continued to balk at the British terms, 
Machel upped the ante.  He instructed his Foreign Minister, who was in London to observe the 
Lancaster House proceedings, to make it clear that there could be no question of la luta continua 
at Mozambique’s expense.  If Mugabe wished to continue the war, he would have to find a new 
base of operations.734  With Nkomo itching to settle and Machel threatening to expel his army 
from Mozambique, Robert Mugabe relented.   
   
Conclusion 
On December 21, 1979, in the gilded halls of Lancaster House’s long gallery, the 
Rhodesian protagonists finally signed a peace agreement.  It was an accord which had taken 
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nearly 15 years to achieve and had cost more than 20,000 lives.  Peter Carrington did not recall 
the conference fondly in his memoirs, describing those 15 weeks as “a tempestuous and testing 
time, as hard as any I ever experienced.”735  Nevertheless, he managed to succeed where so many 
of his predecessors had failed: in procuring a settlement that put Rhodesia on the path to genuine 
majority rule.  In so doing, he also demonstrated to the international community that seemingly-
intractable conflicts could be resolved by the ballot rather than the bullet.  “You have given the 
people of Rhodesia and the neighboring countries new hope for the future,” the Foreign 
Secretary told Muzorewa, Mugabe, and Nkomo during a brief signing ceremony, “that at the end 
of a bitter conflict lies the prospect of national reconciliation.”736  Thus it was that seven years to 
the day after the Chimurenga had begun, the Lancaster House settlement brought the conflict to a 
close.737   
Aside from the long-suffering people of Rhodesia, perhaps no one was more pleased with 
the conference’s outcome than Margaret Thatcher.  The settlement provided her with something 
which had eluded Harold Wilson, Ted Heath, and James Callaghan: an honorable way out of the 
Rhodesian imbroglio.  As Thatcher noted in her memoirs, the settlement had “large benefits” for 
Britain.738  Diplomatically, it removed a continual source of irritation in Britain’s relations with 
other Commonwealth countries and enabled Britain to play a more effective role in promoting 
change in Namibia and South Africa.  Economically, the settlement meant that Thatcher would 
no longer have to worry about Nigeria or other African nations resorting to economic blackmail 
over her Rhodesian policies.  And domestically, the accord removed one of the most contentious 
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issues from the British landscape.  Thatcher expressed her gratitude to her Foreign Secretary in a 
memorandum on December 21.  “Today sees the successful conclusion of an extraordinary piece 
of diplomacy.  The period ahead in Rhodesia is not going to be easy but the signature of the 
Agreement at the end of the Lancaster House Conference later this morning will nonetheless be a 
milestone of major significance.”739   
The Western media breathed a sigh of relief once the Rhodesian protagonists had signed 
the peace agreement.740  So did the Carter Administration, which labeled the Lancaster House 
settlement “a triumph of reason and an extraordinary diplomatic success.”741  To Jimmy Carter 
and many of his chief foreign policy advisers, the accord vindicated their efforts to bring 
majority rule to Rhodesia.  At a time when renewed US-Soviet tensions were threatening to 
undermine Carter’s “post-Cold War” approach to foreign policy, the Lancaster House settlement 
demonstrated that dealing with problems on their own terms (rather than as part of the East-West 
struggle) could pay dividends.742  And on the domestic front, Carter’s political advisers expected 
the settlement to appeal to African Americans and liberals – two important constituencies that 
felt let down by many of the Administration’s centrist policies.743   
While much of the credit for the Lancaster House agreement has rightfully gone to Peter 
Carrington and Margaret Thatcher, scholars have tended to overlook the fact that the Frontline 
Presidents played an important role in resolving the Rhodesian crisis.  After years of harboring 
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the Zimbabwean guerrillas and enduring “external raids,” the Frontline Presidents had become 
“fed up with the war.”744  Once they realized that the British proposals would lead to a genuine 
transfer of power in Rhodesia, they strong-armed their clients into accepting the Lancaster House 
proposals.  One possible explanation for this oversight is that Frontline Presidents were not eager 
to be seen as applying pressure on their clients to settle with Muzorewa’s “puppet” regime.  For 
domestic political reasons, they were eager to be seen backing Robert Mugabe and Joshua 
Nkomo to the hilt in their “war of national liberation.”  In an effort to preserve this façade of 
unwavering support, the Presidents often took a hardline stance in public while privately pressing 
the Patriotic Front to make concessions.745    As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, Samora 
Machel, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, and Olusegun Obasanjo played a crucial role in the 
search for Zimbabwean independence.  From pressing Margaret Thatcher to abandon her initial 
support for the “internal settlement” to forcing Mugabe and Nkomo to accept Britain’s proposals, 
the Lancaster House accord owed as much to the efforts of these African leaders as it did to 
British statesmanship.  Whether the settlement they helped to broker represented “a victory for 
diplomacy” (as some have suggested), remains an open question.746 
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Epilogue 
 
Robert Mugabe and the Limits of the Lancaster House Settlement, 1980-2012 
 On April 16, 1980, the sun finally set on Britain’s African empire.  Dignitaries and 
leaders from more than 100 countries gathered in Rufaro soccer stadium on the outskirts of 
Salisbury to witness the birth of Africa’s newest nation.  The stadium, like the rest of the capital, 
proudly displayed flags and bunting bearing Zimbabwe’s official colors.  The ceremony took on 
a somewhat surreal feeling as white soldiers (formerly members of the Rhodesian security 
forces) stood at attention while a military band played the guerrilla anthem, “God Bless Africa.”  
The black soldiers (formerly guerrillas) reciprocated, saluting as the band played “God Save the 
Queen” while a British policeman lowered the Union Jack for the final time.  The 40,000 
Africans on hand rejoiced as the Zimbabwean flag was raised in its place.  After a 21-gun salute, 
Bob Marley and the Wailers took to the stage to perform their new single, “Zimbabwe.”  The 
usually-quiet streets of Salisbury erupted as gleeful Africans sang and danced in celebration.  At 
long last, they had achieved independence under majority rule.
747
 
  By far the most impressive figure at the independence proceedings was Prime Minister 
Robert Mugabe.
748
  Belying his reputation as a radical Marxist, Mugabe struck a conciliatory 
tone at the independence ceremony.  He spoke of the need for peace and reconciliation.  “The 
wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten,” he solemnly declared.  “If we ever 
look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely that oppression and 
racism are inequalities that must never find scope in our political and social system.  It could 
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never be a correct justification that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had 
power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power.  An evil remains an evil 
whether practised by white against black or black against white.”749  These words echoed the call 
for national unity that Mugabe had issued on March 4, the day on which British officials 
announced that he had won a sweeping electoral victory.  “There is no intention on our part to 
use the advantage of the majority we have secured today…to…victimize the minority,” Mugabe 
had pledged on that occasion.  “We will ensure that there is a place in this country for 
everybody.”750   
 This Robert Mugabe seemed a completely different man than the guerrilla leader whom 
many whites had come to regard as “the apostle of Satan.”  During the bush war, he had insisted 
on the need for a one-party state, pledged that Ian Smith and his “criminal gang” would be tried 
and shot, maintained that private industry would be abolished, and declared that the white 
“exploiters” would be kicked off their land.  Once elected, however, Mugabe rapidly changed his 
tune.  According to one CIA report, the Prime Minister-elect was “keenly sensitive to the need to 
maintain white confidence” and acted accordingly.751  He abandoned his plans for 
nationalization, promised that his government would not attempt to redistribute white-owned 
lands, and allowed the whites to retain several key cabinet positions.  He invited Joshua Nkomo 
to join him in a government of national unity and, to everyone’s surprise, struck up a rapport 
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with Ian Smith.  In an unexpected display of goodwill, the former enemies walked side-by-side 
into the Zimbabwean House of Assembly when it opened on May 15.
752
   
Such displays of moderation and tolerance surprised many of Mugabe’s countrymen.  
“We were really worried,” explained one white farmer.  “But now, Mr. Mugabe…has shattered 
us all by his reasonableness [sic].  He’s absolutely marvelous.”753  Many white Zimbabweans 
began to wonder if life under Mugabe might not be as bad as the Rhodesian Front’s propaganda 
machine had predicted it would be.  Many Westerners shared this sense of cautious optimism.  
Indeed, South African envoys throughout Western Europe and North America reported that the 
Zimbabwean election results had been accepted “with equanimity and even pleasure.”754  Much 
to the chagrin of the apartheid regime, most of the Western world seemed willing to give Robert 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe a chance.755  Even Ian Smith was forced to admit that his former bête noire 
was doing an impressive job and that “things could turn out better than we had originally 
thought” if Mugabe continued down the path he was on.756 
 Life greatly improved for the Zimbabwean people in the years after independence.  
Despite the ravages of war, the country was well positioned to prosper.  It possessed a wealth of 
natural resources, a developed economy, a larger black middle class than any other African 
nation had enjoyed at the time of independence, and an unprecedented number of skilled 
laborers.  Moreover, Zimbabwe was one of the few nations in southern Africa capable of 
producing enough food to feed its people.  “You have inherited a jewel,” Tanzanian President 
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Julius Nyerere told his Zimbabwean counterpart.
757
  With the end of the Chimurenga, the 
economy grew by leaps and bounds (an estimated 24% in two years).
758
  Western donors rushed 
to provide the fledgling nation with economic aid, and a wave of foreign workers arrived to help 
rebuild the country.  “We are the darling of the world,” an elated Mugabe told an audience of 
white farmers.
759
  Black Zimbabweans benefitted from Mugabe’s initiatives to provide free 
health care and primary education, to increase the minimum wage, and to train black civil 
servants.  By 1990, 70% of black Zimbabweans were attending high school (as compared to 2% 
before independence); the country’s literacy rate had risen to 92% (the highest on the continent); 
and health care facilities had multiplied to the point that many rural Zimbabweans were able to 
walk to the nearest clinic.
760
  With Mugabe at the helm, the country seemed poised to achieve 
great things.   
  
An International Success Story 
The Zimbabwean people were not the only ones who regarded Robert Mugabe’s 
ascension to the prime ministership as cause for celebration.  It was also seen as a triumph for the 
developing world – most notably for the Frontline States, the Commonwealth, and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU).  While previous accounts of the Rhodesian crisis have 
tended to focus on the guerrilla war or Western attempts at mediation, this dissertation has 
sought to demonstrate the important role that the Frontline States, the Commonwealth, and the 
                                                          
757
 Quoted in Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns, 15. 
758
 Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns, 46. 
759
 Zimbabwe received nearly £900 million in aid in its first year of independence alone.  Meredith, Our Votes, Our 
Guns, 46-47. 
760
 Holland, Dinner with Mugabe, xx; Peter Godwin, The Fear: Robert Mugabe and the Martyrdom of Zimbabwe, 
(New York: Little, Brown, and Company: 2010): 323. 
225 
 
OAU played in the search for Zimbabwean independence.
761
  As demonstrated in Chapter One, 
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda tirelessly lobbied the United Kingdom and the United States 
to use their clout to topple the Rhodesian Front.  Although these efforts did not immediately bear 
fruit, Kaunda’s persistence was rewarded in 1976 when the Americans finally decided to assume 
a leadership role in the search for Zimbabwean independence.  As demonstrated in Chapter Five, 
the Frontline Presidents, the Commonwealth, and the OAU used the threat of economic reprisals 
and the severance of diplomatic relations to convince Margaret Thatcher not to accept the 
“internal settlement.”  Moreover, the bush war which ultimately forced Smith to abdicate would 
not have been possible without the assistance of the Frontline Presidents and the OAU’s 
Liberation Committee.  However, this support was not entirely one-sided.  As noted in Chapter 
Five, the Frontline Presidents insisted that Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo attend the 
Lancaster House conference and strong-armed the guerrilla leaders into participating in British-
sponsored elections.   
The Carter Administration also regarded Mugabe’s election as a success for its human 
rights policy.  Having grown up in the heart of Dixie, Jimmy Carter had been committed to the 
cause of African majority rule since his inauguration.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that a 
profound sense of triumphalism was evident during Mugabe’s first state visit to Washington.  A 
crowd of several hundred Americans (including government officials, business leaders, and civil 
rights activists) crammed into the East Room to meet with the Zimbabwean leader.  Carter 
waxed rhapsodic about Zimbabwe’s potential and its leader.  “Your nation has been blessed by 
very fine natural resources; mineral deposits not even yet explored, certainly not exploited; 
productive land, the potential of which has not nearly been reached; eager, well-trained, highly 
                                                          
761
 Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985) and Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe's Guerilla War: Peasant Voices, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
226 
 
motivated people who want to work in a sense of peace for future progress,” the President 
remarked.  But even more important than Zimbabwe’s untapped riches was the idealism of its 
people.  “I think the greatness of any nation is measured not just in…what it possesses, but what 
it stands for,” Carter told his Zimbabwean counterpart.  “And I'm very proud…to realize that the 
principles and ideals of our two countries, as exemplified by you and your new government, are 
very similar, perhaps even identical.”762  As these remarks indicate, the President saw Zimbabwe 
as a powerful ally in his global human rights campaign.   
Carter was also aware that Mugabe’s election had important Cold War implications at a 
time when the Soviets and their allies seemed to be on the march in the developing world.  First 
and foremost, it brought the Chimurenga to an end, thereby ensuring that the Soviets and Cubans 
would not replicate their Angolan triumph.  Moreover, Mugabe had few ties to Moscow, which 
had backed Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) rather than his 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) throughout the bush war.  US officials hoped that 
this would prevent Zimbabwe from establishing good relations with Moscow.  And, indeed, this 
is exactly what happened in the early months of 1980.  Mugabe denounced the Soviet Union for 
seeking to keep the nations it provided with aid in thralldom, rejected a Soviet military assistance 
package, and refused to allow the Russians to open an embassy in Salisbury.
763
  While US 
officials expected Zimbabwe to follow a more non-aligned path in the future, these actions 
suggested that Mugabe saw the West as his closest ally and would be very cautious in dealing 
with the Eastern bloc.   
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This dissertation has focused on Cold War considerations for two reasons.  The first is 
that scholars of the Rhodesian crisis have tended to overlook the ways in which the re-emergence 
of East-West tensions in the late-1970s influenced Jimmy Carter’s African policy.  The second 
reason is that scholars in recent years have written extensively about the ways in which the Cold 
War affected the decolonization process in Africa.
764
  In general, they have concluded that the 
relationship was harmful to colonized peoples who were seeking to cast off the yoke of European 
imperialism.
765
  Historian Donal Lowry has demonstrated that anti-communism was central to 
the Rhodesian Front’s staying power.  Because many Rhodesians saw Robert Mugabe, Joshua 
Nkomo, and their ilk as communist-inspired rabble-rousers, Lowry argues, they failed to take the 
nationalists’ grievances seriously.  This left armed struggle as the only means of achieving 
majority rule in Rhodesia.
766
  According to historian John Daniel, a similar dynamic was at work 
in South Africa.
767
   
Generally speaking, American policymakers also had difficulty adapting to the demise of 
the colonial order and the emergence of dozens of states that were more interested in economic 
development and the ending of white rule than in the clash between the superpowers.  US 
officials were quick to spot a communist conspiracy behind third world uprisings, and nationalist 
                                                          
764
 See, for instance, Thomas Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 
1948-1968, (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the 
Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Sue 
Onslow, ed., Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, (London: Routledge, 2009); Piero 
Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2002); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making 
of Our Times, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The 
United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998, (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 2001); and Vladimir Shubin, The 
Hot Cold War: The USSR in Southern Africa, (London: Pluto Press, 2008).  
765
 Sue Onslow has argued that the Cold War “intensified and prolonged the struggle between the remaining white 
minorities in power and black nationalist movements.”  Onslow, “Introduction,” in Cold War in Southern Africa, 1, 
241.  See also, Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 269 and Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, 253.    
766
 Donal Lowry, “The Impact of Anti-Communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 1920-1980,” Cold 
War History, vol. 7, no. 2 (May 2007): 169-194. 
767
 John Daniel, “Racism, the Cold War, and South Africa’s Regional Security Strategies,” in ed. Sue Onslow, Cold 
War in Southern Africa, 35-54. 
228 
 
leaders who attempted to remain neutral in the US-Soviet struggle were frequently portrayed as 
Soviet pawns.  Fearing that the “loss” of any country to the communist bloc could undermine 
American credibility and set the dominos in motion, US officials looked to remove leaders who 
seemed susceptible to Moscow’s siren song.  Overtly or covertly, they sought to topple perceived 
enemies such as Mohammad Mossadeq in Iran, Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala, and Fidel Castro in 
Cuba.  Conversely, they supported right-wing strongmen such as the Shah of Iran, Ngô Dình 
Diệm in South Vietnam, and the Somoza family in Nicaragua because, for all their flaws, they 
were seen as allies in the struggle against communism. 
The dynamic was no different in sub-Saharan Africa.  Many of the elite white males 
responsible for crafting America’s foreign policy carried racialist assumptions about black 
Africans.
768
  They fretted that “primitive” and “emotional” African leaders would be susceptible 
to communist subversion.  By contrast, the colonial powers and the South Africans were seen as 
“rational” actors who would keep the communists at bay.  Thus, despite the anti-colonial rhetoric 
of such documents as the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter, successive US 
administrations were reluctant to embrace African nationalism.  While many US officials 
recognized that black Africa would achieve independence at some point, they favored a gradual 
transition to majority rule.  They were especially concerned that if black Africans gained 
independence before they were “prepared,” they would not exercise it “responsibly.”  Whatever 
else they may have meant by this term, US officials were first and foremost concerned that post-
colonial nations remain aligned with the Western bloc.
769
  Although this attitude was most 
prevalent during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, it persisted well into the 1980s. 
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In addition to racialist assumptions, these concerns about “premature independence” 
reflected a lack of knowledge about sub-Saharan Africa.  According to historian James 
Meriwether, few African Americans had an accurate understanding of what Africa was like in 
the immediate post-World War II era.
770
  The elite white men in the White House and the State 
Department tended to be even less knowledgeable about the continent and its affairs.  The Africa 
they imagined was something straight out of a Tarzan movie – a mysterious land filled with 
jungles, cannibals, witchcraft, and wild animals.
771
  Given their ignorance about Africa, it should 
come as little surprise that US officials repeatedly confused the continent’s territories, mistaking 
Niger for Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia for South Africa, and (in a true feat of geographic 
ineptitude) Tunisia for Indonesia.
772
  The situation remained largely unchanged until the State 
Department established a bureau to deal specifically with African affairs in 1958.  Prior to that, 
African matters had been handled by the State Department’s European Bureau – a clear 
indication that US officials continued to regard African territories as colonial possessions rather 
than future members of the international community. 
Even as the “wind of change” began to sweep across Africa, the continent received little 
attention from those at the upper echelons in Washington.  In large part this was because it 
remained relatively devoid of Soviet intrigue.  With periodic exceptions (most notably the crisis 
in the Congo), sub-Saharan Africa remained, in the words of one recent study, “a distant front in 
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the Cold War.”773  Because the Soviets seemed incapable of winning hearts and minds in black 
Africa, US officials saw little need to alter their policy of offering rhetorical support for majority 
rule while attempting to maintain sound relations with the colonial powers and apartheid South 
Africa.  
While this approach may seem cynical, it illustrates the difficulties American statesmen 
faced in balancing geostrategic considerations with democratic ideals.  Indeed, there were a 
number of US officials who regarded white rule as immoral and sympathized with black 
Africans’ aspirations for self-determination.774  Unfortunately for those who wished to champion 
majority rule in Africa, geostrategic and geopolitical concerns hindered their ability to do so.
775
  
One such concern was economics.  In the early post-war years, the United States was eager to 
see Europe rebuild itself – preferably at minimal cost to the American taxpayer.  American 
corporations needed new markets, and a crippled Europe could not provide them.  Many in the 
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations hoped that the riches of their empires would help the 
colonial powers recover from the devastation wrought by World War II.
776
  US officials were 
also hesitant to offend their NATO allies by criticizing their colonial policies.  And, of course, 
the United States was hardly in a position to assail other nations for their handling of racial 
issues at a time when Jim Crow remained in full force.
777
  Other practicalities further muddled 
the situation.  For example, US officials were eager to stay on good terms with the Portuguese so 
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that they could retain access to the military base located in the Azores.  Similarly, South Africa 
was seen as a strategically and economically important partner despite its apartheid policies.
778
  
These factors compelled US officials to walk a fine line between condemning white rule in 
Africa and condoning immediate majority rule.
779
   
Ironically, however, Cold War considerations played a major role in prompting US 
officials to reassess their “middle road” policy in the mid-1970s.  As demonstrated in Chapter 
Two, the Angolan civil war transformed southern Africa into a Cold War hot spot.  After his 
disastrous foray into the Angolan civil war, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger came to 
appreciate that supporting minority regimes was no longer an effective means of containing 
Soviet (and Cuban) expansionism in the region.  To the contrary, nationalist leaders who saw 
America’s gradualist policies as tantamount to supporting white supremacy had begun to look to 
the communist bloc for assistance.  US officials had long feared this possibility, believing that 
violent struggles for majority rule would bring more “radical” nationalist leaders to the fore and 
produce more “radical” states.  In an effort to minimize the opportunities for communist 
involvement in southern Africa, American foreign policymakers hoped “to eliminate violence as 
the vehicle for political change.”780  Henry Kissinger, the self-proclaimed high priest of 
realpolitik, understood this reality only too well.  It was for this reason that he travelled to 
Lusaka in 1976 to proclaim America’s “unrelenting opposition” to minority rule.  
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Cold calculations rather than moral misgivings prompted Kissinger to emerge as a 
champion of majority rule in 1976.  While the Secretary’s conversion may not have been 
heartfelt, it represented an important turning point in US-African relations.  After three decades 
of hedging its bets, the United States had unequivocally aligned itself with black Africans’ quest 
for self-determination.  That it was Henry Kissinger (whose disregard for southern Africa’s black 
population has been well-documented) who delivered this message only serves to underscore the 
centrality of Cold War considerations when it came to US-African relations.  As demonstrated in 
Chapters Three and Four, Jimmy Carter and his chief foreign policy advisers shared Kissinger’s 
concern about the possibility of southern Africa falling into communist hands.  Although 
Carter’s sympathies were more in tune with those of the African people, geostrategic imperatives 
reinforced his desire to resolve the Rhodesian crisis before the communist powers exploited it to 
strengthen their position in southern Africa.
781
  Thus, at least in this instance, Cold War 
considerations prompted the United States to side with a non-white people in their struggle 
against a right-wing, anti-communist regime. 
While the Carter Administration was pleased with the outcome of the Rhodesian crisis, 
many African Americans were elated.  Their joy can be seen in the hero’s welcome that Robert 
Mugabe received when he visited the United States in August 1980.  Thousands of African 
Americans turned out to hear the Prime Minister speak in Harlem.  He received a similar 
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reception when he visited Howard University several days later.
782
  More than 2,000 students 
gathered to catch a glimpse of the man whose army had struck a crippling blow against white 
rule in southern Africa.  “Mugabe, Mugabe,” they chanted as he appeared on stage.  Amid 
tumultuous applause and some black power salutes, Mayor Marion Barry presented the Prime 
Minister with the key to the city.
783
   
These raucous receptions reflect the support that African Americans had provided the 
Zimbabwean cause since 1965.  That black Americans lobbied against minority rule in southern 
Africa should come as no surprise.  A rapidly-growing body of literature has documented the 
ways in which they opposed white supremacy, colonialism, and economic exploitation in the 
post-1945 era.
784
  In the words of Walter White, Executive Secretary of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), “World War II has given the Negro…a sense 
of kinship with the other colored – and also oppressed – peoples of the world.”785  While the 
NAACP (along with organizations such as the National Negro Congress (NNC) and the Civil 
Rights Congress (CRC)) opposed colonial rule the world over, their ancestral ties to Africa led 
black Americans to take a special interest in that continent.  Seeing their own struggle for civil 
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rights as part and parcel of a global quest for racial equality, members of these organizations 
worked to debunk the myth of the “white man’s burden” in the years after World War II, 
documenting how the colonial powers had underdeveloped Africa and exploited its people.   
Some scholars have suggested that African Americans abandoned their internationalist 
agenda during the 1950s.
786
  There is some truth to this argument.  The NAACP leadership took 
a step back in the early 1950s in an effort to preserve the organization’s relationship with the 
Truman Administration and to avoid prosecution by the House Un-American Activities 
Committee (HUAC).
787
  Groups like the CRC, which were more leftward-leaning, fell prey to 
HUAC during the Red Scare of the 1950s.  Nevertheless, African Americans’ relative silence on 
colonial questions during this period should be seen as a strategic retreat rather than an abject 
surrender.  With the passing of McCarthyism and the inspiration provided by pan-Africanist 
leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, African American activists reasserted the connection between the 
Civil Rights movement at home and African independence movements abroad in the late-1950s 
and early-1960s.  New organizations such as the American Negro Leadership Congress on Africa 
(ANLCA) emerged to join the crusade for racial equality.
788
   
However, as historian James Meriwether has pointed out, African American activists 
were confronted with a major challenge in the mid-1960s as a number of African nations (most 
notably, Ghana, the Congo, and Nigeria) became mired in economic recessions, experienced 
mounting political repression, and became embroiled in ethnically-based civil wars.  According 
to Meriwether, groups such as the NAACP and the ANLCA responded by ignoring the problems 
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facing independent African nations and focusing on the injustice of white rule in southern 
Africa.
789
  Indeed, historian Eric Morgan has recently documented how black activists continued 
to protest South Africa’s apartheid policies, urging successive administrations to sever ties with 
Pretoria unless the Afrikaners agreed to scuttle their racially-oppressive policies.
790
  As 
demonstrated in Chapter One, African American activists also protested Ian Smith’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1965.  Many black leaders (including Martin Luther King Junior, 
James Farmer, and Roy Wilkins) recognized that Rhodesian independence would spell disaster 
for the colony’s black population and urged Lyndon Johnson to bring the rebellion to a halt 
before Ian Smith transformed Rhodesia into another South Africa. 
Unfortunately for the people of southern Africa, this pressure did not convince LBJ to 
take drastic measures.  Preoccupied by Vietnam and a spate of other crises, the Johnson 
Administration was content to follow the British lead on Rhodesia.  Despite this inertia, African 
American activists continued to speak out against white rule in southern Africa during the 1960s 
and 1970s.  With the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, a number of African Americans 
were elected to Congress.  Charles Diggs, Andrew Young, and many of their colleagues in the 
Congressional Black Caucus used their positions to attack Richard Nixon’s “do-nothing” African 
policy.
791
  Lobbying groups such as Randall Robinson’s Trans-Africa joined the fray during the 
1970s.
792
  These activists found a sympathetic leader in Jimmy Carter who, not coincidentally, 
had ridden a wave of African American support to the White House.  While Carter and his chief 
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foreign policy advisers were no less concerned about the Cold War implications of the 
Rhodesian crisis than Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger had been, Carter could ill afford to 
ignore what African Americans had to say about his African policies.  Thus, when they 
overwhelmingly objected to recognizing the “internal settlement,” Carter listened.  Robert 
Mugabe was well aware of black activists’ efforts on his behalf as well as their pan-Africanist 
vision.  Thus, when he visited Harlem, Mugabe drew a direct link between their struggle for 
Civil Rights and Zimbabwe’s struggle for majority rule.  “The African people, you and I, refused 
to submit,” Mugabe told his audience, adding that “master and slave have now become 
equals.”793   
British officials also saw Mugabe’s election as a victory of sorts.  Although Margaret 
Thatcher had initially viewed Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo as “terrorists,” she was glad to 
have the Rhodesian crisis behind her.  The Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary earned 
international acclaim for successfully mediating a crisis which many pundits had come to regard 
as intractable.  British officials were also pleasantly surprised by Mugabe’s moderate policies 
and his willingness to let bygones be bygones.  A country assessment sheet compiled by the 
Foreign Office at the end of 1980 praised the Zimbabwean Prime Minister for reaching out to the 
country’s white citizens.  The paper also concluded that although technically non-aligned, 
Zimbabwe’s ties to the West were much stronger than its ties to the Soviet bloc.  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly from Britain’s perspective, because of Mugabe’s “pragmatic” 
economic policies, Zimbabwe was likely to become a valuable trading partner in the near 
future.
794
  Moreover, the successful resolution of the Rhodesian crisis strengthened Britain’s 
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relations with its Commonwealth partners and enabled Thatcher and her Cabinet colleagues to 
focus their energies on more pressing issues. 
The Rhodesian crisis also demonstrated the value of the Anglo-American “special 
relationship.”  Much has been written about the partnership between the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  Scholars and statesmen have long debated how “special” it really is and the 
extent to which it has allowed the British to influence the American foreign policymaking 
process.
795
  The Rhodesian case seems to support John Dumbrell’s “neo-functionalist” model, 
which posits that common interests have comprised the heart of the relationship.  Indeed, by the 
mid-1970s, both nations saw it as in their interest to facilitate Rhodesia’s transition to majority 
rule as quickly as possible.  Although the Americans were more concerned about Cold War 
considerations than were their British counterparts, the transatlantic allies worked together to 
bring the crisis to an end.  Henry Kissinger managed to force Ian Smith to publicly accept the 
need for majority rule within two years – thereby reassuring the Frontline Presidents that a 
negotiated settlement remained within reach at a moment when the Presidents were coming to 
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regard armed struggle as the only path to majority rule in Rhodesia.  The Carter Administration 
picked up where Kissinger had left off, launching a series of Anglo-American initiatives.  
Although these initiatives failed to bring the crisis to an end, they kept the door open for the 
negotiated settlement that Margaret Thatcher and Peter Carrington brokered in December 1979.  
Although the transatlantic allies did not always see eye-to-eye, British officials recognized that 
American support had been “indispensable” in bringing the Rhodesian crisis to an end.796 
 
The Demise of the Lancaster House Order 
Unfortunately for the people of Zimbabwe, the halcyon days of 1980 would not last.  In 
recent years, scholars have focused on Mugabe’s efforts to thwart democratic change, clinging to 
power through the use of fraud and violence.
797
  Peter Godwin, a Zimbabwean expatriate, has 
recently published a chilling account of Mugabe’s efforts to steal the 2008 election from Morgan 
Tsvangirai and his party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).  According to Godwin, 
after the MDC narrowly outpolled ZANU-PF in the initial round of balloting, ZANU-PF officials 
unleashed a wave of murder, torture, and rape designed to cow opponents prior to the run-off 
vote.  The atrocities Godwin catalogues are not for the faint of heart.  Thousands of those who 
dared to vote for the MDC were beaten, burned, castrated, and worse.  According to the author, 
the Zimbabwean people have dubbed this campaign chidudu, which means, simply, “the fear.”798   
Unfortunately for the Zimbabwean people, such tactics are nothing new for Mugabe.  
During the 1980 electoral campaign, he and his supporters used violence and intimidation to 
                                                          
796
 Minute, Nigel Sheinwald to P.J. Barlow and Derek Day, “Dispatch: US Policy towards Rhodesia, May 1979 to 
April 1980,” May 22, 1980, FCO 36/2751, TNA. 
797
 See, for instance, The Association for Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) Bulletin, no. 79 (Spring 2008), 
http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/acasbulletin79.pdf and no. 80 (Winter 2008), 
http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/acasbulletin80.pdf. 
798
 Godwin, The Fear, 109.  
239 
 
ensure that rural Zimbabweans voted “the right way.”  Many were told that unless ZANU-PF 
won the election, Mugabe would return to the bush and resume the war.  Others were told that if 
they failed to vote for ZANU-PF, they would be killed.
799
  Mugabe’s opponents were prevented 
from campaigning in the country’s Shona-speaking eastern provinces, and more than a few of 
those who attempted to do so were abducted and never seen or heard from again.
800
  By February 
1980, Christopher Soames, the British Governor responsible for overseeing the elections, was 
sending a steady stream of cables to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office detailing the 
“systematic campaign of violence and intimidation being conducted by ZANU (PF) throughout 
the eastern provinces.”  In the Governor’s mind, this “campaign of terror” was providing ZANU 
with “a wholly unfair advantage over its rivals.”801  It was only Britain’s desire to remove the 
Rhodesian albatross from around its neck that prevented Soames from disqualifying ZANU-PF 
in certain regions of the country.
802
   
Time and again, Mugabe and his ZANU-PF colleagues have resorted to violence in an 
effort to preserve their grip on power.  In 1983, they unleashed a special North Korean-trained 
paramilitary force (known as the Fifth Brigade) against supporters of Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU 
party.  Using the pretext of rural lawlessness, Mugabe dispatched the Fifth Brigade to 
Matabeleland (the Ndebele-speaking region from which ZAPU drew its support) in January 
1983.  From the moment the troops arrived, they waged a campaign of violence so savage that 
one journalist has described it as “far worse than anything that had occurred during the 
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Rhodesian war.”803  More than 2,000 civilians were killed in the span of six weeks.  Thousands 
more were tortured and driven from their homes.  The campaign, known as Operation 
Gukurahundi (“the rain that washes away the chaff”), continued for four years, until ZAPU’s 
back had been broken.  By that time, some 20,000 Zimbabweans (mostly Ndebele and Kalanga) 
had been killed.  Countless others had been tortured, maimed, and chased into exile.  Mugabe’s 
henchmen made little attempt to cover up their involvement in the genocide.  “ZANU-PF rules 
this country,” remarked police chief Enos Nkala, “and anyone who disputes that is a dissident 
and should be dealt with.”804   
And so they have been.  Every time Mugabe and his inner circle have sensed their grip on 
power beginning to slip away, they have responded with brutal force.  By 2000, party officials 
had come to regard the country’s white population as the greatest threat to their power.  On 
February 26, they initiated their infamous “fast-track” land reform program.  In essence, “land 
reform” consisted of chasing white farmers – who had produced more than 90% of Zimbabwe’s 
maize (the country’s main staple) and almost all of the country’s export crops – from their land.  
The result has been nothing short of catastrophic, as a country which once served as the 
breadbasket of southern Africa has been ravaged by famine.
805
  The famine and subsequent 
economic collapse triggered a mass exodus of doctors, teachers, and skilled laborers, which sent 
the country into a tailspin from which it has yet to recover.
806
  As a result, Mugabe and his 
ministers now preside over a nation pockmarked by hyperinflation, the near complete collapse of 
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its infrastructure, and a myriad of pandemics including malnutrition, malaria, cholera, and 
AIDS.
807
   
Tempting as it may be to do so, Zimbabwe’s woes cannot all be blamed on one man (not 
even a “strongman” like Robert Mugabe).  Even many of Mugabe’s critics recognize that the 
prime minister faced a number of daunting challenges upon assuming office in 1980.  Perhaps 
the most vexing of these was the issue of “land reform.”  As noted in Chapter Five, the Lancaster 
House agreement sought to ensure that the Zimbabwean government did not confiscate white-
owned farms after independence.  While the British regarded this provision as vital to preventing 
a white exodus, it crystalized a situation in which a few thousand white farmers owned a 
disproportionate amount of the country’s best farmland.  Given that the unequal distribution of 
land had played a major role in fuelling the Chimurenga, it is widely acknowledged that the 
Lancaster House arrangement was not sustainable.
808
  Political scientist Mahmood Mamdani has 
recently suggested that although the methods employed were harsh, the “land redistribution” 
initiatives of the early 2000s were well-received by many Zimbabweans.
809
  A number of 
scholars have disputed this claim, yet even the least sympathetic among them have 
acknowledged that some segments of society viewed the farm invasions in a favorable light.  
“Mahmood Mamdani is correct to stress that Robert Mugabe is not just a crazed dictator or a 
corrupt thug,” historian Terence Ranger wrote in 2009, “but that he promotes a programme and 
                                                          
807
 See, for instance, New York Times, “Robert Mugabe vs. Zimbabwe,” October 21, 2009. 
808
 Both critics and supporters of the “fast-track” land reform policies agree that there was a genuine need for land 
redistribution in Zimbabwe.  See Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe,” London Review of Books, vol. 30, 
no. 4 (December 2008): 1-14 and the response by Timothy Scarnecchia et al, “Letters,” London Review of Books, 
vol. 31, no. 1 January 1, 2009): 19-21, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n23/mahmood-mamdani/lessons-of-zimbabwe.       
809
 “The people of Zimbabwe are likely to remember 2000-3 [the years when the last remaining white farmers were 
driven from their land] as the…the dawn of true independence” and “the end of the settler colonial era,” Mamdani 
wrote in 2008.  Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe,” 2.  The article touched off a storm of protest.  See, for instance, 
eds. Sean Jacobs and Jacob Mundy, “Reflections on Mahmood Mamdani’s Lessons of Zimbabwe,” ACAS Bulletin, 
no. 82 (Summer 2009): 1-63, http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/acasbulletin82.pdf    
242 
 
an ideology that are attractive to many in Africa and some in Zimbabwe itself.”810  Cast in this 
light, Mugabe comes across less as an out-of-control despot than as a nationalist leader trying to 
redress the most egregious shortcomings of the Lancaster House agreement.   
Some scholars have also suggested that Mugabe’s influence has been less pronounced in 
recent years than many outsiders appreciate.  For instance, Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros have 
asserted that the land occupations of the early 2000s were not orchestrated by ZANU-PF elites, 
but rather, by a group of impoverished Zimbabweans unwilling to tolerate the white 
community’s continued dominance of the agricultural sector.  It was not until 2003, they argue, 
that ZANU-PF officials decided to co-opt the movement.
811
  In this respect, Moyo and Yeros are 
in agreement with Mamdani, who has asserted that a group of land-hungry war veterans initiated 
the farm invasions against Mugabe’s wishes.812  In a similar vein, some scholars have questioned 
Mugabe’s role in the violence that followed the March 2008 elections.  Political scientist Norma 
Kriger is among those who have suggested that Operation Mavhoterapapi (which translates to 
“where did you put your ‘x’?” or “how did you vote?”) was initiated by ZANU-PF hawks rather 
than by Mugabe himself.
813
  Although these claims remain hotly-contested, they serve as a 
reminder that Zimbabwe’s problems run deeper than the country’s octogenarian leader and his 
determination to hold onto power.  Indeed, Mugabe is hardly the only African leader to be 
afflicted from what political scientists have described as “big man syndrome.”814   
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Given the chaos which has enveloped Zimbabwe, few now regard the diplomatic process 
which enabled ZANU-PF to seize power as a resounding success.  To the contrary, the country’s 
downward spiral has spawned a veritable cottage industry as journalists, scholars, and pundits 
have attempted to answer the question: “what went wrong in Zimbabwe?”815  Some critics – most 
notably Ian Smith – seem to revel in ZANU-PF’s missteps.816  While such criticism is to be 
expected from the former Rhodesian Prime Minister, some black Zimbabweans have joined 
Smith in mourning the passing of his white-supremacist regime.  “When the country changed 
from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, we were very excited,” one man recently told a New York Times 
reporter.  “But we didn’t realize the ones we chased away were better and the ones we put in 
power would oppress us.”  Another Zimbabwean expressed similar sentiments.  “It would have 
been better if whites had continued to rule,” he opined.  “It was better under Rhodesia.  Then we 
could get jobs.  Things were cheaper in stores.  Now we have no money, no food.”817  This 
opinion is far from universally held, but it is hard to imagine a stronger indictment of 
Zimbabwe’s current plight than the fact that some of those individuals whom the Rhodesian 
Front deprived of their most basic rights and liberties now yearn for the days of minority rule. 
While it is difficult to do, historians must strive to avoid taking a teleological approach 
when studying the Rhodesian crisis, the Lancaster House settlement, and the country’s 1980 
election.  For, as previously demonstrated, many people (both inside Zimbabwe and around the 
world) hailed the process which brought Mugabe to power as a resounding success for African 
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nationalism and a major blow against white rule in southern Africa.
818
  Reggae icon Bob Marley, 
who performed at Zimbabwe’s independence ceremony shortly before succumbing to a 
malignant form of melanoma, took this view.  In his song “Zimbabwe,” Marley congratulated 
those who had played a role in liberating Zimbabwe and urged them to put aside their differences 
for the good of their country.  Many Westerners shared this hopeful vision.  They praised the 
Lancaster House agreement and the popular election of a black prime minister.  While some 
doubts about Mugabe’s newfound moderation lingered, the worst case scenario of a black-white 
showdown seemed to have been averted.  And with the end of the bush war, many hoped that a 
stable and prosperous Zimbabwe would encourage the South African government to begin 
dismantling apartheid.
819
   
None of this analysis should be seen as an excuse for Mugabe’s disastrous economic 
policies and human rights violations.  Nor is it meant to argue that the Lancaster House 
agreement was perfect.  Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Zimbabwe’s fate was not 
preordained.  The country was dealt a difficult hand, but historical contingency has played an 
important role in its demise.  Millions of Zimbabwean freely cast their ballot for Robert Mugabe 
in 1980, and amid the independence festivities, a sense of possibility pervaded the country.  
“There was a charged atmosphere of possibility,” one white Zimbabwean later recalled.  “We 
would show the world just what could be achieved in Africa’s newest independent nation.”820  
The Christian Science Monitor was similarly optimistic about Zimbabwe’s prospects.  The 
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situation there was enough to “put a glow in the heart when one considers the strife out of which 
Zimbabwe was born,” one article concluded.821  That these expectations have not been realized is 
the true “tragedy of Zimbabwe.” 
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Conclusion 
In introducing Henry Kissinger on April 27, 1976, Zambian Foreign Secretary Rupiah 
Banda noted that it was his country’s “fervent hope” that the United States would “identify 
herself more positively with the oppressed peoples of southern Africa” and join the search for a 
Rhodesian settlement.
822
  The Foreign Secretary’s comment clearly reflected Kenneth Kaunda’s 
belief that the United States was the only power capable of mediating the Rhodesian crisis before 
it spiraled out of control.  This conviction helps to explain the Zambian President’s emotional 
response to Kissinger’s Lusaka Address; Kaunda was overjoyed that the Americans had finally 
decided to support the Zimbabwean cause after a decade of sitting on the fence.  Henry Kissinger 
was hardly the white knight Kaunda had envisioned.  Nevertheless, he hoped that the Secretary’s 
Lusaka Address would mark the beginning of the end of the Rhodesian crisis.     
But had the Zambians miscalculated by pinning their hopes on American intervention?  
In a sense, they had.  For, as this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate, the United States was 
just one of the actors that helped to defuse the Rhodesian crisis.  Moreover, the United States 
was far from the most important player in the mediation process.  As demonstrated in Chapter 
Five, the Americans exercised virtually no influence over the 1979 Heads of Commonwealth 
Meeting and were only minor players during the Lancaster House negotiations.  This may 
explain why few scholars have focused on the role that America played in facilitating Rhodesia’s 
transition from minority rule to majority rule.  In another respect, however, the American 
contribution was a significant one.  Between 1976 and 1979, the Ford and Carter Administrations 
helped to convince African leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda, Samora Machel, and Julius Nyerere 
that a negotiated settlement remained within reach.  By doing so, US officials helped to prevent 
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southern Africa from sliding into an all-out race war that almost certainly would have prevented 
an agreement from being reached.  Put another way, America’s contribution to the Zimbabwean 
cause was not its ability to resolve the crisis but rather its ability to buy time for others to do so.   
Interestingly, there were a number of US officials viewed who viewed the Rhodesian 
crisis as a British problem and would have preferred to let the British handle it on their own.  As 
Robert Komer, a high-ranking member of the Johnson Administration opined in a December 
1965 memorandum to the President, “There’s no doubt that we ought to duck this mess if we can 
afford to, leaving it to the British or others.  We already have enough even larger problems on 
our plate.  But can we?”823   
For a myriad of reasons, “ducking” the crisis did not prove to be a realistic option.  One 
reason for this was domestic politics.  In recent years, a number of historians of American 
foreign relations have emphasized the interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign 
policymaking.  All seem to be in agreement that politics do not, in fact, stop at the water’s 
edge.
824
  This was certainly the case during the Rhodesian crisis.  As we have seen, domestic 
political considerations helped to shape America’s Rhodesian policy – especially during the 
presidencies of Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter.  A number of prominent African Americans 
saw the Rhodesian crisis as an opportunity for their country to reaffirm its commitment to racial 
equality.  Although Johnson and Carter were personally sympathetic toward the Zimbabweans’ 
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plight, their support for the Zimbabwean cause was hardly rooted in altruism.  To the contrary, 
both men believed that supporting majority rule in southern Africa would translate into more 
black votes come election time. 
While the domestic angle cannot be ignored, it should not be overemphasized either.  For 
although many African Americans urged US officials to back the Zimbabweans in their struggle 
for majority rule, there were powerful countervailing forces at work.  A number of influential 
Americans (including former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Senator Harry Byrd Junior, and 
presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan) sought to ensure that Ian Smith and his white supporters 
retained an inordinate amount of power in Rhodesia.  At times, they were able to marshal a 
considerable degree of grassroots support.
825
  Despite these periodic bouts of interest, however, it 
is unlikely that many Americans lost much sleep worrying about Rhodesia.  During the course of 
his African shuttle diplomacy, Henry Kissinger frequently told interlocutors that most Americans 
had never heard of such places as Rhodesia, which he quipped, “[T]hey probably think…is a 
country club on the way from New York to Westchester Country.”826  Polls tended to confirm 
Kissinger’s dim view of the American public’s knowledge of sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting 
that even many African Americans were not particularly well-informed about developments 
there.
827
  As a black-white issue, the Rhodesian crisis had the ability to incite passions.  
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Nevertheless, most Americans remained much more concerned about domestic issues than they 
did about what was happening in faraway Rhodesia. 
Given that Rhodesia’s fate was not a major concern for most Americans, it seems fair to 
conclude that US officials were probably more concerned about the geopolitical and geostrategic 
implications of the Rhodesian crisis than they were about its domestic impact.  More than 
anything, they were concerned about the possibility of the Chimurenga igniting a race war in 
southern Africa and about how African leaders would view the US response to Ian Smith’s 
unilateral declaration of independence.  As one member of the Johnson Administration surmised 
in a memorandum to the President, “Rhodesia itself isn’t very important to us.  But the point is 
that it’s critical to all the other Africans.  They see it as a straight anti-colonial issue, and their 
anti-white instincts are aroused.  So our stance on this issue will greatly affect our influence 
throughout Africa – it will be a test of whether we mean what we say about self-determination 
and racialism.”828  At a time when they were trying to gain as many allies as possible in their 
contest against the Soviet Union, US officials hoped to avoid alienating nations in the developing 
world (particularly in Africa) by overtly or tacitly supporting the Rhodesian rebels.   
This brings us to the heart of the matter – namely, that US policymakers were deeply 
conscious of Cold War considerations as they crafted their Rhodesian policy.  (For that matter, 
they were extremely aware of Cold War considerations as they crafted their African policy more 
generally – especially after the Congo crisis of the early 1960s).829  For although the Cold War 
was primarily fought in Europe and Asia between 1945 and 1975, US officials were determined 
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to preserve the Western bloc’s position in sub-Saharan Africa.830  The Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations had hoped that America’s European allies would be able to prevent communism 
from taking root in Africa, but by the 1960s, as the continent began to emerge from colonial rule, 
it became apparent that the United States would either have to develop a more proactive African 
policy or risk “losing” the continent to the communist powers.831  After Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev pledged to assist "wars of national liberation throughout the world” in 1961, 
American foreign policymakers became convinced that the Soviets were looking to exploit racial 
conflicts in southern Africa in order to carve out their own sphere of influence in the region.
832
   
These fears of communist penetration were compounded by the assumption that African 
leaders were particularly vulnerable to communist subversion because they were politically 
“naïve” and unduly “emotional.”  This racially-informed attitude is evident in the comments of 
one of Lyndon Johnson’s top aides, who warned that unless the Western powers took decisive 
action to quell the Rhodesian rebellion, they risked losing control of the situation to “a gaggle of 
irresponsible Africans, perhaps with Soviet support.”833  This comment speaks not only to 
American concerns about Soviet involvement in southern Africa, but it probably also reflects a 
deeply-rooted racial hierarchy which placed Anglo-Europeans at the top and black Africans at 
the bottom.
834
  In order to prevent “irresponsible” African leaders from acting “precipitously,” 
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US officials recognized that the West would need to engineer a solution to the Rhodesian crisis 
that brought a “moderate” black regime to power.  They hoped the British would be able to 
achieve this feat, but once it became clear that the British were not up to the task, US officials 
became more directly involved in the mediation efforts.  Thus, even in an area widely regarded 
as “a distant front in the Cold War,” American foreign policymakers could not escape the logic 
of the containment policy.  
 
African Agency and the Rhodesian Crisis 
While this dissertation has focused at length on America’s role in mediating the 
Rhodesian crisis, it has also sought to highlight the critical role that African statesmen played in 
this process.  That African leaders played an important role in shaping the future of their 
continent should come as no surprise to scholars.  After all, scholars have documented the many 
ways in which Africans resisted and ultimately undermined European colonial rule.
835
  While a 
number of scholars have examined the role that the Zimbabwean guerrillas played in bringing 
minority rule in Rhodesia to an end, the contributions of statesmen such as Kenneth Kaunda, 
Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere, and Olusegun Obasanjo have often gone unrecognized.
836
  This 
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historical blind spot is difficult to explain since contemporary journalists were not shy about 
acknowledging the crucial role that Frontline Presidents and their colleagues in the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) played in facilitating Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule.837  In an 
effort to demonstrate the international nature of the search for Zimbabwean independence, this 
dissertation has attempted to at least partially rectify this omission. 
As we have seen, the Frontline Presidents, the Commonwealth, and the OAU called upon 
the Western powers to crush the Rhodesian rebellion beginning in 1965.  Because the British and 
their American allies never sent troops to Rhodesia, most scholars have deemed these calls 
impractical and ineffective.  However, these assumptions must be questioned in light of recently-
declassified archival materials.  Members of the Johnson and Carter administrations feared that 
African leaders would regard their handling of the Rhodesian crisis as inadequate.  And if 
American policymakers were worried about this possibility, the British (whose economic 
investments and Commonwealth ties meant that Africa was far more important to the United 
Kingdom than it was to the United States) were downright terrified about it.  Although Harold 
Wilson opted to pursue a policy of economic sanctions, recently-declassified documents reveal 
that some British officials urged military intervention in Rhodesia if the only alternative was a 
break in relations with most of black Africa.
838
  Although sanctions were initially ineffective, 
they at least marked Rhodesia as a pariah state and ensured that the rebellious colony would not 
be recognized as a legitimate member of the international community.  In this sense, while 
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Kenneth Kaunda and his African colleagues failed to convince the British and Americans to 
drive Ian Smith and his followers from power, they were able to ensure that Rhodesia did not 
become “another South Africa” (i.e., an internationally-recognized apartheid state). 
African statesmen further contributed to the Zimbabwean cause by providing public 
support, weapons, and safe havens for the Zimbabwean guerrillas.  Although this dissertation has 
not focused explicitly on the Chimurenga, it was the bush war more than any other single factor 
which brought Rhodesia’s white-supremacist leaders to the negotiating table.  Ian Smith and his 
followers were not about to voluntarily cede power, and Britain was in no position to bludgeon 
them into doing so.  It is therefore unlikely that the Rhodesian Front would have agreed to 
relinquish power if not for the bush war.  But while much has been written about the guerrillas, 
less attention has been paid to the price that the Frontline Presidents (most notably, Kenneth 
Kaunda and Samora Machel) paid for allowing ZANU and ZAPU to operate out of their 
countries.  Rhodesian raids (such as the one on Nyadzonya) could be devastating, and the 
guerrillas eventually wore out their welcome.  For these reasons, it should come as no surprise 
that Kaunda and Machel’s steadfast support for the Chimurenga caused their domestic support to 
dwindle over time.  Thus, while recognizing the important role that the Zimbabwean guerrillas 
played in bringing majority rule to Rhodesia, it is also important to recognize the sacrifices that 
the Frontline Presidents made on their behalf. 
In addition to supporting the Chimurenga, African statesmen used their diplomatic and 
economic leverage to facilitate a Rhodesian settlement in 1979.  Shortly after Ian Smith broke 
with the British in 1965, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah bemoaned the Commonwealth’s 
inability to convince Britain to impose majority rule at gunpoint.  “[I]t is very doubtful if 
effective pressure can…be brought to bear against Britain by the Commonwealth on the 
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Southern Rhodesian issue,” he lamented in a letter to his Nigerian counterpart.839  While 
frustrated over Britain’s refusal to use force, Nkrumah’s pessimism was largely unjustified.  Not 
only did African pressure compel British officials to assume a more confrontational position vis-
à-vis the Rhodesian Front than they otherwise would have done, but Nigeria’s oil wealth enabled 
General Obasanjo to convince Margaret Thatcher to abandon her support for the “internal 
settlement” in 1979.  The Frontline Presidents also applied considerable pressure on Robert 
Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo at key moments during the Lancaster House negotiations – all but 
forcing the guerrilla leaders to accept Britain’s final terms.   
Although the Lancaster House agreement has been far from perfect, it was seen as a 
diplomatic coup at the time.  Not only was it expected to prevent the racial conflagration that 
many international commentators had seen as inevitable, but it was also expected to set a 
precedent for change in Namibia and South Africa.  International commentators realized that 
there were key differences the Rhodesian and Namibian cases, yet they maintained that the 
situations were linked “politically and psychologically” and that “a breakthrough on one would 
encourage [the] resolution of the other.”840  Pundits also expected the successful mediation of the 
Rhodesian crisis to “play usefully” in the intense debate that South Africans were conducting 
about their country’s future.841  The search for Zimbabwean independence had been long and 
arduous, but in the end, many international commentators concluded that it had been worth it.  
One particularly-optimistic New York Times article lauded Margaret Thatcher and Jimmy Carter 
for resisting right-wing pressure to recognize the “internal settlement.”  “The success of 
the…[Lancaster House] Conference supports the position of those in America and Britain who 
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have argued that our interest lies in settling African problems in an African, not an East-West 
context,” the author noted.842  While such articles reflect the optimism generated by the 
Lancaster House agreement, they give far too much credit to the British and Americans.  For, as 
this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate, it took the combined efforts of the Organization of 
African Unity, the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, and the United States to finally defuse 
the Rhodesian crisis. 
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